Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree, as well as related crimes. On appeal, Defendant Facey contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his murder conviction as a joint venturer; both defendants argued that the jury should have been instructed on defense of another; and Defendant Norris claimed he was entitled to a jury instruction that one of the elements of possession of a firearm was the lack of a license. The court rejected defendants' arguments, affirmed defendants' convictions, and declined to exercise its power to grant relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Norris" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the town's solicitation of bids for the construction of a new police station. Barr Inc. submitted the lowest bid but the town determined that Barr was not a "responsible and eligible bidder," and that the contract should instead be awarded to the next-lowest bidder. Under G.L.c. 149, 44A(2)(D), contracts for the construction of public buildings estimated to cost above $100,000 "shall be awarded to the lowest responsible and eligible general bidder." At issue was whether, when an awarding authority was making a determination as to bidder responsibility, it was constrained to look only at materials compiled as part of the Department of Capital Asset Management's (DCAM's) contractor certification process. The court concluded that the competitive bidding statute placed no such restriction on awarding authorities. Therefore, the court could not conclude that the town exceeded its statutory authority by conducting an investigation into Barr's performance in past projects. View "Barr Inc. v. Town of Holliston" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, aggravated burglary, and armed assault in a dwelling. Defendant subsequently sought to vacate the conviction of armed assault in a dwelling on the ground that it was duplicative of the conviction of aggravated burglary. The court concluded that defendant was entitled to challenge whether two of the convictions arising from his guilty plea were barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy, but that his challenge failed because the convictions of armed assault in a dwelling and aggravated burglary were not duplicative. Accordingly, the denial of defendant's motion to vacate his conviction was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Negron" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of disorderly conduct and acquitted of assault as a result of a verbal altercation with her boyfriend. Defendant received two years of straight probation, with conditions, and subsequently appealed from her conviction. At issue was whether the 2009 amendment to G.L.c. 272, section 53, which became effective after defendant had engaged in disorderly conduct but before the time of her trial, and which changed the punishment for a first offense, constituted a repeal of the prior version of that statute but, pursuant to G.L.c. 4, section 6, Second, did not affect the punishment incurred before the repeal took affect. Rejecting defendant's arguments, the court held that it saw no clearly expressed intention by the Legislature to have the 2009 amendment to G.L.c. 272, section 53, apply retroactively. The fact that a defendant who committed the offense of disorderly conduct before July 1, 2009, was not entitled to the benefit of the 2009 amendment may be, in defendant's view, an unfair consequence of G.L.c. 4, section 6, Second, but it did not rise to the level of repugnancy. View "Commonwealth v. Dotson" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth sought relief from an order of a Superior Court judge unsealing affidavits underlying seven search warrants executed against plaintiffs during the course of a Statewide investigation into online gambling conducted at internet cafes. While the court agreed with the Commonwealth that plaintiffs did not have a Fourth Amendment right per se to access such materials, the court nonetheless concluded that interests protected by the Fourth Amendment were properly considered under the "good cause" standard for impounding judicial records and that the judge did not abuse his discretion or commit any other error of law in weighing those interests in this case. As the court saw no merit in the Commonwealth's remaining arguments, the court affirmed the judgment. View "New England Internet Cafe, LLC & others v. Clerk of the Superior Court for Criminal Business in Suffolk County & another" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of being an accessory before the fact to the murder in the first degree of the victim. Defendant appealed from his conviction and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that there was no error relating to the testimony of two key prosecution witnesses and therefore trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the testimony. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court also declined to exercise its power pursuant to G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to order a new trial or enter a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt. View "Commonwealth v. Burgos" on Justia Law

Defendant and two others were indicted for the crime of aggravated rape, with joint enterprise as the sole aggravating factor. After defendant was convicted, defendant argued that, apart from the court's authority in capital cases under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, an appellate court was without authority to order entry of conviction of a lesser included offense. Defendant further argued that, where the Commonwealth did not request an instruction on the lesser included offense and the conviction on the greater offense was a nullity, the Commonwealth was not entitled to entry of a conviction on the lesser included offense. The court agreed with the Appeals Court and vacated so much of the conviction as alleged aggravated rape, let stand his conviction as to the lesser included offense of rape, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for resentencing as to the crime of rape. View "Commonwealth v. French" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief seeking a determination that, by refusing to give her additional break time and a suitable environment during the medical licensing examination in which to express breast milk for her nursing daughter, the NBME violated her right to privacy under arts. 1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; (2) the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.L.c. 12, sections 11H, 11I; (3) the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, G.L.c. 93, section 102; and (4) the Massachusetts public accommodation discrimination statute, G.L.c. 272, sections 92A, 98. Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief requiring the NBME to give her an additional sixty minutes of break time per test day and a private room with a power outlet in order to express her breast milk in privacy. In a counterclaim, the NBME sought a declaration that it was not a State actor and that its gender-neutral accommodation policy did not disparately impact female exam candidates. The court concluded that the NBME did not violate the civil rights act because its conduct did not amount to coercion under that act; plaintiff proffered sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the NBME violated her rights under the equal rights act; in regards to plaintiff's claim under the public accommodation statute, the court rejected the legal arguments advanced by the NBME regarding the application of that statute to these circumstances; and because plaintiff was entitled to statutory relief under the public accommodation statute, the court did not decide her constitutional claim. The court's decision in the context of the equal rights act and public accommodation statute counts, that lactation was a sex-linked classification, recognized that there remained barriers that prevented new mothers from being able to breastfeed or express breast milk. The court took the opportunity to extend protection to lactating mothers in the context of lengthy testing required for medical licensure. View "Currier v. National Board of Medical Examiners" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury on two indictments charging statutory rape. The alleged victim was his then fifteen year old niece. Defendants subsequently appealed from his convictions. The court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial because the judge erred in excluding testimony of an expert and the evidence of childhood sexual abuse necessary to apply the expert opinion to the facts of this case, and because the error was prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Polk" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of carrying a firearm without a license; possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card; and possession of a loaded firearm. Defendants appealed, challenging, among other issues, the sufficiency of the evidence that they possessed the firearm. The court concluded that the evidence that defendants jointly and knowingly possessed the loaded firearm was sufficient as a matter of law. The court concluded, however, that the judge erred in denying defendants the opportunity to offer the affirmative defense that the firearm was manufactured before 1900 and therefore could be lawfully possessed without a license to carry and that this error could have materially influenced the firearm and ammunition convictions. Therefore, the court reversed the judgments of convictions for those charges and remanded for a new trial on those charges. View "Commonwealth v. Jefferson" on Justia Law