Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant committed a breach of a settlement agreement with the town by failing to remove mulch from property owned by Plaintiff. Defendant filed a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, contending that the civil claim was intended to retaliate, deter, and punish Defendant solely for engaging in the constitutionally protected activity of petitioning the town. The motion was denied. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that Defendant failed to meet its required threshold showing that Plaintiff's claim of breach of the settlement agreement was based on Defendant's exercise of its right to petition. View "Marabello v. Boston Bank Corp." on Justia Law

Based on an assault that occurred on June 6, 2007, a jury convicted Defendant of attempted murder, armed home invasion, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery. The appeals court affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending, inter alia, that the assault constituted a consensual sexual encounter, and thus, in light of Lawrence v. Texas, the trial judge committed constitutional error by not instructing the jury that consent is a defense to the crimes of armed home invasion and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no conflict between the reasoning of Lawrence and the Court's prior decisions holding that consent is not a defense to the crimes charged, and the judge appropriately instructed the jury on consent; (2) although the admission of materials retrieved on Defendant's home computer were proper, the judge's failure to view a video clip depicting a nude woman being strangled seemingly to death prior to ruling that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect was an abuse of discretion; but (3) upon independent review, the evidence was highly probative of Defendant's motive and intent, outweighing its plainly prejudicial effect. View "Commonwealth v. Carey" on Justia Law

Defendant was false accused of assaulting with a gun Ramon Benzan, a person who was performing work for Defendant. After the criminal complaint issued, it became apparent that Benzan had lied to a Boston police detective about the alleged assault in an attempt to extort money. The prosecutor filed a nolle prosequi. Defendant later moved to expunge his criminal records, arguing that the judge had the equitable authority to do so because Defendant had committed fraud on the court. A Boston municipal court judge deneid the motion, concluding that the case was controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Boe and that under Mass. Gen. Laws 276, 100C, the judge had no power to issue an order of expungement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no fraud on the court; and (2) accordingly, the judge correctly determined that he lacked the equitable authority to grant the relief requested. View "Commonwealth v. Moe" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants, two brothers, were convicted of several violations of the controlled substances laws, including the possession of class B and class D substances with intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendants primarily claimed that the admission of certificates of drug analysis to prove the chemical composition of the drugs seized in their shared apartment was constitutional error. The appeals court reversed based on improperly admitted drug certificates, even though Defendants both testified at trial and admitted that they possessed the drugs but for personal use. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the submission in evidence of the drug certificates without the testimony of the analyst that prepared them violated Defendants' right of confrontation; but (2) when considering Defendants' testimony along with the totality of the record, the admission of the drug certificates was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Mendes " on Justia Law

Ernest Murphy was employed by the Commonwealth as a superior court judge for eight years. Following the publication of libelous articles about Murphy's performance of his judicial duties, and his subsequent receipt of hate mail and death threats, Murphy was diagnosed with PTSD and major depressive disorder and was unable to continue performing the essential duties of his job. The state board of retirement rejected his application for accidental disability retirement benefits pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws 32, 7, and this denial was upheld by the contributory retirement appeal board (CRAB). At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Murphy was entitled to receive accidental disability retirement benefits on the grounds that he was permanently disabled from performing the essential duties of his job by reason of a personal injury sustained as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties. The Court affirmed, holding that Murphy did not sustain his disabling injuries while in the performance of his judicial duties, as (1) Murphy was not engaged in judicial work during the time he opened and read the death threat; and (2) the act of opening and reading his mail was, in itself, not a judicial duty. View "Murphy v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd." on Justia Law

An electrician was killed by electrocution while attempting to repair an electrical transformer at the Logan Airport Hilton Hotel (Hilton). Plaintiff, as administratrix of the electrician's estate, filed suit against, inter alia, Hilton, the architect who designed the hotel (Cambridge Seven), the consultant Cambridge Seven retained to provide electrical engineering services (Costentini), and the construction subcontractor for electrical services (Broadway), alleging negligence, gross negligence, and breach of warranty. Hilton and Broadway filed cross claims against Cambridge Seven and Cosentini for indemnification and contribution. The superior court granted the motion for summary judgment brought by Cambridge Seven and Cosentini as to the complaint and cross claims and ordered final judgment. Hilton and Broadway appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on behalf of Cambridge Seven and Cosentini as to the cross claims brought by Hilton and Broadway for indemnification; but (2) reversed as to the cross claims for contribution. Remanded. View "LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture" on Justia Law

In 1941, Anna Child Bird executed a will with a testamentary trust that benefitted her sons, her grandsons, and their issue. At the time the will was executed, the law provided that an adopted child was excluded from the definition of "child." In 1958, the statute was amended to redefine the term "child" to include an adopted child. By its terms, however, the 1958 amendment applied only to testamentary instruments executed after 1958. In 2009, another amendment made the 1958 amendment applicable to all testamentary instruments regardless of when executed. Plaintiff was the biological great-grandchild of Anna, and Plaintiff had two adopted brothers. Plaintiff's father was a biological grandson of Anna. Plaintiff had been receiving income distribution from the testamentary trust established by Anna in her will. The Supreme Court concluded that the retroactive application of the 2009 amendment to Anna's trust, with the effect that Plaintiff's interest in the trust would be divided into three parts to cover her and her two adopted brothers, was unconstitutional. Remanded. View "Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A." on Justia Law

A superior court jury convicted Defendant William Santos of armed robbery and murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder fin the shooting death of Luis Rodriguez. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in admitting many portions of Defendant's statement given to the police following the shooing, and the admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial court err in admitting statements made by the codefendant to his sister shortly after the shooting, and the error was not harmless. View "Commonwealth v. Santos" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth and William O'Connell (collectively, Petitioners) filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from a district court judge's order releasing from impoundment a redacted version of a search warrant affidavit. The affidavit contained a recitation of allegations made against O'Connell, a prominent real estate developer, that were the subject of criminal charges of, inter alia, statutory rape. George W. Prescott Publishing Company sought access to the impounded affidavit on the grounds that the document was presumptively public. The district court judge vacated his earlier order impounding the affidavit but further ordered that the affidavit be redacted before it was made available to the public. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mass. Gen. Laws 41, 97D, which bars from disclosure affidavits containing reports of rape, does not apply to search warrant affidavits; and (2) the judge did not err in vacating the order of impoundment. View "Commonwealth v. George W. Prescott Publ'g Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for the death of Lourdes Hernandez. Defendant appealed, claiming that inappropriate statements made in the prosecutor's closing argument and a defective jury instruction on reasonable doubt constituted error requiring that his conviction be reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the prosecutor did not commit prejudicial error in his closing remarks; (2) the jury instruction was an accurate statement of the law, the instruction did not denigrate the Commonwealth's burden of proof, and Defendant was not prejudiced by the instruction; and (3) cumulative error did not warrant a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Mejia" on Justia Law