Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, 3, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, 148 and 150, when plaintiff filed an action in superior court against his former employers and their officers. At issue was whether the justice erred by denying plaintiff's second petition of relief from an order granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration as to some of plaintiff's claims and staying his remaining claims pending arbitration. The court held that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion by denying relief where plaintiff offered several arguments that the justice's order was wrong on the merits and each of his arguments could be addressed in an appeal from a final judgment and where plaintiff had an alternative interlocutory remedy, namely, a petition for relief under G.L.c. 231, 118.

The subject of the present appeal was an order issued by a judge in the Probate and Family Court, authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication (substituted judgment treatment order) to a mentally ill women under guardianship. The order was issued on February 2009 and has since expired, therefore, the appeal was moot. However, the court addressed the issue concerning notice requirements applicable to motions seeking substituted judgment treatment orders because that issue was likely to recur. The court held that a party filing a motion for entry of a substituted judgment treatment order must provide all other parties with at least seven days notice through service of a copy of the motion on them, and must give the same notice, through service, of every affidavit that will be filed in support of the motion.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty when she ran over her husband several times and was convicted of an assault and battery on him by means of a dangerous weapon. Defendant raised issues on appeal related to evidence of her mental impairment, the ineffective assistance of counsel, error in the judge's limiting instruction, and the reduction of her sentence. The court held that the jury was not properly instructed that they could consider evidence of mental impairment on the question of extreme atrocity or cruelty, but that the conviction of murder in the second degree could stand unless the Commonwealth elected to move for a new trial. Therefore, the court declined to decide the remaining issues and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or greater and sentenced to a one-year term of probation and ninety-day loss of license. The principal issue in this case was whether an annual certification, and accompanying diagnostic records, attesting to the proper functioning of the breathalyzer machine used to test defendant's blood alcohol content were admissible in a criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The court held that the certification and supporting records were created as part of a regulatory program providing standardized mechanisms for the routine maintenance of all breathalyzer machines throughout the Commonwealth and therefore, they were admissible evidence as business records pursuant to G.L.c. 233, 78, and were not testimonial statements within the scope of protection afforded by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, their admission in this case was not error and the conviction affirmed.

The Real Estate Bar Association of Massachusettes ("REBA") claimed that certain activities undertaken by the National Real Estate Information Services ("NREIS") constituted an unauthorized practice of law. At issue was whether NREIS's activities, either in whole or in part, based on the record and as described in the parties' filings, constituted the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, section 46 et seq. Also at issue was whether NREIS's activities, in contracting with Massachusetts attorneys to attend real estate closings, violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, section 46 et seq. The court held that certain of the real estate settlement activities undertaken by NREIS did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law but the court could not determine based on the record whether the other described settlement activities did. The court also held that the closing or settlement of the types of real estate transactions described in the record required not only the presence but the substantive participation of an attorney on behalf of the mortgage lender and that certain services connected with real property conveyances constituted the practice of law.

Plaintiff served as an elementary school nurse during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years but did not acquire professional teacher status under G.L. c. 71, sections 41 and 42. Defendant sent plaintiff a notice that she would not be employed for the following 2009-2010 school year because she did not have the proper professional standards. Plaintiff sued defendant asserting that she was entitled to reemployment where defendant failed to comply with the requirements under G.L. c. 71, section 42. At issue was whether the nonrenewal of plaintiff's employment should be treated as a "dismissal" within the meaning of section 42 and subject to the protections therein. The court held that the decision not to rehire a teacher on the experience of his or her term of employment cannot be equated to dismissal of a teacher during his or her term of employment. Therefore, plaintiff was not dismissed from her position and was not entitled to safeguards under section 42.

Defendant appealed a conviction of murder in the first degree where the predicate felony for felony-murder was an armed home invasion. Defendant was also convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court reversed the conviction on the indictment charging armed home invasion where the indictment failed to specify the offense for which the defense was charged but affirmed defendant's conviction of felony-murder and illegal possession of a firearm. The court also held that, in light of the circumstances, the admission of the threat at issue did not unfairly prejudice the defendant and there was no error in admitting it. The court further held that self-defense was inapplicable to a charge of felony-murder so any error in the self-defense and excessive force instructions would have had no impact on felony-murder deliberations; that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; and that the judge did not err in deciding his motion for a new trial without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant appealed his conviction of possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and resisting arrest. At issue was whether the court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress and properly convicted him. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion and held that there was no error in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence where the firearm was recovered as a result of a lawful seizure of his person; there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions of resisting arrest to and unlawful possession of a firearm where he charged at officers and used physical force against one officer; and there was no merit to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim that counsel failed to suppress his statement in response to an officer where there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have could have inferred that he knew that the two men following him were police officers and that the police wished to stop him. The court also held that defendant's right to bear arms and to self-defense under the Second Amendment and his equal protection guarantees under Federal and State Constitutions were not violated.

The mother of a child who was the subject of care and protection in a proceeding in Juvenile Court appealed from a judgment denying her petition for relief from an order placing the child in temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families ("department"). At issue was whether the denial of extraordinary relief was an abuse of discretion or an error of law. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the judge's findings clearly supported her determination where the department made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child by placing the mother in two successive foster homes to help her learn better parenting skills and there was no reason to believe that a third placement would have been more successful. The court also held that the judge did not err in holding that the child was suffering from serious abuse or neglect in the mother's custody.