Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief seeking a determination that, by refusing to give her additional break time and a suitable environment during the medical licensing examination in which to express breast milk for her nursing daughter, the NBME violated her right to privacy under arts. 1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; (2) the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.L.c. 12, sections 11H, 11I; (3) the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, G.L.c. 93, section 102; and (4) the Massachusetts public accommodation discrimination statute, G.L.c. 272, sections 92A, 98. Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief requiring the NBME to give her an additional sixty minutes of break time per test day and a private room with a power outlet in order to express her breast milk in privacy. In a counterclaim, the NBME sought a declaration that it was not a State actor and that its gender-neutral accommodation policy did not disparately impact female exam candidates. The court concluded that the NBME did not violate the civil rights act because its conduct did not amount to coercion under that act; plaintiff proffered sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the NBME violated her rights under the equal rights act; in regards to plaintiff's claim under the public accommodation statute, the court rejected the legal arguments advanced by the NBME regarding the application of that statute to these circumstances; and because plaintiff was entitled to statutory relief under the public accommodation statute, the court did not decide her constitutional claim. The court's decision in the context of the equal rights act and public accommodation statute counts, that lactation was a sex-linked classification, recognized that there remained barriers that prevented new mothers from being able to breastfeed or express breast milk. The court took the opportunity to extend protection to lactating mothers in the context of lengthy testing required for medical licensure. View "Currier v. National Board of Medical Examiners" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury on two indictments charging statutory rape. The alleged victim was his then fifteen year old niece. Defendants subsequently appealed from his convictions. The court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial because the judge erred in excluding testimony of an expert and the evidence of childhood sexual abuse necessary to apply the expert opinion to the facts of this case, and because the error was prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Polk" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of carrying a firearm without a license; possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card; and possession of a loaded firearm. Defendants appealed, challenging, among other issues, the sufficiency of the evidence that they possessed the firearm. The court concluded that the evidence that defendants jointly and knowingly possessed the loaded firearm was sufficient as a matter of law. The court concluded, however, that the judge erred in denying defendants the opportunity to offer the affirmative defense that the firearm was manufactured before 1900 and therefore could be lawfully possessed without a license to carry and that this error could have materially influenced the firearm and ammunition convictions. Therefore, the court reversed the judgments of convictions for those charges and remanded for a new trial on those charges. View "Commonwealth v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm; unlawful possession of a loaded firearm; and unlawful possession of ammunition without a firearm identification (FID) card. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions of possession of a firearm and possession of a loaded firearm. The court rejected defendant's argument and affirmed his firearm convictions. Defendant also appealed from his conviction under the sentencing enhancement provision of G.L.c. 269, 10G(c), on the ground that the evidence presented in support of one of his three prior convictions, assault and battery, failed to establish that he committed a "violent crime" within the meaning of G.L.c. 140, section 121. The court agreed with defendant and vacated the judgment for conviction under G.L.c. 269, section 10G(c), as an armed career criminal based on three predicate offense convictions, and remanded the case for the entry of judgment and resentencing under G.L.c. 269, section 10G(c), based on two predicate offense convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Eberhart" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery (with his fists); assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (shod foot); and the unlawful possession of a firearm outside of his residence or place of business, as well as unlawful possession of a firearm having previously been convicted of a violent crime. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the firearm should have been suppressed because there was neither probable cause that a firearm would be found in the vehicle nor grounds for conducting an inventory search; the evidence was insufficient to prove that he constructively possessed the firearm; and with respect to the assault and battery convictions, defendant contended that the judge improperly permitted the jury to view a photograph of the victim's facial injuries. The court rejected defendant's arguments regarding the firearm and subsequent offender convictions, and discerned no merit in defendant's remaining claims. View "Commonwealth v. Gouse" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on all three theories of murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping. On appeal, defendant argued (1) error in the denial of his motion to suppress statements and evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel predicated on trial counsel's failure to (a) engage a sleep deprivation expert and (b) request a jury instruction on the effect of defendant's intoxication relative to his intent; and (3) improper closing argument by the prosecutor. The court rejected defendant's arguments and affirmed the order denying the motion to suppress and the judgments of conviction. The court discerned no basis to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Morales" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant's claims on appeal related largely to statements he made to a detective while he was in custody in a hospital recovering from a gunshot wound. Because a number of aspects of the trial, among them the detective's testimony concerning defendant's unrecorded statements, prejudicial limitations on defendant's right to cross-examine a detective, and certain of the prosecutor's remarks in closing argument, created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Woodbine" on Justia Law

After her mother had died and genetic market testing had revealed that R.R. was not her biological father, a judge in the Probate and Family Court allowed Karen's motion to vacate the voluntary acknowledgment of parentage and a judgment of support, custody, and visitation that was based on the voluntary acknowledgment of parentage. At issue was whether the judge was correct in vacating the voluntary acknowledgement of parentage, where it was not challenged until more than one year after it was executed, where after the mother's death the mother's husband signed an affidavit denying paternity, and where the judge made no finding as to Karen's best interest. The court concluded that the voluntary acknowledgment of parentage never became effective as a matter of law because the mother was married at the time of the child's birth and the husband had not executed an affidavit denying paternity until after the mother's death. Because the acknowledgment never had force or effect, there was no time limit on challenges to its validity, and the judge was required to vacate it. View "D.H. vs. R.R" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a superior court judge's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging violations of her state civil rights. Plaintiff contended that she had a right, secured by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and by art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, to attend a lecture that was open to the public, held on the campus of Tufts and that defendants violated the act when they excluded her from the lecture. Tufts, through its office of continuing education, presented a publicly advertised lecture on its campus entitled, "Dangers of Feeding Your Pet a Raw Diet." Plaintiff, who was an advocate of raw food diets for animals, sought to attend the lecture. At the time, she had not paid her bill for services rendered to her horse and defendants informed plaintiff that she was ineligible for continuing education services at Tufts. The court concluded that the circumstances of plaintiff's exclusion from the lecture did not amount to an interference with any claimed free speech right, and thus that the allowance of summary judgment on this claim was proper. The court also concluded that the allowance of summary judgment for defendants' on plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence was correct. View "Roman v. Trustees of Turfts College & others." on Justia Law

The Foggs challenged the issuance of a building permit to 81 Spooner Road, LLC (developer), by the building commissioner for the town of Brookline. At issue was whether a judge in the Land Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Fogg and his mother, on the issue of their standing as "aggrieved" persons under G.L.c. 40A, section 17. The court concluded that the developer failed to rebut the Foggs' presumption of standing. Because the Foggs were deemed to have standing, the judge properly eliminated that issue from the ensuring trial on the merits of the parties' complaints seeking judicial review of the board's decision to rescind the building permit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "81 Spooner Road, LLC vs. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brookline & others (and a companion case )" on Justia Law