Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Smaland, together with third-party defendants, appealed from a Superior Court judge's order disqualifying their attorney from representing them in a real property dispute against the Genovas. The judge disqualified the attorney based on his conclusion that the attorney was a necessary witness because his clients had raised an advice of counsel defense and he had assisted various witnesses in submitting errata sheets that substantively changed their deposition testimony. The court concluded that the judge failed to engage a sufficiently searching review of this fact-intensive issue. Consequently, the court vacated the order and remanded the case for a further hearing. The court also considered the scope of disqualification orders under Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.7(a), and to clarify the proper use of errata sheets in altering deposition testimony under Mass. R. Civ. P. 30(e). View "Smaland Beach Assoc., Inc. v. Genova & another" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted, among other things, of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant subsequently appealed his convictions. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the murder conviction; the prosecutor did misstate certain evidence at trial but the court concluded that the error did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice; and the trial judge's instructions to the jury were not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and declined to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce the murder verdict or order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Young" on Justia Law

This matter came before the court on a reservation and report by a single justice of the court of a decision and final order of the department approving a power purchase agreement (PPA) that National Grid entered into with Cape Wind. The four parties that brought the appeal were all interveners in the department's proceeding. They claim that the PPA violated the commerce clause of the United States Constitution; the department improperly found that the PPA was cost effective and in the public interest; the contract should have been solicited through competitive bidding and subject to a cap on its size; and the department erroneously both approved a method for recovering costs from all distribution customers and required that the contract facilitate financing of a renewable energy generation source. The interveners sought reversal of the department's decision and order, and a remand to the department for further proceedings. The court reviewed the department's decision under G.L.c. 25, section 5, and gave deference to the department's expertise and experience, remanding to the county court where the single justice will affirm the department's decision. View "Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utilities & others (No. 1)" on Justia Law

The court addressed a procedural question that related to Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utilities & others (No. 1). At issue was whether the department committed error in denying the third motion filed by the Alliance to reopen the administrative record in the proceeding that the court reviewed in Alliance III. The court applied the more deferential standard of review that generally applied to procedural decisions by agencies on whether to reopen an administrative record and held that the department did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen a closed record in a completed proceeding in order to accept more information on the same points. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court where the decision of the department denying the motion to reopen the record was to be affirmed. View "Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utilities & others (No. 2)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged his expulsion from Weston High School for allegedly possessing and distributing a "marijuana cookie" on school property. The court held that the judge abused his discretion where the record did not suggest that the judge either considered the proper legal standards for the allowance of a motion for a preliminary injunction or evaluated the factual circumstances relevant to plaintiff's alleged misconduct. Therefore, the order regarding plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was vacated in its entirety and the matter remanded. View "Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Weston" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his conviction for trafficking in over fourteen grams of cocaine. On appeal, defendant contended that the Commonwealth violated his right to confront the witnesses against him when it introduced evidence from laboratory drug tests through the testimony of a substitute analyst rather than through the analyst who performed the test. Defendant also contended that the trial judge erred in admitting certain hearsay statements and that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Although much of the challenged testimony was erroneously admitted, this testimony did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice; nor was defendant denied the effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Munoz" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his convictions of two counts of rape of a child under sixteen years of age and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person who has attained the age of fourteen years. Defendant contended, among other things, that certain statements admitted against him at trial were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The court concluded that defendant unambiguously invoked his right to counsel and that questioning should have ceased until counsel was made available. Therefore, the incriminating statements should not have been admitted at trial. In any event, defendant was entitled to relief because the Commonwealth did not satisfy its heavy burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's subsequent waiver of that right was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Because the court could not conclude that the erroneous admission of defendant's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a new trial was required. View "Commonwealth v. Hoyt, Sr" on Justia Law

After the report and the transcript of an inquest was filed in the Superior Court, and a grand jury returned an indictment charging Amy Bishop with the murder of her brother, Globe filed a motion in the Superior Court to inspect and copy the inquest report and the transcript of the inquest proceedings. Applying the court's new standard to the inquest report and transcript at issue in this case, the court held that the denial of the motion to impound must be vacated because, as to the transcript, the judge failed to recognize the effect of G.L.c. 38, section 10, and, as to the report, the judge rested on the principle in Kennedy v. Justice of the District Court of Dukes County that the court replaced with the rule that the report became a presumptively public document when the transcript became a presumptively public document. On remand, the judge will conduct further proceedings in accordance with this opinion, with the proviso that the inquest report and transcript shall continue to be impounded until at least ten calendar days after the issuance of the rescript. View "The Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., petitioner" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree by reason of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed. The court concluded that the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree based on extreme atrocity or cruelty. The court also held that no substantial likelihood of miscarriage occurred where the evidence did not warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on heat of passion induced by sudden combat. Because defendant received the benefit of an instruction to which he was not entitled, any errors in the instruction could not have prejudiced him. The court further held that the judge correctly excluded the evidence of the victim's prior violent conduct. Finally, the court concluded that there was no reason to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law

This was an action for judicial review of a final decision and order of the board suspending Stephen Chadwick's license to practice dentistry in Massachusetts. Because the court agreed that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgt. Ass'n applied to the disciplinary proceeding, the court concluded that, while the board could mandate compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., standards in dental practices and sanction dentists for professional misconduct after OSHA determined that a violation had occurred, the board could not interpret, apply, and enforce OSHA standards regarding workplace safety on its own record. The court further concluded that the preemptive effect of OSHA articulated in Gade also barred the board from sanctioning Chadwick based on conduct it found to be violative of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines and department regulations, where such action constituted the direct and substantial regulation of occupational safety and health issues for which Federal OSHA standards were in effect. The court further concluded that the board's one finding unrelated to a formal OSHA standard was supported by substantial evidence View "Chadwick v. Board of Registration in Dentistry" on Justia Law