Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict to manslaughter or to order a new trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the exclusion of Defendant's recorded interview statements with police as inadmissible hearsay did not violate his constitutional rights; (2) the trial judge erred in instructing counsel that attorney-conducted voir dire is limited to questions solely related to apparent bias and does not include the opportunity to elicit information that may help counsel exercise a peremptory challenge, but the error was harmless; (3) the admission of relationship-related text messages between Defendant and a former romantic partner was not an abuse of discretion; and (4) the Commonwealth's cross-examination of Defendant did not result in reversible error. View "Commonwealth v. Steeves" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the housing appeals committee had jurisdiction over the projects at issue in this case and the power to remove or modify conditions that made such projects significantly more uneconomic.Under the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B, 20-23, qualifying developers of low or moderate income housing have access to a comprehensive streamline permitting process and expedited appeal before HAC. The Act further authorizes HAC to strike or modify any conditions on a comprehensive permit application that would make it "uneconomic" to proceed with a project. At issue was whether the HAC has the power to reject conditions where a project has received a funding commitment from a public subsidizing agency and the developer receives a comprehensive permit subject to conditions but the rate of return for the original proposal is found to be uneconomic and HAC determines that the imposed conditions make the project "significantly more uneconomic" and therefore rejects them. The Supreme Judicial Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that HAC is authorized to eliminate conditions that effectively prevent such projects by rendering them significantly more uneconomic. View "Zoning Board of Appeals of Milton v. HD/MW Randolph Avenue, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge granting partial summary judgment and entering declarations in the two underlying cases that certain waterways regulations were an improper delegation of the Department of Environmental Protection's public trust responsibilities, holding that there was no error.Consistent with its public trust responsibilities, the Department set certain specifications for buildings within one hundred feet of protected tidelands and promulgated regulations purporting to allow the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs to override the Department's specifications by approving substitute specifications as part of a municipal harbor plan. At issue was whether the Department had the authority to delegate this override authority to the Secretary. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the delegation was ultra vires and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Armstrong v. Secretary of Energy & Environmental Affairs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court denying Appellants' petitions for relief in the county court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 from the order of the municipal court that Appellants be detained on the ground of dangerousness, holding that there was no error. Appellants were charged with unlicensed firearm possession pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10(a) and held before trial on the ground of dangerousness. On appeal, Appellants argued that including unlicensed firearm possession as a predicate offense violates substantive and procedural due process and that there was insufficient evidence of their dangerousness. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) unlicensed possession of a firearm is a constitutional predicate offense under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58A(1); and (2) there was no abuse of discretion in the determinations that Appellants should be held on the ground of dangerousness. View "Vega v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme cruelty and felony murder, holding that there was no error warranting a new trial, nor was there any reason to exercise the Court's extraordinary authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme cruelty and felony murder; (2) although portions of the prosecutor's opening statement and examination of one witness were improper, the errors did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (3) Defendant's challenges to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings were unavailing. View "Commonwealth v. Sun" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree, carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, holding that there was no error warranting a new trial, nor was there any reason to exercise the Court's extraordinary authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's murder conviction; (2) the prosecution's introduction of character and prior bad act evidence did not sufficiently influence the grand jury's decision to indict to require dismissal of the indictments; (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's instruction on eyewitness identification; (4) the prosecutor's questions to the venire did not result in a biased jury; and (5) while several of the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument were improper, the improprieties did not warrant a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Insureds in this insurance dispute over attorney's fees, holding that attorney's fees under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A are not awarded as "damages because of 'bodily injury' and are not 'costs taxed against the insured.'"At issue was whether Insureds' insurance policy, which covered "sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'bodily injury,'"included Insureds' liability for attorney's fees under chapter 93A, section 9(4) in an action for breach of warranty resulting in bodily injury. After paying the substantive damages on the claim, Insurer brought this declaratory judgment action to determine whether it was also responsible for attorney's fees. The superior court concluded that the policy did cover attorney's fees. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Insureds' policy did not cover the award of attorney's fees under chapter 93A. View "Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Poirier" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the scope of the litigation privilege, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the protection afforded by the litigation privilege applies even where the statements in question are fraudulent misrepresentations and that the litigation privilege extends to actions taken during the course of litigation.Plaintiffs were creditors of William von Thaden, who was married to Kimberly von Thaden until their divorce. Defendant represented Kimberly in the divorce proceedings. Before they filed the instant complaint against William and Kimberly Plaintiffs had asserted several claims against William related to contract disputes. William subsequently declared bankruptcy. Plaintiffs then commenced this action against Defendant, seeking to hold him liable for allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations he made to the court during the divorce trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of this complaint, holding that the litigation privilege applied under the circumstances of this case. View "Bassichis v. Flores" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the opinion of a panel of the appeals court affirming the probation violation hearing judge's ruling that Probationer had violated the terms of his probation by committing new crimes, revoking his probation, and sentencing him to a term of incarceration, holding that Probationer's inability to question his accuser violated his right to present a defense.The hearing justice revoked Probationer's probation on the basis of hearsay statements by the complainant, his former fiancee, who alleged that Probationer had repeatedly raped her over a period of four months when they were living together. On appeal, Probationer argued that his constitutional due process rights were violated because the complainant did not appear at the hearing to testify or to be cross-examined. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that precluding Probationer from calling the accuser as a witness at the hearing violated Probationer's due process right to present a defense. View "Commonwealth v. Costa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the superior court judge granting partial summary judgment and separate and final judgment for Plaintiffs in this familial dispute over assets left by Lubov Stempniewicz, the mother and grandmother to the parties to this action, holding that the judgment is reversed with respect to count eight of Plaintiffs' complaint.Plaintiffs initiated this action against their uncle to determine the validity of the Living Trust of Lubov Stempniewicz. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that their uncle acted without authority in creating the trust, and therefore the trust was void ab initio. The superior court agreed and granted judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding that summary judgment was proper as to all counts except count eight, alleging "constructive trust." View "Barbetti v. Stempniewicz" on Justia Law