Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, charged with deriving support from prostitution, was tried before a jury that indicated that they were unable to reach a verdict. The judge declared a mistrial. Prior to retrial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictments against him on double jeopardy grounds. The trial judge (the same judge as at his first trial) denied that motion, finding that the prior declaration of mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that defendant may be retried. View "Ray v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Following internal upheaval in a gang, five members and a nonmember associate executed a sixth member. Two other members testified under cooperation agreements. Davenport, the nonmember who killed the victim, testified that he acted under duress. Following joint trial of four defendants, the jury found all guilty of first degree murder and of other crimes. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting Davenport’s claim that he was entitled to an instruction on duress as a defense to murder. The court also rejected arguments by other defendants that their defenses were mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable with Davenport's duress defense, so that their trials should have been severed, and that the Commonwealth was improperly allowed to challenge a juror who failed to make complete disclosure of his criminal record (the prosecutor discovered the omission after declaring his satisfaction with the juror but before the jury were sworn). The judge properly denied a motion for recusal that was based on statements made during a plea colloquy; properly admitted a statement of another defendant; properly denied a hearing to challenge reliability and admissibility of expert opinion testimony on bloodstain pattern analysis; and properly denied a required finding of not guilty on a charge of aggravated rape. View "Commonwealth v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

The Wetlands Protection Act, G.L. c. 131, 40, requires a conservation commission to issue a decision on a requested order of conditions within 21 days after holding a public hearing on the applicant's notice of intent to perform work covered by the act. Following the owner’s request for an extension, a hearing on his application for construction of a pile-supported pier and floating dock was held on April 6; the commission voted to deny the application on April 27 and mailed notice on April 28, 22 days after the hearing. The department reversed, based on the commission’s failure to timely act. In the meantime, the commission issued an enforcement order, based on work being done on the applicant’s property. The Supreme Judicial Court held that an applicant may waive the statutory time restriction, but any waiver must be voluntary in fact, its duration defined and reasonable in length, and notice of the waiver's duration must be a matter of public record, available to all interested persons. In this case, the applicant is entitled to proceed under the order issued by the department. View "Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of Hingham" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to rape of a child and an unrelated unarmed burglary, and was sentenced to eight to 15 years. He had been the live-in boyfriend of the victim's mother for many years. When the victim was approximately seven years old, he began fondling her chest, and when she was about 10 years old he raped her once or twice each week. The charged rapes occurred when the victim was age 12 to 14. A jury found defendant to be a sexually dangerous person, G.L. c. 123A, 1, and he was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center for an indeterminate period of from one day to life. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed for a new trial, based on the court: allowing evidence of defendant’s refusal to participate in sex offender treatment programs; admitting evidence of rumors that he had sexually assaulted another inmate; and instructing the jury regarding mental abnormality and the likelihood of engaging in sexual offenses. The prosecutor's closing argument, regarding defendant's sexual frustration from time in prison, was improper. The court properly excused a prospective juror for cause who expressed his belief that no medical expert could conclusively demonstrate whether defendant is going to commit another sexual offense. View "Commonwealth v. Hunt" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth alleged that, at age 16-17, the defendant committed several crimes including acts of child rape. The defendant was not apprehended until he was 26 years old. The defendant moved to dismiss the youthful offender indictments because he had not been afforded a transfer hearing pursuant to G.L. c. 119, 72A, which states that prior to indictment, the judge must determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offenses charged and, if so, either order the defendant discharged, if consistent with the protection of the public, or dismiss the case, if the public interest requires that the defendant be tried. The judge allowed the defendant's motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Section 72A, states that, "[i]f a person commits an offense or violation prior to his seventeenth birthday, and is not apprehended until after his eighteenth birthday, the court, after a hearing, shall determine whether there is probable cause ...." The language, "after a hearing shall," is clear and unambiguous. Section 54, which states, "[t]he court shall proceed on the complaint or the indictment ... in accordance with [sections 55-72], inclusive," does not exempt the Commonwealth from complying with the requirements of section 72A. View "Commonwealth v. Nanny" on Justia Law

