Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of attempted kidnapping of an eleven-year-old boy when he drove up to the boy, who was walking along the street, and told him to get in his car. At issue was whether the trial judge erred in denying defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty because there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that his statement to police was improperly admitted in evidence. The court held that there was no evidence that defendant did anything but drive away after the boy refused to get into the vehicle and therefore, the court held that the trial judge erred in denying the motion for a required finding of not guilty. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and set aside the finding.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and carrying a firearm without a license. Defendant appealed from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, contending that, in several respects, he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. Defendant also challenged his firearm conviction under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments and argued that the court should exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt. The court held that because defendant had not asserted or made any showing that he applied for a license to carry a firearm, defendant could not challenge this conviction. The court also held that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel as it related to evidence of defendant's gang affiliation, failure to introduce material exculpatory evidence, the prosecutor's closing argument, and jury instructions. The court also held that there was no basis of relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery of the victim when he punched him at a bowling alley. At issue was whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defense where he instructed the jury solely on whether the force that was used was greater than necessary in all circumstances. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and held that the error in the jury instruction on self-defense did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where defendant was not prejudiced by the incomplete instruction and where there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant used unreasonable force in the circumstances.

Mother appealed the Juvenile Court's determination that her daughter was in need of care and protection and dispensed with the need for the child's parents' consent to adoption, guardianship, custody, or other disposition of the child, which effectively terminated the parents' rights. At issue was whether G.L.c. 233, section 82, which in certain circumstances allowed the admission into evidence in a civil proceeding of "out-of-court statements of a child under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed on or with the child," applied where the child was under the age of ten when she made the statements but ten years of age or older at the time of trial. The court held that the statute applied where the child was under the age of ten when she made the statements, regardless of her age at the time of the trial. Therefore, the court held that the hearsay statements made by the child when she was under the age of ten but admitted in evidence when she was eleven years of age were properly admitted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Juvenile Court's decree.

Richard S. Higgins filed a workers' compensation claim with the Department of Industrial Accidents ("department") after he injured his back while working for the school department of Maynard. At issue was whether employees, who were subject to examinations conducted pursuant to G.L.c. 152, section 45, were entitled to discovery and production of reports made in connection with such examinations. The court held that, in the context of the workers' compensation scheme, a report of a physician's examination of an employee procured by the employer or insurer under section 45, that was related to the employee's work-related injury, could be used by the employee to cross-examine the impartial physician, regardless of whether such a report had been admitted in evidence at a hearing or otherwise placed at issue by the employer or insurer.

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion for a new trial in which he sought to vacate guilty pleas he entered in 2005, on the ground that he was deprived of his right of effective assistance of counsel, as that right had recently been explicated in Padilla v. Kentucky. At issue was whether Padilla applied retroactively to defendant's collateral challenge to his convictions and, if so, whether he had demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel's shortcomings. The court held that Padilla did apply retroactively on collateral review of guilty pleas obtained after the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. The court also held that defendant had made an insufficient showing that had he been properly informed of the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial.

Defendant was charged with several offenses based on events that transpired after defendant and a companion pushed their way into an apartment where a dinner party was in progress. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to commit a felony. The court held that there was insufficient evidence where the inference that defendant intended to commit the felony of assault and battery by mean of a dangerous weapon or knew that his companion possessed a knife when they forced their way into the apartment could be plausible but could not bear the weight of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for entry of judgment of conviction on the lesser included offenses of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor and for sentencing pursuant to that offense.

This action arose when claimant, a former customer service representative for Verizon New England, Inc. ("Verizon"), was denied unemployment benefits. At issue was whether the board of review of the division of unemployed assistance ("board") erred because Verizon took the "last step" in the termination process that entitled claimant to unemployment benefits. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, which affirmed the decision of the board, to deny claimant benefits because the court agreed with the board's conclusion that the claimant did not meet her burden of showing that her decision to leave was involuntary, where she was not compelled to apply for the termination, did not believe her job was in jeopardy, and left in part for personal reasons.

Defendant appealed from his conviction of the deliberately premeditated murder of his estranged wife in May 2000. Defendant asserted several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a conversation between the victim and their daughter as an excited utterance that supplied the motive for the murder; in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial because the witness's testimony as to her observation of defendant inside the apartment building on the morning of the murder was admissible and because there was nothing objectionable about the questions soliciting that testimony; in concluding that the prosecutor's closing argument was not improper; and in refusing to give a so-called Commonwealth v. Bowden instruction where the judge's instructions on credibility and reasonable doubt were adequate and they allowed defendant the opportunity to present fully this factual issue to the jury. The court also held that there was no error in a jury instruction that defendant alleged, for the first time on appeal, failed adequately to explain deliberate premeditation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle after his license had been revoked for operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. At issue was whether the district court erred by admitting into evidence a certificate from the registry of motor vehicles attesting to the fact that a notice of license suspension or revocation was mailed to defendant on a specified date. The court held that the admission of the certificate violated defendant's rights of confrontation and cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment where the registry certificate did not constitute a non-testimonial business record. The court also held that such admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the registry certificate was the only evidence presented by the Commonwealth to establish notice. Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.