Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and the unlawful possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant argued that he should be granted a new trial because the trial judge erred by asking the members of the jury venire to make "mental note[s]" rather than raise their hands in response to any affirmative answer to the questions asked by the judge during jury selection; by allowing a witness to testify to defendant's silence after she accused him of the killing; by preventing defendant from admitting into evidence that the Commonwealth's key percipient witness had told another witness that he had not seen anything; in instructing the jury regarding transferred intent; and in refusing to ask the jury for clarification of their finding as to murder in the first degree, where they did not separately indicate that they based their verdict on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The court concluded as to each of these grounds that the judge either did not err or that his error did not prejudice defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and also concluded that there was no basis to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce defendant's murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial.

This case was brought pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, section 14, and G.L.c. 231A, where the court was asked to decide whether the the imposition of $275 in filing fees to obtain judicial review of a final decision of a municipal parking clerk regarding a parking citation offended the Massachusetts Constitution. Plaintiffs each appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court that the statutory scheme that imposed such fees for review of a municipal parking clerk's adjudication of the citation, following an in-person administrative hearings, was consonant with the principles of due process, equal protection, and separation of powers. The court held that the statutory scheme did not violate substantive or procedural due process; did not violate the equal protection clause; and afforded the opportunity for judicial review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, a workers' compensation claimant, brought suit against defendant regarding the company's conduct in referring his claim to the insurance fraud bureau (IFB), communicating with fraud investigators and prosecutors regarding his activity and claim, and using criminal processes to gain leverage in dealings with him. At issue was whether summary judgment in favor of defendant was properly denied. The court held that defendant enjoyed qualified immunity regarding its reporting of potentially fraudulent activity but that summary judgment was inappropriate because all of plaintiff's claims rely, at least in part, on conduct falling outside the scope of the immunity. The court also held that portions of plaintiff's claims could be barred by workers' compensation exclusivity under G.L.c. 152, but that not one of plaintiff's counts was barred entirely such that the Superior Court would be without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order of the Superior Court denying summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from an encounter between police and several residents, and their guests, in front of a home, which erupted into an altercation and the subsequent arrest of four men on a number of charges. Defendant and his brother (defendants) were convicted of disturbing the peace and defendant was also convicted of two counts of assault and battery on a police officer. At issue was the trial court's erroneous exclusion of certain statements made by the police officers. The court held that the exclusion of the statements did not rise to the level of constitutional error and was properly reviewed under the prejudicial error standard. In the court's review, the error was prejudicial and therefore, the court reversed defendants' convictions.

Defendant was convicted of attempted kidnapping of an eleven-year-old boy when he drove up to the boy, who was walking along the street, and told him to get in his car. At issue was whether the trial judge erred in denying defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty because there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that his statement to police was improperly admitted in evidence. The court held that there was no evidence that defendant did anything but drive away after the boy refused to get into the vehicle and therefore, the court held that the trial judge erred in denying the motion for a required finding of not guilty. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and set aside the finding.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and carrying a firearm without a license. Defendant appealed from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, contending that, in several respects, he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. Defendant also challenged his firearm conviction under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments and argued that the court should exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt. The court held that because defendant had not asserted or made any showing that he applied for a license to carry a firearm, defendant could not challenge this conviction. The court also held that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel as it related to evidence of defendant's gang affiliation, failure to introduce material exculpatory evidence, the prosecutor's closing argument, and jury instructions. The court also held that there was no basis of relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery of the victim when he punched him at a bowling alley. At issue was whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defense where he instructed the jury solely on whether the force that was used was greater than necessary in all circumstances. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and held that the error in the jury instruction on self-defense did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where defendant was not prejudiced by the incomplete instruction and where there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant used unreasonable force in the circumstances.

Mother appealed the Juvenile Court's determination that her daughter was in need of care and protection and dispensed with the need for the child's parents' consent to adoption, guardianship, custody, or other disposition of the child, which effectively terminated the parents' rights. At issue was whether G.L.c. 233, section 82, which in certain circumstances allowed the admission into evidence in a civil proceeding of "out-of-court statements of a child under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed on or with the child," applied where the child was under the age of ten when she made the statements but ten years of age or older at the time of trial. The court held that the statute applied where the child was under the age of ten when she made the statements, regardless of her age at the time of the trial. Therefore, the court held that the hearsay statements made by the child when she was under the age of ten but admitted in evidence when she was eleven years of age were properly admitted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Juvenile Court's decree.

Richard S. Higgins filed a workers' compensation claim with the Department of Industrial Accidents ("department") after he injured his back while working for the school department of Maynard. At issue was whether employees, who were subject to examinations conducted pursuant to G.L.c. 152, section 45, were entitled to discovery and production of reports made in connection with such examinations. The court held that, in the context of the workers' compensation scheme, a report of a physician's examination of an employee procured by the employer or insurer under section 45, that was related to the employee's work-related injury, could be used by the employee to cross-examine the impartial physician, regardless of whether such a report had been admitted in evidence at a hearing or otherwise placed at issue by the employer or insurer.

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion for a new trial in which he sought to vacate guilty pleas he entered in 2005, on the ground that he was deprived of his right of effective assistance of counsel, as that right had recently been explicated in Padilla v. Kentucky. At issue was whether Padilla applied retroactively to defendant's collateral challenge to his convictions and, if so, whether he had demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel's shortcomings. The court held that Padilla did apply retroactively on collateral review of guilty pleas obtained after the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. The court also held that defendant had made an insufficient showing that had he been properly informed of the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial.