Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of illegally prescribing controlled substances in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32A(a) and 32B(a), among other crimes. Defendant appealed, raising the issue of whether a physician "dispenses" rather than "distributes" a controlled substance pursuant to chapter 94C, 32A(a) and 32B(a) when the substance is delivered pursuant to an alleged prescription to a person who does not lawfully possess it. At Defendant's trial, the Commonwealth proceeded only on the theory that Defendant dispensed controlled substances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jury effectively convicted Defendant of distribution even though they were told they were being instructed on dispensing. After Defendant's habeas corpus petition was denied, Defendant filed a motion for release from unlawful restraint challenging the Court's decision in Brown I. The motion was denied without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding (1) there was no merit to Defendant's argument that the distribution conviction violated his right against double jeopardy; (2) the Court did not deny Defendant the right to appeal from the distribution conviction; and (3) Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree for the shooting death of Brittany Perez. Eight bullets were fired at an apartment's front room window where Perez was standing, and four of the bullets struck and killed Perez. The window was covered by venetian blinds and dark curtains. Defendant was seen fleeing the scene of the shooting. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction, holding that the trial judge erred in deciding not to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, where the jury reasonably could have found that Defendant did not know the room was occupied when he fired the rifle at the window. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Horne" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) assessed a penalty against Plaintiff for improper handling and disposal of roof shingles that contained asbestos. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that, pursuant to the Administrative Penalties Act, it was entitled to a notice of noncompliance and the opportunity to cure any violations before the imposition of a penalty. The commissioner of the DEP affirmed the penalty after accepting the recommendation of a hearing officer, finding that Plaintiff's failure to comply fell within one of the exceptions to the notice requirement because it was "willful and not the result of error." The hearing officer interpreted this language, otherwise called the "willfulness exception," as requiring only a showing of the "intent to do an act that violates the law if done." The Supreme Court affirmed the agency's disposition but on different grounds, holding (1) the DEP's decision was based on an error of law because its interpretation of the willfulness exception did not comport with the clear meaning of the relevant statute; but (2) Plaintiff's conduct was willful and not the result of error within the meaning of the Act because Plaintiff knew or should have known of the likely presence of asbestos in the shingles. View "Franklin Office Park Realty Corp. v. Comm'r of Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

A Boston police officer witnessed Sylvain engaging in a sexual act with a prostitute. As the officer approached, Sylvain removed plastic baggies from his coat pocket and placed them in his mouth. Believing that the baggies contained "crack" cocaine and fearing overdose, the officer attempted to intercede. Although Sylvain ingested the drugs, a search of his jacket revealed an additional baggie of crack cocaine. The incident took place within 1,000 feet of a child care center. Sylvain, a noncitizen lawfully residing in the U.S., pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, subjecting him to automatic deportation. After the conviction the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the rule announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) regarding a criminal defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to accurate advice about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, was not a "new" rule and applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Sylvain sought to vacate his guilty plea, arguing that his attorney erroneously advised him that there would be no deportation consequences. The motion was denied. While Sylvain's appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Chaidez v. United States (2013), holding that Padilla did announce a "new" rule and does not apply retroactively to collateral challenges. The Massachusetts Supreme Court remanded, holding that, as a matter of Massachusetts law, the right enunciated in Padilla was not new and, consequently, defendants whose state law convictions were final after April 1, 1997, may attack their convictions collaterally on Padilla grounds. View "Commonwealth v. Sylvain" on Justia Law

