Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Commonwealth v. Hanson H.
Juvenile was arraigned in the juvenile court on a complaint alleging indecent assault and battery on a person under the age of fourteen. Juvenile pleaded delinquent and was placed on supervised probation for a period of six months. Although Juvenile was not advised during the plea colloquy that GPS monitoring would be required as a condition of probation, the judge entered an order requiring Juvenile to wear a GPS monitoring device during the term of his probation. The judge denied Juvenile's motion for relief from GPS monitoring. The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal, holding that a juvenile court retains the discretion, based on the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether GPS monitoring should be imposed as a condition of probation for a juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent after committing a sex offense. View "Commonwealth v. Hanson H." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Juvenile Law, Massachusetts Supreme Court
Bar Counsel v. Farber
G. Russell Damon filed with bar counsel a complaint regarding attorney Peter Farber's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation of certain facts in connection with a real estate purchase. After bar counsel filed a petition for discipline against Farber, Damon testified as a witness before a hearing committee of the board of bar overseers (board) on the matter. The hearing committee made findings consistent with the allegations in the petition for discipline, and the board adopted the committee's factual findings. Thereafter, the Supreme Court issued an order of public reprimand. Farbert subsequently filed a civil suit against Damon asserting, inter alia, claims of defamation and wrongful instigation of civil proceedings based on statements made in the complaint, in follow-up communications with bar counsel, and in the testimony Damon gave. Bar counsel filed this action for declaratory judgment to resolve controversy between the parties relating to the proper interpretation of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 9. The Supreme Court held that, under section 9, a bar discipline complainant is entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability with respect to his complaint filed with bar counsel or the board and his sworn testimony given or communications made to bar counsel or the board or any hearing committee thereof. Remanded. View "Bar Counsel v. Farber" on Justia Law
Commonwealth v. Palmer
After police found marijuana plants that collectively weighed less than one ounce growing in a closet in Defendant's home, Defendant was charged with cultivation of marijuana and committing that violation in a school zone. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32L, a person who cultivates marijuana plants that weigh one ounce or less may not be charged with cultivation in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws 94C, 32C(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this case was controlled by the Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Keefner, and (2) section 32L decriminalized simple possession but did not repeal the offense of cultivation of marijuana under section 32C(a) where the amount of marijuana cultivated is one ounce or less. View "Commonwealth v. Palmer" on Justia Law
Commonwealth v. Pacheco
A State trooper was patrolling a state park when he spotted a vehicle parked in a handicapped parking space that did not display a handicapped placard. The trooper approached the driver's side window and smelled the strong odor of freshly burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. The vehicle's occupants admitted to smoking marijuana. The trooper then searched the vehicle, including the trunk, in which he discovered a semiautomatic handgun in a backpack. Defendant was charged with several firearm and ammunition offenses. Defendant unsuccessfully sought suppression of the firearm and ammunition found in the backpack. The Supreme Court reversed the order denying the motion to suppress, holding that the trooper did not have probable cause to believe that a criminal amount of contraband or evidence of a crime could be found in the trunk, and therefore, the search of the trunk was illegal. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Pacheco" on Justia Law
Commonwealth v. Daniel
Defendants were stopped by police officer for a motor infraction. The interior of the vehicle smelled of burnt marijuana, and in response to a question from the officer, the driver produced two bags containing marijuana. The officer searched the vehicle and found a handgun and ammunition in the glove box. Defendants were charged with firearms offenses and successfully moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed the order that the evidence be suppressed, holding (1) the search was not justified by the need to search for contraband; (2) the officer's extensive search was not justified by his need to ensure his safety; and (3) the Commonwealth failed to establish that the officer's search of the vehicle was proper because he had probable cause to believe the driver was operating while under the influence of marijuana. View "Commonwealth v. Daniel" on Justia Law
Commonwealth v. Jackson
Police officers observed Defendant sharing what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette with two others on a park bench. The officers seized the cigarette and conducted a warrantless search of Defendant's person and backpack. In the backpack they found marijuana with a total weight of less than one ounce. Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and a corresponding drug violation in or near a school or park. The municipal court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search was not a lawful search incident to arrest, as the officers had no basis to arrest Defendant before searching him. View " Commonwealth v. Jackson" on Justia Law
GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.
This case involved multiple litigations among three parties - Insurer, insured Mortgagee, and Homeowner - arising out of a defect in the title to Homeowner's home. Insurer brought suit in the land court on behalf of Mortgagee seeking to reform the deed to the property or to equitably subrogate Homeowner's interest in the property behind Mortgagee's mortgage. Homeowner initiated suit in the superior court against Mortgagee. Eventually, all claims in both actions became part of a federal court case, which settled. Thereafter, Mortgagee filed a complaint against Insurer in the U.S. district court seeking to recover from Insurer for the costs Mortgagee incurred in defending against Homeowner's claims. The judge determined Insurer had no obligation under its title insurance policy to pay Mortgagee's defense costs but certified two questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The Court answered by holding that, under Massachusetts law (1) a title insurer does not have a duty to defend the insured in the entire lawsuit where one claim is within the scope of the title insurance coverage and other claims are not; and (2) a title insurer that initiates litigation similarly does not have a duty to defend the insured against all reasonably foreseeable counterclaims.
View "GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law
LeBaron v. Commonwealth
Defendant was convicted of several criminal offenses. Defendant's appeal from his convictions was pending in the appeals court, where he was represented by counsel. Acting pro se, Defendant filed a motion in the appeals court, which responded that it would consider only filings submitted by counsel of record. Defendant filed a petition under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, seeking relief from that ruling and a stay of his appeal until he was allowed to proceed without counsel. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court was not obligated to permit Defendant to proceed in a hybrid manner with representation in part by counsel and in part by himself. View "LeBaron v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law
Merriam v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.
Demoulas Super Markets (DSM) was a closely held Massachusetts corporation. In this case, several minority Class A stockholders (Sellers), whose offer to sell their shares to DSM was rejected, brought an action seeking a declaration that, consistent with DSM's articles of organization (articles), Sellers could dispose of their shares in any manner they saw fit. DSM counterclaimed, claiming that Sellers could not sell their shares to any buyer who would imperil DSM's status as a Subchapter S Corporation and that Sellers were obligated to reoffer their shares to DSM before selling them to a third party on more favorable terms. A superior court judge declared (1) Sellers were not bound by the articles from freely transferring their stock, and (2) Sellers were not obligated to reoffer their shares to DSM before offering them to a third party on more favorable terms than those arrived at by arbitrators designated in accordance with the articles. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Sellers were not bound by fiduciary duty and could sell their shares regardless of whether the buyer's ownership would terminate DSM's S corporation status; and (2) DSM's articles did not create a preemptive right of first offer held by DSM. View "Merriam v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Business Law, Massachusetts Supreme Court
Commonwealth v. Butler
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. The appeals court affirmed, concluding that any delay in bringing Defendant to trial did not violate Mass. R. Crim. P. 36. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to the appeals court that Defendant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds should have been allowed under the speedy trial provisions of the state or federal Constitutions. The motion was denied, and the appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where (1) the speedy trial clock starts when a Massachusetts criminal complaint issues; (2) the speedy trial clock "resumes" when the Commonwealth reinstates charges following dismissal; and (3) although the delay from the attachment of the right to a speedy trial in September 1991 to Defendant's trial in May 2003 was lengthy, the factors set forth in Baker v. Wingo did not establish that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. View "Commonwealth v. Butler " on Justia Law