Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of unlawful distribution of cocaine and of a drug offense in a school zone. The Appeals Court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v. King, affirmed defendant's convictions, holding that a field test and other circumstances rendered the admission of the certificate of drug analysis harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court granted defendant's application for further appellate review and paired this case for argument with Commonwealth v. King, a case that raised the same issue and involved the same prosecutor and the same detective as were involved in this case. Because the court concluded, as it did in King, that in the specific circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth's evidence was not so overwhelming as to nullify the effect of the erroneously admitted certificate, the judgment was reversed. View "Commonwealth v. Billings" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unlawful distribution of cocaine. The Appeals court affirmed his conviction, holding that the field test and other circumstances rendered the admission of a certificate of drug analysis harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court granted defendant's application for further appellate review and paired this case for argument with Commonwealth v. Billings. Because the court concluded that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth's evidence was not so overwhelming as to nullify the effect of the erroneously admitted certificate, the judgment was reversed. View "Commonwealth v. King" on Justia Law

While being held for custodial interrogation, and without having first waived the Miranda rights of which he had been advised, defendant shook his head from side to side in response to the question, "So you don't want to speak?" At issue was whether defendant, by his conduct, had invoked the right to remain silent guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of rights and, if so, whether the police sufficiently honored that right. The court concluded that, under both the Fifth Amendment and art. 12, the right to remain silent was invoked but was not "scrupulously honored" and that suppression of the subsequent incriminating statements was accordingly warranted. In so concluding, the court held that, in the prewaiver context, art. 12 did not require a suspect to invoke his right to remain silent with the utmost clarity, as required under Federal law. View "Commonwealth v. Clarke" on Justia Law

This case concerned a family dispute over ownership of what had been the family home in Woburn. At issue was whether a party could establish that she lacked the capacity to contract, thus making the contract voidable by her, in the absence of evidence that she suffered from a medically diagnosed, long-standing mental illness or defect. The court concluded that its evolving standard of contractual incapacity did not in all cases require proof that a party's claimed mental illness or defect was of some significant duration or that it was permanent, progressive, or degenerative; but, without medical evidence or expert testimony that the mental condition interfered with the party's understanding of the transaction, or her ability to act reasonably in relation to it, the evidence would not be sufficient to support a conclusion of incapacity. In this case, the evidence was insufficient to support a determination of incapacity where Susan, among other things, understood at the time that she was participating in a mediation to discuss settlement of the lawsuit, was aware that the subject of the mediation was to resolve the dispute regarding the family home, participated in the mediation, and listened to the arguments of counsel. Therefore, the court vacated the motion judge's order and remanded for entry of an order enforcing the settlement agreement. View "Sparrow v. Demonico & another" on Justia Law

Samuel Pietropaolo Sr. (Sam Sr.)directed a substantial portion of his retirement benefits to the upkeep of a life insurance policy that he purchased in 1998 through his nephew, an insurance agent. The nephew assured Sam Sr. and the other plaintiffs that the policy provided death benefits of $500,000 but, in fact, the policy provided only $200,000 in benefits. Although plaintiffs regularly received accurate policy statements from the insurer that issued the policy, they relied on the nephew's assurances as to the policy's value for almost six years, only bringing this action in July 2004. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were properly pleaded in tort under G.L.c. 93A. Their claims were therefore subject to the limitations periods in G.L.c. 260, section 2A, and 5A, respectively, which were susceptible to tolling. The court further concluded that the nephew's fraudulent concealment of these claims tolled the limitation period as to claims against the nephew himself, but did not toll the limitation period with regard to the remaining defendants. However, because the limitation period for claims brought under G.L.c. 93A was longer than the limitation period for tort claims, the nationwide defendants have not shown that plaintiffs' G.L.c. 93A claim against Nationwide was time barred. The court finally concluded that the trial judge did not err in deciding that the economic loss doctrine did not bar plaintiffs' common-law claims; determining that it was not unreasonable as a matter of law for plaintiffs to have relied on the nephew's misrepresentations; dismissing plaintiffs' G.L.c. 93A claim against Barry G. Armstrong; determining the amount of the damages on plaintiffs' G.L.c. 93A claim against the nephew; or calculating the award of attorney's fees against the nephew. View "Passatempo, trustee, & others v. McMenimen, & others." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of a Class B substance with intent to distribute and possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute and eventually entered into a plea agreement. At issue was whether a judge had the authority under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29(a), to reduce a sentence after defendant and the Commonwealth had entered into a plea in which the Commonwealth agreed not to seek indictments against defendant on the pending charges, defendant had agreed to plead guilty to the charges and join the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation, and the judge had imposed the recommended sentence. The court concluded that where, as here, a judge acted on his own timely motion to revise or revoke a sentence, the judge had the authority to reduce a sentence where it appeared that justice may not have been done regardless whether a plea agreement included an agreed sentence recommendation. View "Commonwealth v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in a criminal complaint with a single count of armed robbery and eventually plead guilty in the District Court to a reduced charge. At issue was whether the Commonwealth had the authority to require a judge to vacate a defendant's guilty plea where the Commonwealth made a charge concession as part of the plea agreement and the judge imposed a sentence less severe than the agreed sentence recommendation. The court concluded that the Commonwealth did not have this authority under Mass. R. Crim. P. 12, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511, or G.L.c. 278, section 18. The court further concluded that if the guilty plea were to be vacated at the prosecution's request and over the objection of the defense, double jeopardy would bar further prosecution on that charge. View "Commonwealth v. Dean-Ganek" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an appeal from a decision of the board approving a minor modification to the site assignment for an existing landfill and related processing facility pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, section 14. At issue was plaintiff's standing to seek judicial review in the Superior Court of the board's decision. The court concluded that on the record before it, plaintiffs lacked standing to seek judicial review of the board's decision in the Superior Court as persons "aggrieved" and, nevertheless, plaintiffs' substantive challenges to the decision lacked merit. View "Board of Health of Sturbridge & others v. Board of Health of Southbridge & another. " on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on two indictments charging statutory rape of his fifteen year old niece. At issue was whether defendant, whose motion to stay the execution of his sentence was denied by a single justice of the Appeals Court, could file another motion to stay the execution of his sentence before a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court after direct appellate review was granted. The court concluded that he could so proceed, and that the single justice could elect to consider de novo defendant's application for a stay. Because the court concluded that the single justice did not abuse his discretion in allowing defendant's motion to stay the execution of the sentence, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Polk v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case involved Commonwealth Care, a state-initiated program that provided structured premium assistance for low-income Massachusetts residents. In 2009, the Legislature made certain changes to the eligibility requirements of Commonwealth Care, enacted in a two-part supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 2010. Section 31(a) of the appropriation excluded all aliens who were federally ineligible under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 8 U.S.C. 1601-1646, from participation in Commonwealth Care. Plaintiffs were individuals who either have been terminated from Commonwealth Care or have been denied eligibility solely as a result of their alienage. The court held that section 31(a) could not pass strict scrutiny and that the discrimination against legal immigrants that its limiting language embodied violated their rights to equal protection under the Massachusetts Constitution. View "Finch & others v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. & others" on Justia Law