Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose when Robert Morrison, Jr. pleaded guilty to, among other things, four counts of assault and battery on a public employee (the arresting police officer) and the officer consequently brought a civil suit against Morrison for his injuries. Morrison and Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Metropolitan) subsequently applied for direct appellate review on the issue of whether Metropolitan had a duty to defend and indemnify Morrisson in the civil suit. The court held that an exclusion in a liability policy for "intentional and criminal acts" applied where the insured intended to commit the conduct that caused injury and where the conduct was criminal. The court also held that a guilty plea did not negate an insurer's duty to defend, even where the duty to defend would be negated by a criminal conviction after trial, because a guilty plea was not given preclusive effect and was simply evidence that the insured's acts were intentional and criminal. The court further held that one of the consequences of such a breach of its duty to an insured by failing to provide a defense was that, in determining whether the insurer owed a duty to indemnify the insured for the default judgment, the insurer was bound by the factual allegations in the complaint as to liability. The court finally held that, because the judge based her conclusion that Metropolitan had no duty to indemnify in large part on Morrison's guilty pleas and because the judge determined that Metropolitan had no duty to indemnify without first determining whether it owed a duty to defend at the time of the default judgment, the court vacated the declaratory judgment and set aside the allowance of Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment as well as the denial of Morrison's motion for partial summary judgment. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Metropolitan Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Morrison, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a level three sex offender with Asperger's disorder currently residing in a rest home. At issue was whether G.L.c. 178K(2)(e), which prohibited level three sex offenders to move to a rest home or other regulated long-term care facility, was unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. The court held that the statute infringed on plaintiff's protected liberty and property interests and violated his right to due process; because the statute failed to provide for an individualized determination that the public safety benefits of requiring him to leave the rest home outweighed the risks to plaintiff of such a removal, the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. View "John Doe vs. Police Commissioner of Boston & others" on Justia Law

This case arose when defendant, a sex offender, was notified by the Sex Offender Registry Board (Board) on July 3, 2008, that he had been recommended for reclassification as a level three sex offender where defendant had been classified as a level two sex offender since 2004. At issue was whether the board had the authority to promulgate a regulation declaring that a sex offender waived the right to a classification hearing by failing to appear at that hearing without good cause. The court held that because the Legislature specified only that the classification hearing was waived where the sex offender did not timely request a hearing, the board lacked the authority to declare the hearing waived where a sex offender requested a hearing and the sex offender's attorney was present at that hearing. View "John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 941 vs. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff, Bank of New York (BNY), asserted that it acquired title to the home of defendant pursuant to foreclosure proceedings. At issue was whether the Housing Court had jurisdiction to decide the validity of a challenge to a title, raised by a former homeowner as a defense to a summary process eviction action by a party acquiring the property pursuant to a foreclosure sale. The court vacated the allowance of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings because the court concluded that the Housing Court had jurisdiction to consider the validity of plaintiff's title as a defense to a summary process action after a foreclosure sale pursuant to G.L.c. 239, section 1. View "Bank of New York v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. At issue was whether defendant's motion for new trial was properly granted where defendant challenged the instruction on extreme atrocity or cruelty and the instruction on reasonable provocation as it related to both murder and manslaughter. The court held that it was error to conclude that the instruction on extreme atrocity or cruelty created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice and that the court did not adequately consider the issue of erroneous instruction on plenary review. The court also held that defendant was not entitled to the instruction on provocation and voluntary manslaughter where the evidence of "cooling off" was objective and sufficient to remove provocation as a mitigating factor on the question of malice. Therefore, the court held that the judge abused her discretion in granting defendant a new trial and the order was vacated. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony-murder in the first degree based on the predicate felony of attempted armed robbery, and related crimes. At issue was whether the jury should have been instructed that an alternative underlying felony for the felony-murder charge was armed home invasion committed with a firearm, a crime that at the relevant time did not carry a life sentence and therefore could have served as a predicate felony-murder in the second degree. The court held that, where the felony later advanced by defendant as the predicate for an instruction on felony-murder in the second degree was not itself the subject of a separate indictment, no error occurred if the trial judge did not charge the jury on it even though there could be sufficient evidence supporting such a charge, at least where, as here, no party requested such an instruction or even brought the issue to the judge's attention at trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial. The court also held that defendant's argument that his separate conviction of armed home invasion merged with his felony-murder conviction must be vacated because it was not properly before the court. View "Commonwealth v. Stokes" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, armed home invasion, arson, and two charges of violation of an abuse prevention order. Defendant appealed both from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that the absence of an instruction on felony-murder in the second degree with arson as the predicate felony required a reversal of defendant's conviction of felony-murder in the first degree. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's conviction of that crime, set aside the verdict, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, at the Commonwealth's option, a verdict of guilty of felony-murder in the second degree may be entered in lieu of a new trial on the murder indictment. The court affirmed defendant's other convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Bell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery of his girlfriend (victim). On appeal, defendant contended that the admission into evidence of a tape of the 911 telephone call the victim made violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The court held that the victim's 911 call was an excited utterance and was not testimonial because the court could infer from the victim's statements during the call that the victim had just been assaulted, that the victim was still in the same apartment building as the assailant, and that the victim was in danger until the police came or defendant fled. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Commonwealth v. Beatrice" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder with armed assault with the intent to rob as the predicate felony. Defendant was also convicted of armed assault in a dwelling, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. Defendant claimed error regarding the denial of his motion to suppress; claimed that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts and in limiting defendant's use of third-party culprit evidence; claimed that trial counsel should have requested a jury instruction concerning the effects of marijuana intoxication on defendant's ability to form the specific intent for murder with deliberate premeditation and the underlying felony for felony-murder; and requested that, pursuant to G.L.c. 278, section 33E, the court reduce the verdict on the murder charge or order a new trial. The court found no reversible error and therefore, affirmed the judgments of conviction and discerned to basis to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Morgan" on Justia Law

PCG Trading filed a complaint for legal malpractice and related claims against Seyfarth Shaw and four individual attorneys associated or formerly associated with the firm. At issue was whether a motion filed by PCG Trading for admission of an attorney pro hac vice was properly denied by a judge in the Superior Court. The court held that the order denying the motion to admit Robert L. Garner pro hac vice was reversed, and the case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. View "PCG Trading, LLC v. Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, et al." on Justia Law