Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree based on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in accepting the assertion by a witness of privilege under the Fifth Amendment and in conducting a hearing on the witness's claim of privilege; (2) Defendant's delay in raising the issue of the unanimity of the jury's verdict of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon was dispositive of his claim in this appeal; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial where Defendant's trial counsel provided him with effective assistance; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to prove extreme atrocity or cruelty. View "Commonwealth v. Alicea" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased real property after a real estate broker gave him incorrect information about the zoning classification of the property. Plaintiff was thereafter unable to use the property as he intended. Plaintiff sued the broker and the real estate agency that employed her, alleging misrepresentation and violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 2. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) a broker has a duty to exercise reasonable care in making representations as to a property's zoning designation, and where the misrepresentations were based on information provided by the seller, as in this case, the question of whether it was reasonable in the circumstances to rely on such information is to be determined by the trier of fact; and (2) an exculpatory clause in the purchase and sale agreement did not preclude the buyer's reliance on prior written representations as to zoning classification. View "DeWolfe v. Hingham Centre, Ltd." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree of his wife on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty; (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting the medical examiner's testimony or Defendant's jailhouse telephone call recordings; (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument; and (4) the jury was properly instructed on "dangerous weapon"; (5) cumulative error did not require reversal; and (6) there was no reason to reduce the murder conviction or order a new trial pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Roy" on Justia Law

Juvenile was arraigned in the juvenile court on a complaint alleging indecent assault and battery on a person under the age of fourteen. Juvenile pleaded delinquent and was placed on supervised probation for a period of six months. Although Juvenile was not advised during the plea colloquy that GPS monitoring would be required as a condition of probation, the judge entered an order requiring Juvenile to wear a GPS monitoring device during the term of his probation. The judge denied Juvenile's motion for relief from GPS monitoring. The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal, holding that a juvenile court retains the discretion, based on the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether GPS monitoring should be imposed as a condition of probation for a juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent after committing a sex offense. View "Commonwealth v. Hanson H." on Justia Law

G. Russell Damon filed with bar counsel a complaint regarding attorney Peter Farber's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation of certain facts in connection with a real estate purchase. After bar counsel filed a petition for discipline against Farber, Damon testified as a witness before a hearing committee of the board of bar overseers (board) on the matter. The hearing committee made findings consistent with the allegations in the petition for discipline, and the board adopted the committee's factual findings. Thereafter, the Supreme Court issued an order of public reprimand. Farbert subsequently filed a civil suit against Damon asserting, inter alia, claims of defamation and wrongful instigation of civil proceedings based on statements made in the complaint, in follow-up communications with bar counsel, and in the testimony Damon gave. Bar counsel filed this action for declaratory judgment to resolve controversy between the parties relating to the proper interpretation of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 9. The Supreme Court held that, under section 9, a bar discipline complainant is entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability with respect to his complaint filed with bar counsel or the board and his sworn testimony given or communications made to bar counsel or the board or any hearing committee thereof. Remanded. View "Bar Counsel v. Farber" on Justia Law

After police found marijuana plants that collectively weighed less than one ounce growing in a closet in Defendant's home, Defendant was charged with cultivation of marijuana and committing that violation in a school zone. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32L, a person who cultivates marijuana plants that weigh one ounce or less may not be charged with cultivation in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws 94C, 32C(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this case was controlled by the Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Keefner, and (2) section 32L decriminalized simple possession but did not repeal the offense of cultivation of marijuana under section 32C(a) where the amount of marijuana cultivated is one ounce or less. View "Commonwealth v. Palmer" on Justia Law

A State trooper was patrolling a state park when he spotted a vehicle parked in a handicapped parking space that did not display a handicapped placard. The trooper approached the driver's side window and smelled the strong odor of freshly burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. The vehicle's occupants admitted to smoking marijuana. The trooper then searched the vehicle, including the trunk, in which he discovered a semiautomatic handgun in a backpack. Defendant was charged with several firearm and ammunition offenses. Defendant unsuccessfully sought suppression of the firearm and ammunition found in the backpack. The Supreme Court reversed the order denying the motion to suppress, holding that the trooper did not have probable cause to believe that a criminal amount of contraband or evidence of a crime could be found in the trunk, and therefore, the search of the trunk was illegal. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

Defendants were stopped by police officer for a motor infraction. The interior of the vehicle smelled of burnt marijuana, and in response to a question from the officer, the driver produced two bags containing marijuana. The officer searched the vehicle and found a handgun and ammunition in the glove box. Defendants were charged with firearms offenses and successfully moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed the order that the evidence be suppressed, holding (1) the search was not justified by the need to search for contraband; (2) the officer's extensive search was not justified by his need to ensure his safety; and (3) the Commonwealth failed to establish that the officer's search of the vehicle was proper because he had probable cause to believe the driver was operating while under the influence of marijuana. View "Commonwealth v. Daniel" on Justia Law

Police officers observed Defendant sharing what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette with two others on a park bench. The officers seized the cigarette and conducted a warrantless search of Defendant's person and backpack. In the backpack they found marijuana with a total weight of less than one ounce. Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and a corresponding drug violation in or near a school or park. The municipal court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search was not a lawful search incident to arrest, as the officers had no basis to arrest Defendant before searching him. View " Commonwealth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

This case involved multiple litigations among three parties - Insurer, insured Mortgagee, and Homeowner - arising out of a defect in the title to Homeowner's home. Insurer brought suit in the land court on behalf of Mortgagee seeking to reform the deed to the property or to equitably subrogate Homeowner's interest in the property behind Mortgagee's mortgage. Homeowner initiated suit in the superior court against Mortgagee. Eventually, all claims in both actions became part of a federal court case, which settled. Thereafter, Mortgagee filed a complaint against Insurer in the U.S. district court seeking to recover from Insurer for the costs Mortgagee incurred in defending against Homeowner's claims. The judge determined Insurer had no obligation under its title insurance policy to pay Mortgagee's defense costs but certified two questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The Court answered by holding that, under Massachusetts law (1) a title insurer does not have a duty to defend the insured in the entire lawsuit where one claim is within the scope of the title insurance coverage and other claims are not; and (2) a title insurer that initiates litigation similarly does not have a duty to defend the insured against all reasonably foreseeable counterclaims. View "GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law