Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Three witnesses identified defendant as the shooter. He was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of both premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, G.L. c. 265, s 1; carrying a firearm without a license, G.L. c. 269l s 10 (a); carrying a loaded firearm, G.L. c. 269, s 10; possession of ammunition without a FID card, G.L. c. 269, s 10 (b ); and discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a building, G.L. c. 269, s 12E. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, finding that evidentiary errors were not prejudicial in light of the strong case against defendant. The court had allowed the prosecution to introduce a round of ammunition found in defendant's apartment, with an instruction that these items could be considered only to show defendant's familiarity with or access to firearms, The court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of security measures in defendant's apartment: pit bull dogs, a security camera trained on the front door, and a police scanner. The court permitted a state trooper to testify to a conversation between defendant and the key identifying witness, DeMiranda, in which defendant offered to pay DeMiranda to leave the country. View "Commonwealth v. Barbosa" on Justia Law

Manavoglu was shot while pursuing the man who had robbed him at gun point in the restaurant he owned in Boston. He died two days later. A jury convicted defendant, whom the police apprehended in the area within minutes of the incident, whom two witnesses identified, and who confessed to the crime during a police interview, of felony-murder in the first degree (G.L. c. 265, 1); armed robbery (G.L. c. 265, 17); possession of a firearm and ammunitions without a firearm identification card (G.L. c. 269, 10 (a) and G.L. c. 269, 10(h )). The Second Circuit vacated the armed robbery conviction as duplicative because it was the predicate to the felony-murder conviction, but otherwise affirmed. The court rejected arguments concerning refusal to suppress statements made during an interview within hours of the shooting; evidence regarding gunshot residue testing conducted on clothing found near the scene; testimony from a witness, who had identified defendant, about his military training on "observations," and incorporation of that testimony into closing arguments; and prosecutorial comments that impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant and inaccurately characterized evidence. The defendant also argued the Commonwealth's case relied heavily on eyewitness testimony that the defendant characterized as "notoriously unreliable." View "Commonwealth v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2004-2005, Costa & Son Construction performed site work for the general contractor (Braitt) on such a project in Bridgewater. After Braitt terminated the relationship Costa sued, alleging breach of contract and violations of G.L. c. 93A. Costa sought to recover damages under a payment bond obtained by Brait from Arch Insurance, G.L. c. 149, 29. Brait asserted similar counterclaims against Costa. Arch argued that Costa had relinquished any right to claim against the bond pursuant to a provision of his subcontract with Brait. The trial court granted Brait and Arch directed verdict with respect to claims under the bond. A jury returned a verdict for Costa, against Brait. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated the directed verdict. A subcontractor on a public construction project for which a payment bond has been obtained by the general contractor pursuant to G.L. c. 149, 29, may not by private agreement forgo its right to pursue payment under the bond. The court also vacated the portion of the amended judgment granting consequential damages to Costa; consequential damages were precluded by the contract. View "Costa v. Brait Builders Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape and furnishing alcohol to a person under 21 years of age. On appeal he claimed error in the denial of his right to cross-examine the victim as to her motive to fabricate; in denial of his motion for a required finding of not guilty as to the element that he knew or should have known of the victim's incapacity to consent; and in refusal to instruct the jury that they could consider the defendant's state of intoxication when deciding whether he reasonably should have known of the victim's incapacity to consent. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judge's instruction was error under Commonwealth v. Blache, (2008), in which it held that where the Commonwealth relies on evidence that a rape victim was incapable of consent to establish the element of lack of consent and thereby reduce the degree of required force to that which is needed to effect penetration, "the Commonwealth should also prove the defendant's knowledge of the complainant's incapacitated state." The error, however, did not prejudice the defendant. There was no evidence of debilitating intoxication. He was not entitled to an instruction on voluntary intoxication. View "Commonwealth v. Mountry" on Justia Law

In 2000 Go-Best wired $5 million to an account entitled "Morris M. Goldings client account" at Citizens Bank, based on representations made by Morris M. Goldings, who was then a Massachusetts attorney. Goldings later admitted that the representations were false and that he had used the money to pay other debts. Go-Best filed suit against Citizens Bank, bringing claims of misrepresentation, conversion, aiding and abetting a fraud, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting a conversion, and negligence. Citizens Bank had no knowledge of Goldings's scheme to defraud Go-Best but failed to notify the Board of Bar Overseers of dishonored checks issued on the client account more than six months before Go-Best wired funds into that account. The trial court dismissed, but a divided Appeals Court reversed in part, vacating dismissal of claims of negligence and of aiding and abetting. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reinstated dismissal. Without actual knowledge, the bank's duty to notify the board of dishonored checks from trust accounts arose only from its contractual duty, not from any duty in tort, so the bank could not be liable to Go-Best for any negligence in fulfilling that duty. View "Go-Best Assets Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of MA" on Justia Law

