Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and doing so in a school zone, moved successfully to suppress drugs that were seized from his person. At issue was whether the police had probable cause to arrest defendant and search his boot where they found 28 packaged bags of "crack" cocaine. The court held that the series of events seen by the experienced surveillance officer were more than sufficient for reasonable suspicion. However, the quantum of facts known to the police justified a stop of defendant for questioning but without more, those facts did not justify the search of defendant's boot, which required probable cause.

A juvenile was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon on the grounds of a school in violation of G.L. c. 269, 10(j) when a knife, a recent birthday gift from his father, dropped out of his pocket during shop class and had been seen by the instructor who reported the juvenile to the dean. At issue was whether a knife that was not a per se dangerous weapon enumerated in G.L. c. 269, 10(b), could constitute a "dangerous weapon" as that term was used in section 10(j), when that knife was not being used in a dangerous manner. The court held that the phrase "dangerous weapon," as used in section 10(j), must be interpreted as incorporating the common law definition of that phrase. The definition included knives that were "designed and constructed to produce death, or great bodily harm" but that were not necessarily stilletos, daggers, dirk knives, or the other objects listed in section 10(j). Such knives were dangerous per se under the common law and thus prohibited from schools under section 10(j). The court also held that, although it appeared unlikely that the two-inch folding knife carried by the juvenile constituted a dangerous weapon within the common law definition, the court remanded to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings to determine the design, purpose, and construction of the knife.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging defamation, violation of G.L. c. 93A, 11, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with contractual and business relations and defendants filed counterclaims. At issue, among others, was whether actions taken by an employer against a former employee could violate G.L. c. 151B, 4(4), and (4A), sections of the antidiscrimination law that respectively prohibited retaliation and interference with a protected right. The court held that an employer or other person could be liable to a former employee under these sections for retaliatory or interfering conduct that occurred after the employment relationship had terminated. The court also affirmed in part and reversed in part the remaining issues in case.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, 3, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, 148 and 150, when plaintiff filed an action in superior court against his former employers and their officers. At issue was whether the justice erred by denying plaintiff's second petition of relief from an order granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration as to some of plaintiff's claims and staying his remaining claims pending arbitration. The court held that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion by denying relief where plaintiff offered several arguments that the justice's order was wrong on the merits and each of his arguments could be addressed in an appeal from a final judgment and where plaintiff had an alternative interlocutory remedy, namely, a petition for relief under G.L.c. 231, 118.

The subject of the present appeal was an order issued by a judge in the Probate and Family Court, authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication (substituted judgment treatment order) to a mentally ill women under guardianship. The order was issued on February 2009 and has since expired, therefore, the appeal was moot. However, the court addressed the issue concerning notice requirements applicable to motions seeking substituted judgment treatment orders because that issue was likely to recur. The court held that a party filing a motion for entry of a substituted judgment treatment order must provide all other parties with at least seven days notice through service of a copy of the motion on them, and must give the same notice, through service, of every affidavit that will be filed in support of the motion.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty when she ran over her husband several times and was convicted of an assault and battery on him by means of a dangerous weapon. Defendant raised issues on appeal related to evidence of her mental impairment, the ineffective assistance of counsel, error in the judge's limiting instruction, and the reduction of her sentence. The court held that the jury was not properly instructed that they could consider evidence of mental impairment on the question of extreme atrocity or cruelty, but that the conviction of murder in the second degree could stand unless the Commonwealth elected to move for a new trial. Therefore, the court declined to decide the remaining issues and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or greater and sentenced to a one-year term of probation and ninety-day loss of license. The principal issue in this case was whether an annual certification, and accompanying diagnostic records, attesting to the proper functioning of the breathalyzer machine used to test defendant's blood alcohol content were admissible in a criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The court held that the certification and supporting records were created as part of a regulatory program providing standardized mechanisms for the routine maintenance of all breathalyzer machines throughout the Commonwealth and therefore, they were admissible evidence as business records pursuant to G.L.c. 233, 78, and were not testimonial statements within the scope of protection afforded by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, their admission in this case was not error and the conviction affirmed.

The Real Estate Bar Association of Massachusettes ("REBA") claimed that certain activities undertaken by the National Real Estate Information Services ("NREIS") constituted an unauthorized practice of law. At issue was whether NREIS's activities, either in whole or in part, based on the record and as described in the parties' filings, constituted the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, section 46 et seq. Also at issue was whether NREIS's activities, in contracting with Massachusetts attorneys to attend real estate closings, violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, section 46 et seq. The court held that certain of the real estate settlement activities undertaken by NREIS did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law but the court could not determine based on the record whether the other described settlement activities did. The court also held that the closing or settlement of the types of real estate transactions described in the record required not only the presence but the substantive participation of an attorney on behalf of the mortgage lender and that certain services connected with real property conveyances constituted the practice of law.

Plaintiff served as an elementary school nurse during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years but did not acquire professional teacher status under G.L. c. 71, sections 41 and 42. Defendant sent plaintiff a notice that she would not be employed for the following 2009-2010 school year because she did not have the proper professional standards. Plaintiff sued defendant asserting that she was entitled to reemployment where defendant failed to comply with the requirements under G.L. c. 71, section 42. At issue was whether the nonrenewal of plaintiff's employment should be treated as a "dismissal" within the meaning of section 42 and subject to the protections therein. The court held that the decision not to rehire a teacher on the experience of his or her term of employment cannot be equated to dismissal of a teacher during his or her term of employment. Therefore, plaintiff was not dismissed from her position and was not entitled to safeguards under section 42.

Defendant appealed a conviction of murder in the first degree where the predicate felony for felony-murder was an armed home invasion. Defendant was also convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court reversed the conviction on the indictment charging armed home invasion where the indictment failed to specify the offense for which the defense was charged but affirmed defendant's conviction of felony-murder and illegal possession of a firearm. The court also held that, in light of the circumstances, the admission of the threat at issue did not unfairly prejudice the defendant and there was no error in admitting it. The court further held that self-defense was inapplicable to a charge of felony-murder so any error in the self-defense and excessive force instructions would have had no impact on felony-murder deliberations; that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; and that the judge did not err in deciding his motion for a new trial without first holding an evidentiary hearing.