Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant filed an application in the county court under G.L.c. 278, section 33E for leave to appeal from the denial of his second motion for a new trial. A single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court on the question of whether a so-called Acevedo error in the jury instructions on the burden of proof on provocation presented a "new and substantial" question under the statute, and if it did, whether the error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The court concluded that defendant's claims were not new and substantial within the meaning of G.L.c. 278, section 33E. The court continued to adhere to the principle that single justices, whose decisions under section 33E were final and unreviewable, faced with gatekeeper applications under section 33E, would allow cases to proceed to the full court in all meaningful matters. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court where an order shall be entered denying defendant's application for leave of appeal. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a teacher with professional teacher status, was dismissed by the superintendent of the school district for multiple instances of conduct unbecoming a teacher. On appeal, plaintiff argued that G.L.c. 71, section 42, which compelled arbitration of a wrongful dismissal claim made by a public school teacher with professional teacher status, violated art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because it impermissibly delegated to a private individual (an arbitrator) a judicial function and denied meaningful judicial review. The court concluded that this statute's provision authorizing arbitration of a principal or superintendent's dismissal decision did not interfere with core judicial functions and that the scope of judicial review set forth in the statute did provide for meaning judicial review such that there was no art. 30 violation. Plaintiff also contended that, pursuant to G.L.c. 150C, section 11, the arbitration award should be vacated because the arbitrator acted in excess of her authority, engaged in misconduct, and exhibited bias against him. The court concluded that the judge properly concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority or act in manifest disregard for the law. The court also rejected plaintiff's claims that the arbitrator engaged in misconduct and exhibited bias. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Atwater v. Commissioner of Education" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for operating while under the influence of intoxication liquor (OUI), operating with a license suspended for a prior OUI, and operating with a revoked license, following an encounter with an off-duty Summerville police officer in the city of Woburn. At issue was the suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of the Woburn encounter, on the ground that the off-duty officer performed an illegal extraterritorial arrest. Because the court concluded that the Summerville officer did not "arrest" defendant for the purposes of triggering the common-law rule against performing a citizen's arrest for a misdemeanor, and that his actions were reasonable preventive measures to ensure public safety, the court agreed with the motion judge that there was no need to exclude the evidence. The court also held that its conclusion was buttressed by the lack of any official misconduct on these facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order denying defendant's motion to suppress and affirmed the convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Limone" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from a judgment of a single justice of the court denying his petition pursuant to G.L.c. 211, section 3. Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictments against him in the Superior Court, arguing that they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The case was now before the court pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21. The rule required petitioner to demonstrate "why review of the trial court decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." Petitioner has failed to do so where a statute of limitations defense could adequately be addressed in the ordinary course of pretrial motions, trial, and appeal. Although petitioner claimed that he had a right not to be tried on the indictment because of the passage of time, a statute of limitations defense protected only the right to have charges brought in a timely fashion. Petitioner's remaining claims similarly could be raised and decided during the ordinary course of trial and appeal. View "Garden v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of a single justice of the court denying, without hearing, his petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3. The case before the court on defendant's memorandum pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, which required him to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or other available means." In his memorandum, which primarily focused on the merits of the judge's decision to revoke his sentence, defendant briefly asserted that he had no remedy in the ordinary appellate process. The court disagreed, if defendant was resentenced to a longer term, he could raise the revocation issue on appeal from that decision. View "Sarantakis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of felony-murder, deliberate premeditation, and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant was also convicted of armed robbery as the predicate felony and three charges of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. On appeal, defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence of armed robbery to support his conviction of felony-murder, that there were numerous errors in the judge's instruction to the jury, and that his attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The court held that because it concluded that no claim of error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, and discerned no reason to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, defendant's convictions were affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Fitchburg appealed from a ruling of the department requiring it to reimburse its customers over $4.6 million in gas supply costs incurred during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 purchasing seasons. The court concluded that the department's determination that Fitchburg's purchasing plans required preapproval was erroneous, as the plans incorporated only traditional risk management techniques that had previously never been subject to the department's preapproval. Penalizing Fitchburg for failing to seek preapproval, when such preapproval was never required, exceeded the department's authority and amounted to an error of law. With respect to the allegedly imprudent purchases, the court agreed with the department that one of the purchases at issue was unreasonable and imprudent, but held that the department's findings of imprudence with regard to the balance of the purchases in 2007 and 2008 were not supported by substantial evidence. View "Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities" on Justia Law

The issue raised by this appeal concerned the threshold administrative remedy or remedies available under the Zoning Act, G.L.c. 40A, to one who was aggrieved by the issuance of a building permit to another person. The court held that where an aggrieved party had adequate notice of the building permit's issuance, he or she was required to appeal the appropriate zoning board of appeals within thirty days of the permit's issue date. In such circumstances, a later appeal to the board from a denial of a request for enforcement was not an available alternative remedy. Accordingly, the court agreed with the Land Court judge that because plaintiffs, who had adequate notice that the challenged building permits had issued to their neighbor, did not file an appeal with the zoning board of appeals within 30 days of issuance, the board, and thereafter the Land Court, lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Connors, Jr. v. Annino" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of unarmed robbery of a person sixty years of age or older and was sentenced to life in prison after the trial judge found him guilty of being a habitual offender. At issue was whether the prosecutor's mathematical analysis in his closing argument of the probability that the lone eyewitness's identification of defendant was accurate created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where the analysis was not a reasonable doubt with a statistical probability. The court held that where, as here, the prosecution's case rested solely on an uncertain eyewitness identification and defendant's association with an admitted perpetrator of the crime, it did. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Ferreira" on Justia Law

In this case, the court must determine whether a plaintiff had standing to maintain a try title action under G.L.c. 240, section 1-5, where he was in physical possession of real property but his chain of title rested on a foreclosure sale conducted by someone other than "the mortgagee or his executors, administrators, successors or assigns." On his own motion, a Land Court judge determined that plaintiff held no title to the property at issue and thus lacked standing to bring a try title action. The judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice and plaintiff appealed. The court held that the Land Court judge properly raised the question whether plaintiff had record title to the property such that he had standing to bring a try title action. Plaintiff had identified no basis on which it might be concluded that he had record title to the property such that a try title action could be sustained. As a result, the Land Court was without jurisdiction to hear the try title action. Dismissal of the petition was therefore proper but the dismissal should have been without prejudice. View "Bevilacqua, III v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law