Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle after his license had been revoked for operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. At issue was whether the district court erred by admitting into evidence a certificate from the registry of motor vehicles attesting to the fact that a notice of license suspension or revocation was mailed to defendant on a specified date. The court held that the admission of the certificate violated defendant's rights of confrontation and cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment where the registry certificate did not constitute a non-testimonial business record. The court also held that such admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the registry certificate was the only evidence presented by the Commonwealth to establish notice. Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

Five months after the Department of Public Utilities ("department") approved the request of Bay State Gas Company ("Bay State") to sell and transfer all the common stock of its subsidiary Northern Utilities, Inc. ("Northern"), Bay State filed a petition for a general increase in its natural gas distribution rates. The department denied that request while allowing Bay State a general rate increase of $19 million. Bay state appealed the department's decision asserting several points of error. The court affirmed the department's decision and held that the department expressly left open the "appropriate ratemaking treatment" to be afforded the operational cost impacts associated with the sale of Northern. Therefore, it was appropriate to address proper treatment of once-shared functions in light of Bay State's assertions during the section 96 Northern proceeding. The court rejected Bay State's other assertions and remanded to the county court where a judgment was to be entered affirming the decisions and order of the department.

Defendant appealed convictions related to several drug offenses. At issue was whether his pretrial motion to suppress evidence and statements was improperly denied where the warrantless search of his hotel room was unlawful, which thereby invalidated statements he later made to police as well as subsequent searches made by police pursuant to warrants. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's pretrial motion to suppress and held that, because the hotel manager lawfully evicted defendant from his room, defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room at the time of the police search and the search therefore was not unlawful.

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion for a new trial where he was convicted of second degree murder for the stabbing of an individual. At issue was whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial because his defense counsel asked the judge not to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on reasonable provocation, even though the evidence permitted such an instruction. The court affirmed the denial of a new trial and held that the defense attorney's strategic decision was not manifestly unreasonable and that there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

Boston Edison Company ("Boston Edison") brought an action under G.L. c. 79, 12 to recover damages caused by four eminent domain takings by the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") on property known as the Fore River Station ("site") in the town of Weymouth and city of Quincy. The parties raised issues related to the reasonable probability of residential development on the north parcel of land; limiting damages on the south parcel of land to those caused by the actual taking or the public project for which the taking was made; and the calculation of interest. The court held that a rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Boston Edison, reasonably could have found that it was reasonably probable that the north parcel could be rezoned for residential use and developed even though it was in a designated port area. The court also held that damages arising from a planned taking were not compensable and therefore, the jury must distinguish between damages arising from the actual taking and those arising from the planned, but unrealized, taking. The court further held that there was no error in the calculation of prejudgment or postjudgment interest where the court failed to see what basis remained for claiming the preamendment rate of interest when Boston waived any constitutional challenge to the statutory rate of interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the rulings and remanded for further action consistent with the opinion and the judge's allowance of the motion for remittur.

Defendant was indicted for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute when he was stopped for speeding and then arrested for operating a motor vehicle without a license in violation of G.L. c. 90, 10. During the subsequent inventory search of defendant's vehicle, police recovered drugs, cash, and other items. At issue was whether the search was unlawful because defendant did not need a Massachusetts driver's license and possessed a valid Canadian driver's license at the time of the stop and therefore, the evidence recovered from the inventory search was fruits of an illegal search. The court affirmed the order allowing defendant's motion to suppress the evidence at issue where the arresting officer did not, in connection with defendant's arrest, take into account the statutory factors enumerated in G.L. c. 90, 3 1/2, for determining Massachusetts residency and therefore, lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for operating without a Massachusetts driver's license.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a general contractor at a residential construction site, alleging claims of negligence, cross negligence and/or willful, wanton, or reckless conduct which resulted in the deaths of two employees hired by the subcontractor that was hired by defendant. At issue was whether, pursuant to G.L. c. 152, 23, a general contractor that paid workers' compensation benefits to an employee of an uninsured subcontractor, was immune from liability for common law claims the employee could have against that general contractor. The court held that the plain language of section 23 did not release a general contractor that paid workers' compensation benefits to its uninsured subcontractor's employee and that G.L. c. 152, 18 made clear that suits were not barred against general contractors that were obligated to pay workers' compensation benefits to the uninsured subcontractor's employees. Accordingly, the immunity provided under section 23 did not apply to defendant and therefore, the court vacated summary judgment in favor of defendant and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant, charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and doing so in a school zone, moved successfully to suppress drugs that were seized from his person. At issue was whether the police had probable cause to arrest defendant and search his boot where they found 28 packaged bags of "crack" cocaine. The court held that the series of events seen by the experienced surveillance officer were more than sufficient for reasonable suspicion. However, the quantum of facts known to the police justified a stop of defendant for questioning but without more, those facts did not justify the search of defendant's boot, which required probable cause.

A juvenile was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon on the grounds of a school in violation of G.L. c. 269, 10(j) when a knife, a recent birthday gift from his father, dropped out of his pocket during shop class and had been seen by the instructor who reported the juvenile to the dean. At issue was whether a knife that was not a per se dangerous weapon enumerated in G.L. c. 269, 10(b), could constitute a "dangerous weapon" as that term was used in section 10(j), when that knife was not being used in a dangerous manner. The court held that the phrase "dangerous weapon," as used in section 10(j), must be interpreted as incorporating the common law definition of that phrase. The definition included knives that were "designed and constructed to produce death, or great bodily harm" but that were not necessarily stilletos, daggers, dirk knives, or the other objects listed in section 10(j). Such knives were dangerous per se under the common law and thus prohibited from schools under section 10(j). The court also held that, although it appeared unlikely that the two-inch folding knife carried by the juvenile constituted a dangerous weapon within the common law definition, the court remanded to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings to determine the design, purpose, and construction of the knife.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging defamation, violation of G.L. c. 93A, 11, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with contractual and business relations and defendants filed counterclaims. At issue, among others, was whether actions taken by an employer against a former employee could violate G.L. c. 151B, 4(4), and (4A), sections of the antidiscrimination law that respectively prohibited retaliation and interference with a protected right. The court held that an employer or other person could be liable to a former employee under these sections for retaliatory or interfering conduct that occurred after the employment relationship had terminated. The court also affirmed in part and reversed in part the remaining issues in case.