In 2008, candidates for the U.S. presidency and vice-presidency collected signatures on nomination papers throughout the Commonwealth. The papers bore the political designation "Libertarian." The candidates failed to secure the indorsement of the national Libertarian party at its convention. The Libertarian Association of Massachusetts contacted the Secretary of the Commonwealth and requested that the names of the persons who won the party indorsement be substituted for the names of the candidates listed on the nomination papers. The Secretary refused. The federal trial court held that G. L. c. 53, 14, which governs filling a vacancy where a candidate nominated for "state, city or town office" withdraws, dies, or otherwise becomes ineligible prior to election, was unconstitutionally vague. On remand, the judge stayed the vagueness claim pending a state court clarification. Plaintiffs then sought a state court declaration that section 14 provides a minor party, which does not qualify as a "political party" under Massachusetts law, a means to "substitute" the names of candidates chosen at its national convention for those listed on nomination papers. After deciding to resolve the case, despite it being moot, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that section 14 applies to presidential electors. Although the section is not a model of clarity, it requires that all candidates gather signatures. View "Libertarian Assoc. of MA v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

More than a year after his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, defendant, moved for postverdict inquiry of the jurors. The trial judge had recused himself and a different judge granted the motion. After holding evidentiary hearings, the judge allowed the motion for a new trial on the basis that the jury had been exposed to an extraneous influence during deliberations and the Commonwealth had failed to prove that the incident did not prejudice the defendant. The Appeals Court vacated the order for a new trial and remanded the case for further inquiry into the bases for the request for a postverdict inquiry of the jurors and, in particular, the role of defendant and his friend in contacting a juror. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed that remand for further inquiry is appropriate and clarified the procedure for conducting postverdict hearings where, although a defendant claims that the jury were exposed to an extraneous influence, there is also evidence that the defendant or someone acting on the defendant's behalf may have been involved. View "Commonwealth v. Bresnahan" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine, G.L. c. 94C, 32E (b ) (1), and conspiracy to violate the drug laws, G.L. c. 94C, 40. He filed an affidavit of indigency, G.L. c. 261, 27B, was appointed counsel, and tendered pleas of not guilty. During proceedings on a motion to suppress, the judge questioned the defendant's indigency status, took evidence, and entered an order concluding that the defendant was not indigent because he was not in custody and had "available funds," under S.J.C. Rule 3:10, 1(b), from his girlfriend and his mother. The judge struck the appearance of counsel in the case before her and in the probation revocation proceeding. The Massachusetts Supreme Court dismissed an appeal, rejecting an argument that consideration of the available funds of his girlfriend and his mother infringed on his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. View "Commonwealth v. Fico" on Justia Law

The trial judge found that defendant was indigent but able to contribute $40,000 to his defense against indictments charging him with the murders of his wife, mother-in-law, and children (S.J.C. Rule 3:10, (1)(g)). In setting the amount of the required contribution, the judge considered assets that defendant had reported to the probation department, including bank accounts, a college fund, and an individual retirement account. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Some of the assets are currently unavailable to defendant under the "slayer statute," G.L. c. 265, 46 because those assets were held jointly with his deceased wife or in trust for the deceased children. An IRA is ordinarily to be considered a liquid asset available to a defendant and may properly be included in the assessment of his ability to pay for his representation, at least up to the net amount available to him after accounting for any early withdrawal penalties and taxes. View "Commonwealth v. Mortimer" on Justia Law

Following indictment on 93 counts of failure to pay wages timely, (G.L. c. 149, 148), defendant filed an affidavit of indigency and sought appointment of counsel at public expense (G.L. c. 211D, 2 1/2 (a )). After reviewing financial information, which showed that defendant and her husband together had an annual income of approximately $60,000 and owned three properties, the probation department recommended the defendant be found not indigent. The trial judge held three hearings at which defendant appeared without counsel and argued that she had little to no discretionary income and that two of the properties were subject to mortgages and tax liens, hindering their liquidity. She did not present evidence, but relied on oral statements and records discovered by the probation department. Reasoning that the defendant has the burden of proof of her indigency, the judge found the defendant not indigent. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. A criminal defendant who seeks to have counsel appointed at public expense bears the burden of proving indigency by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Porter." on Justia Law