In 2006, while visiting relatives in Andover, 29-year-old Aleo attempted to use an inflatable swimming pool slide that had been imported and sold by Toys R Us. She slid down head first; when she reached the bottom of the slide, it collapsed, and her head struck the concrete deck of the swimming pool through the fabric of the slide. Robin's upper two cervical vertebrae fractured, resulting in quadriplegia. She died the following day, after her family, in accordance with her wishes, withdrew life support. Her estate sued, alleging negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, wrongful death, and violation of G.L. c. 93A. A jury found Toys R Us liable for negligence, breach of warranty, and wrongful death, awarding compensatory damages of $2,640,000 and punitive damages of $18 million. Under G.L. c. 229, punitive damages available for gross negligence in wrongful death action. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Toys R Us exhibited a “substantial degree of reprehensibility.” The court rejected challenges to pretrial rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the constitutionality of the $18 million award of punitive damages. View "Aleo v. SLB Toys USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Funds, closed-end investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a- 5(a)(1)(2), are organized as Massachusetts business trusts under G.L. c. 182. Plaintiffs are beneficial owners of preferred shares of each of the Funds. The Funds’ declarations of trust state that meetings shall be held “so long as Common Shares are listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange, on at least an annual basis." After plaintiffs delivered written notice stating an intention to nominate one of their partners for election as a preferred shares trustee of each fund at the 2011 annual meeting, the Funds issued a press release stating that their annual meeting was being rescheduled to July 2012, the last day of the Funds' 2012 fiscal year. Plaintiffs claimed that the bylaws require that an annual shareholders’ meeting be held within 12 months of the last annual shareholder meeting. The Funds argued that the bylaws require only that one meeting be held each fiscal year. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that "on at least an annual basis" means that a shareholders' meeting for each Fund must be held no later than one year and 30 days after the last annual meeting. View "Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund, Ltd. v. PIMCO, Income Strategy Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's 11-year-old stepdaughter told the Sexual Assault Investigation Network (SAIN) that the plaintiff had engaged in sexual conduct with her since she was four years old. Before trial on the resulting charges, the plaintiff sexually assaulted a 16-year-old. He pleaded guilty to indecent assault and battery on a person over 14, G.L. c. 265, 13H. The Sex Offender Registry Board notified the plaintiff of his duty to register and of its preliminary classification of him as a level three sex offender. The plaintiff requested administrative review and moved to continue the hearing until the case regarding his stepdaughter's allegations was resolved. The board denied the motion and considered a summary of the stepdaughter's SAIN interview. Plaintiff’s attorney told the hearing examiner that criminal trial counsel was guarding the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment rights and that the plaintiff, therefore, would not testify or present evidence. The hearing examiner found that the plaintiff presented high risk to re-offend and a high degree of dangerousness, and ordered registration as a level three sex offender. Plaintiff was later found not guilty with respect to his stepdaughter, except the charge of open and gross lewdness. The plaintiff sought review of his final classification, G.L. c. 6, 178M. A trial judge affirmed. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, acknowledging that a convicted offender, awaiting trial on separate sexual offense charges, has a difficult dilemma where a classification hearing is held before the criminal trial. The board acted within its discretion in weighing the public safety interest in obtaining prompt final classification against the offender's interest in not potentially compromising his criminal trial strategy. The board now has discretion to reconsider the classification, but the acquittal is insufficient alone to show that the allegations were false. View "Soe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

After being billed by NEPT for medically necessary chiropractic services provided to the passenger of its insured, Liberty Mutual, claimed that the cost was unreasonably high and thus refused to pay the full amount invoiced. At trial, Liberty Mutual sought to introduce statistical evidence from a commercial database to show that NEPT's charges exceeded the 80th percentile of reported charges for the same procedures, pursuant to G.L. c. 233, 79B, which creates a limited exception to the hearsay rule for factual statements contained in commercial publications. The trial judge denied the motion, finding that the database was unreliable, based on a prior decision from the appellate court with respect to the database. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. Based on the explicit language of section 79B, and the gatekeeper role of a trial judge, it is within a judge's discretion to consider the reliability of evidence offered pursuant to section 79B. View "N.E. Physical Therapy Plus, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant, who admitted shooting his wife, but claimed “heat of passion,” was convicted of murder in the first degree with deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument based on failure to exclude a juror based on the juror's dual citizenship. The court properly admitted statements made by the victim, concerning marital trouble, as proof of the defendant's motive because he was made aware of the victim’s state of mind. Testimony by a friend that the victim had called her, "scared" and crying, and said that “she thought he was going to hit her" was properly admitted as an excited utterance. Admission of autopsy photographs was not unduly prejudicial. Admission of evidence concerning defendant's viewing of pornographic Web sites and of electronic communications describing sexual practices did not constitute impermissible character evidence of the defendant as an aggressor. Introduction of defendant’s firearms, with evidence of his training and certification as a firearms instructor was relevant to whether the murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. The prosecutor’s comments that the victim's disclosure of infidelity was not the sort of provocation that would cause a reasonable adult male to lose his capacity for self-restraint because there were other options, properly made the distinction between a killing committed with "heat of passion" and one committed with premeditation; the jury instruction on “heat of passion” was appropriate.View "Commonwealth v. Tassinari" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the premeditated murder of his mother. Six years later, he sought a new trial, alleging that he had not been competent to stand trial. Defendant submitted an affidavit from a forensic psychologist, indicating "long standing mental disease … schizoaffective disorder with prominent paranoid delusions.” A neuropsychologist administered tests and submitted an affidavit indicating that the defendant has demonstrated symptoms of a delusional disorder since childhood and that he functions intellectually in the low average to borderline retarded range. Trial counsel stated that he had not pursued a competency defense because the defendant denied committing the murder. The Commonwealth did not present evidence. During a hearing, the defendant shouted “racist bitch” at the judge, who had also been the trial judge. The judge ordered a competency evaluation. The court’s forensic psychologist reported that the defendant presented a "complicated diagnostic picture" and was likely incompetent in a complex proceeding such as an evidentiary hearing; she recommended medications, noting that defendant had previously benefited from psychopharmacological intervention. The defendant began taking prescribed medication. His condition improved. The court denied a new trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated, finding that the defendant made an adequate showing to warrant an evidentiary hearing. View "Commonwealth v. Chatman" on Justia Law