Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, and also of armed assault with intent to kill. Defendant appealed from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. Defendant argued that he was entitled to reversal of the convictions and a new trial because the courtroom was improperly closed during individual voir dire of prospective jurors; the judge, outside the presence of defendant, improperly questioned jurors and discussed questions from the jury; defendant was improperly denied a post trial evidentiary hearing on the possible bias of two deliberating jurors; the trial judge committed evidentiary errors; the judge's instructions on malice, voluntary manslaughter, and self-defense were in error; and his trial counsel was ineffective in many respects. The court thoroughly examined the record and affirmed defendant's convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, declining to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33 E. View "Commonwealth v. Dyer" on Justia Law

Petitioners (the witnesses) appealed from the denial by a single justice of their petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3. In their petition, the witnesses sought relief from a Superior Court order granting them immunity pursuant to G.L.c. 233, section 20C-20E, and ordering them to testify in the criminal trial of David Forlizzi and Fred Battista. The court held that the witnesses have not shown that they could not obtain adequate relief from the challenged orders in the normal process of appellate review. Therefore, the denial of their petition was proper. Insofar as the single justice considered the merits of the witnesses' claims, the court also concluded that he correctly determined that the scope of immunity provided to the witnesses pursuant to G.L.c. 233, section 20G, adequately protected their constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the single justice. View "Vaccari & another, petitioners" on Justia Law

This case was before the court pursuant to an order entered by the United States Supreme Court granting defendant's petition for certiorari, vacating the judgment, and remanding the case to the court for further consideration in light of McDonald v. Chicago. At issue was whether McDonald required the court to dismiss the three indictments charging defendant under G.L.c. 269, 10(h)(1), with possession of a firearm and ammunition without a firearm identification (FID) card. The court held that because defendant had not asserted or made any showing that he applied for (and was denied) a FID card to possess a firearm and ammunition, defendant could not challenge his convictions under G.L.c. 269, 10(h)(1), as unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Accordingly, there was no reason to alter the court's judgment. View "Commonwealth v. Loadholt" on Justia Law

Following the death of plaintiff's wife, plaintiff amended the complaint for medical malpractice in a pending action against defendants, to include a claim for wrongful death. The wrongful death claim in the amended complaint was subsequently dismissed as time barred pursuant to G.L.c. 260, section 4 (statute of repose), and plaintiff appealed. The court held that a wrongful death claim could be substituted for a personal injury claim only where the trial had not commenced; the original complaint alleging malpractice was filed within the statutes of limitation and repose; and the allegations of liability supporting the personal injury claim were the same as those supporting the wrongful death claim. Accordingly, the court held that the wrongful death claim in this case should not have been dismissed where plaintiff could, after the period of time set forth in the statue of repose had expired, amend a complaint alleging medical malpractice resulting in injury including expected premature death. View "Sisson, Jr., et al. v. Lhowe, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and of intimidation of a witness. On appeal, defendant claimed that the trial judge committed reversible errors and also raised several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the convictions and declined to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the murder conviction.View "Commonwealth v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Secretary filed an administrative complaint alleging that three hedge funds offered by Bulldog Investors violated section 301 of G.L.c. 110A by offering unregistered securities to a Massachusetts resident through a publicly available website and an e-mail message. The Secretary adopted the hearing officer's finding of a violation and ordered Bulldog Investors to cease and desist from committing any further violations and to take all necessary actions to ensure that future offers and sales of securities complied with section 301. The court held that the challenged provisions of the Massachusetts law were part of a constitutionally permissible disclosure scheme and, to the extent that they restricted speech, they were tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state interest in promoting the integrity of capital markets by ensuring a fully informed investing public. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bulldog Investors, et al. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs commenced an action in the Superior Court, alleging fraud, violation of G.L.c. 93A, and other claims arising from their purchase of a house which, they alleged, contained numerous undisclosed latent defects that rendered the house uninhabitable. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a "Notice of Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct," alleging that the judge was in violation of the Code in several respects. Plaintiffs requested that the single justice remove the judge from the case and the single justice denied relief on the ground that plaintiffs had adequate alternative remedies. The court held that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion by denying extraordinary general superintendence relief and affirmed the judgment. View "Culley, et al. v. Cato, et al." on Justia Law

Ralph C. Sullivan was stopped and issued a citation assessing a one hundred dollar penalty for a moving violation, failure to stay within a marked lane, in violation of G.L.c. 89, section 4A. On appeal, defendant claimed that the twenty-five and fifty dollar filing fees, he was required to pay in order to have his case heard, violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Defendant also argued that, because the statue providing for payment of the twenty-five dollar filing fee was enacted after he had requested a clerk-magistrate's hearing, the imposition of the filing fee was an ex post facto application of that statute. The court held that the filing fees did not violate Sullivan's equal protection rights and that the application of the statute requiring the twenty-five dollar filing fee did not violate the ex post facto clause. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Sullivan's motion seeking the return of these filing fees. View "Police Dept. of Salem v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, armed assault with intent to murder, and possession of an unlicensed firearm. On appeal, defendant argued that he should be granted a new trial because of ineffective assistance of counsel; that the judge erred in limiting the jury's use of exculpatory evidence of third-party culprits, in admitting evidence of defendant's participation in drug dealing, and in failing to give an alibi instruction; and that defendant was entitled to reversal of the guilty verdict on the indictment charging armed assault with intent to murder. The court affirmed the convictions and the denial of the motion for new trial. After a complete review of the record, the court also concluded that there was no basis to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce his murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Walker" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder on both charges, and of burning of a dwelling house, armed robbery while masked, and assault and battery. Defendant subsequently raised numerous issues of error on appeal related to the denial of his motion for a new trial, denial of his motions to suppress, and admission of DNA evidence. The court affirmed defendant's convictions and declined to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial pursuant to its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Cavitt" on Justia Law