Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Quincy (Quincy) served as trustee of the Adams Temple and School Fund and the Charles Francis Adams Fund (together, the Funds) through two boards. The Woodward School for Girls, Inc. (Woodward) has been the sole income beneficiary of the Funds since 1953. In 2007, Woodward filed suit against Quincy seeking an accounting and asserting that Quincy committed a breach of its fiduciary duties in several respects. A probate and family court judge concluded that Quincy committed a breach of its fiduciary duties by failing to invest in growth securities and failing to heed certain investment advice, removed Quincy as trustee, and ordered Quincy to pay a nearly $3 million judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment as to liability, reversed with respect to the calculation of damages on the unrealized gains, and remanded, holding (1) Woodward’s claims were not barred on the grounds of sovereign immunity, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, or laches; (2) the judgment against Quincy for committing a breach of its fiduciary duties to the Funds was proper; (3) the award of damages was erroneous in the calculation of unrealized gains on the investment portfolio; and (4) the judge did not err in including prejudgment interest. View "Woodward School for Girls, Inc. v. City of Quincy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court against the Trustees of the Boston Public Library and a library employee alleging that he was denied entrance to the Boston Public Library in violation of his civil rights. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion seeking disqualification of the Boston Law Department as counsel for Defendants, concluding that the Trustees constitute a municipal entity that oversees the Library as a department of the City of Boston. Plaintiff subsequently filed this action in the county court seeking a judgment declaring that the Trustees and the City “are two separate, independent legal entities,” and that the Law Department may not provide legal representation to the Trustees or Library employees. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the complaint and denied postjudgment relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the complaint in this case dealt with the same controversy that existed between the parties in the federal litigation, it did not present a proper occasion for declaratory relief. View "Lu v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with firearms violations. Defendants filed motions to suppress, which the municipal court allowed. The Commonwealth appealed, but its notice of appeal was filed late in the trial court. The Commonwealth applied to a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for leave to appeal, but that application was also filed late. A single justice allowed the application. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal because the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal had not been timely filed. The Supreme Judicial Court granted the Commonwealth’s request for further review and (1) affirmed the order allowing the motion to suppress; and (2) set out a new framework that will apply henceforth to the manner in which the single justices of the Court should apply the procedural rules governing the timeliness of interlocutory appeals of orders on motions to suppress. View "Commonwealth v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Lexington school district superintendent dismissed Mark Zagaeski, a Lexington high school teacher, from his position for conduct unbecoming a teacher. Zagaeski timely filed an appeal from the school district’s dismissal decision, which resulted in arbitration proceedings. The arbitrator (1) concluded that the school district carried its burden to show facts amounting to conduct unbecoming a teacher but that Zagaeski’s conduct only “nominally” constituted a basis for dismissal; and (2) reinstated Zagaeski as a teacher on the basis of “the best interests of the pupils.” The superior court confirmed the arbitrator’s award. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the superior court judge and vacated the arbitration award, holding that, under the facts of this case, the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by awarding Zagaeski's reinstatement. View "Sch. Comm. of Lexington v. Zagaeski" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former president and chief operating officer of PortfolioScope, Inc., brought suit against Portfolio and two individual defendants alleging, among other claims, breach of contract, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, tortious interference with Plaintiff’s contractual rights, and fraudulent transfers pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. After a bench trial, the judge rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Defendants argued on appeal that the judge erred in her interpretation of an agreement and an amendment, as well as in her analysis of secured transaction principles, and that the errors affected the entire disposition of the case. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in almost all respects, holding that any error in the judge’s interpretation of the amendment affected only Plaintiff’s claim for conversion. View "Weiler v. PortfolioScope, Inc." on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers stopped the vehicle Defendant was driving and placed Defendant under arrest on outstanding arrest warrants. The officers proceeded to pat frisk Defendant’s outer clothing and opened a container found on Defendant. Before transporting Defendant to the station for booking, an officer entered Defendant’s vehicle to retrieve its keys and saw an unlabeled container in plain view. The officer seized the pills contained in the container. Thereafter, Defendant was charged with illegal possession of methadone. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of his arrest on the outstanding warrants. The district court denied the motion, and the Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, vacated Defendant’s conviction, and remanded for a new trial, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the police exceeded the lawful scope of a search incident to arrest, an inventory search, and a seizure under the plain view doctrine. View "Commonwealth v. White" on Justia Law

The Sex Offender Registry Board notified Petitioner that it had preliminarily classified him as a level three sex offender. Petitioner requested a hearing. After the hearing had been completed but before the hearing examiner had rendered a decision, a successor examiner was appointed. The successor examiner then issued his decision classifying Petitioner as a level three offender. The superior court affirmed the Board’s decision. Petitioner sought an order directing the Board to produce a transcript of his classification hearing under 803 Code Mass. Regs. 4.22(4), which directs the Board to provide a successor hearing examiner and the parties with a copy of the transcript where the successor examiner is appointed after the presentation of evidence is complete and the record closed. Despite this requirement, no copy of the classification transcript was ever provided to Petitioner. Petitioner’s request was denied. Petitioner then filed a mandamus petition in the county court seeking to compel the Board to provide a copy of the hearing transcript. A single justice denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the single justice and remanded the case to the county court where an order shall enter directing the Board to produce a copy of the transcript. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

While conducting a search of the cell of Defendant, an inmate, correctional officers found seven photocopies of photographs that depicted naked children. The photographs were excerpted from a National Geographic magazine, a sociology textbook, and a naturist catalogue. Defendant moved to dismiss his ensuing indictments of child pornography and of being a habitual offender, arguing that the photocopies of the photographs did not constitute child pornography within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 29C. The superior court allowed the motion to dismiss on the basis that none of the photocopies constituted a “lewd exhibition” of the children’s body parts as described in the statute. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the photocopies did not depict a “lewd exhibition,” and therefore, the judge properly dismissed the indictments on the ground that the grand jury were not presented with any evidence to support a finding of probable cause to arrest Defendant for possession of child pornography. View "Commonwealth v. Rex" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant for the murder of his wife, who was choked and stabbed to death in the couple’s apartment. The killing was witnessed by the couple’s three and one-half year old son. During trial, Defendant did not dispute that he had killed his wife but asserted only that he had done so in the heat of passion after finding that his wife had remained in contact with other lovers. After a twelve-day trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing Defendant’s son to demonstrate, on a couch in the court room, how the victim had been positioned while Defendant was choking her; and (2) the trial court did not err in prohibiting defense counsel from using a police report to refresh the recollection of a witness regarding a sexual overture made by the victim. View "Commonwealth v. McGee" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the smell of unburnt marijuana suffices to establish probable cause search an automobile. The question arose in the wake of the 2008 ballot initiative decriminalizing possession of one ounce or less of marijuana and the holding in Commonwealth v. Cruz that “the odor of burnt marijuana alone cannot reasonably provide suspicion of criminal activity.” In this case, police perceived a strong odor of unburnt marijuana emanating from Defendant’s vehicle and, after seizing a “fat bag” of marijuana from the glove compartment, searched Defendant’s vehicle. The trial judge denied Defendant’s motion to suppress as to the “fat bag” but ordered suppressed the bags of marijuana found in the ensuing search of the back seat of Defendant’s vehicle. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge correctly determined that the odor of unburnt marijuana did not justify the search of the back seat of Defendant’s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement; but (2) because the judge did not specifically address whether the seizure of the “fat bag” would support probable cause to arrest Defendant, the case must be remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Overmyer" on Justia Law