Blonde appealed denial of his motion to stay pending appeal after a probate judge appointed a special master for the purpose of selling the parties' former marital home. The property has since been sold. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. Blonde had the opportunity to appeal to a panel of the appeals court. He also could have requested that the appeals court expedite such an appeal. An exercise of the court's “extraordinary power” is not necessary because he did not attempt to pursue ordinary appellate remedies. A stay pending appeal was not required and the request for a stay of that aspect of the judgment has become moot.View "Blonde. v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

Healey, convicted of multiple sexual offenses involving children, completed his prison sentences, but remains committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center as a sexually dangerous person. He was initially committed in 1966, under the law then in effect, and was recommitted after he reoffended sexually while on a gradual release program. He unsuccessfully petitioned for discharge under G.L. c. 123A, 9, several times. In 2005, a jury determined that he remained sexually dangerous. Healy filed a petition in the county court, G.L. c. 211, 3, alleging that his conditions of confinement are governed by the 1958 version of the sexually dangerous person law; that he is entitled to be evaluated by psychiatrists rather than psychologists; that he is entitled to hearings before the parole board; that his right to a speedy trial has been abridged; and that he is entitled to proceed jury-waived. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed denial of the petition. Healy was required to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of remedies alternative to G.L. c. 211, 3, and failed to do so. He could have appealed from dismissal of his habeas corpus petition or filed a civil action against the Commissioner of Correction to challenge the terms of his commitment. View "Healey v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

At trial, defendant conceded his guilt of murder, but sought a verdict of murder in the second degree on the ground that his impaired mental condition affected his ability to make decisions in a normal manner or to appreciate the consequences of his actions. He was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty for the beating death of his housemate in 2008. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, declining to grant relief under G.L. c. 278, 33E. The court rejected an argument by new counsel that the judge erred in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on mental impairment. In explaining the elements of murder in the first degree committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, the judge directed the jurors to consider each of the Cunneen factors, and he listed them accurately. The judge subsequently instructed the jury in conformity with the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 61-62 regarding consideration of evidence of the defendant's mental impairment. The jury need not be instructed in the exact words requested by the defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Szlachta" on Justia Law

Defendant entered the apartment of his estranged wife and their two children with a can of gasoline; poured the gasoline so that it landed on himself, his 14-month-old daughter (Diana), the babysitter, and the floor; and ignited it. Fire engulfed Diana’s body, causing permanent disfiguring injuries. Defendant was indicted for armed assault with intent to murder, G.L. c. 265, 18 (b ); aggravated assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon, G.L. c. 265, 15A (c ) (i); assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon, G.L. c. 265, 15A (b ); arson of a dwelling, G.L. c. 266, 1; and armed home invasion, G.L. c. 265, 18C. He testified that he intended to commit suicide, not to injure anyone else, nor to burn the apartment. He did not claim any mental or emotional condition that prevented him from forming requisite intent or that he was not criminally responsible for his acts because of mental or emotional impairment. He was convicted of all charges. The Massachusetts Supreme Court set aside convictions of armed assault with intent to murder Diana and the caretaker, based on admission of incriminating statements defendant made to a psychiatrist after the fire, but otherwise affirmed. The court rejected claims relating to admission of prior bad acts evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Tran" on Justia Law

In 2003 plaintiff entered into a same-sex civil union in Vermont. His Vermont civil union has never been dissolved by any civil authority. Nevertheless, in 2005, plaintiff and defendant were married in Worcester. In 2009 plaintiff filed for divorce from defendant. In his answer, defendant stated that he was married to the plaintiff and counterclaimed for a divorce. Defendant later moved to dismiss on the ground that his Massachusetts marriage was void. Holding that plaintiff's Vermont civil union as the equivalent of marriage in the Commonwealth, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the Vermont civil union would have to be dissolved before either party to that civil union could enter into a valid marriage in Massachusetts to a third party. View "Elia-Warnken v. Elia" on Justia Law