Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case concerning the term "physical abuse" as used in an "abuse and molestation" policy exclusion the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Insurer on its action for declaratory relief, holding that the abuse and molestation exclusion did not exempt coverage under the circumstances of this case.The homeowners' insurance policy at issue precluded coverage under a policy exclusion exempting coverage for "[b]odily injury...arising out of sexual molestation, corporal punishment or physical or mental abuse." Insured initiated an unprovoked attack on Leonard Miville by punching and kicking him repeatedly. When Insurer denied coverage Miville commenced an action against Insured. Insurer brought this action seeking a judgment declaring that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Insured for the personal injury claims. The judge granted summary judgment for Insurer. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that a reasonable insured would not expect the abuse and molestation exclusion to preclude coverage for the incident. View "Dorchester Mutual Insurance Co. v. Miville" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the scope of rights conveyed by a set of burial certificates, as sold by a church to its parishioners, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the burial certificates' unambiguous language permitted the court to disinter and relocate the cremated remains buried on the church's former property despite objections of the decedents' families.After the church in this case was compelled and close and sell its property, it contacted the families of the at least forty-nine deceased individuals interred in the churchyard and requested their consent for relocation and reinterment of the cremains. Family members representing the cremains of twelve individuals did not consent, and the church brought this complaint seeking a declaration that newly-amended church regulations authorized it to relocate the remains. The family court entered judgment in favor of the church. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that this is the type of situation where relocation of the remains is proper. View "Church of Holy Spirit of Wayland v. Heinrich" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that when an otherwise qualifying entity sells an urban redevelopment project during the forty-year tax window set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121A, 18C, the tax concession extends to the capital gain from the sale.The tax exemption at issue provides an incentive for private entities to invest in constructing, operating, and maintaining urban redevelopment projects in deteriorated areas. At issue was whether the sale of an urban redevelopment project during the forty-year tax-exempt window is "on account of" the project, thus extending the tax concession to the capital gain from the sale. In this case, the Commission of Revenue issued notice of assessment to Appellants related to their capital gains from the sales of certain ch. 121A projects. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the capital gain from the sale of the ch. 121A project fell within the tax concession. View "Reagan v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order finding Probationer in violation of his probation, revoking his probation and imposing the remainder of his suspended sentence, holding that the evidence was sufficient to for the superior court judge to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Probationer had violated a term of his probation by committing a new offense.On appeal, Probationer argued that the judge erroneously relied upon an unreliable, in-court identification by a witness who had made no prior, out-of-court identification. Specifically, Probationer asked the Supreme Judicial Court to extend the rule set forth in Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 214 (2014), excluding such identifications in criminal trials without a showing of good reason to probation violation hearings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court declines to extend Crayton to probation violation hearings; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the holding that Probationer had violated a term of his probation by committing a new offense. View "Commonwealth v. Jarrett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the trial judge granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the New England Police Benevolent Association, Inc., Local 192 (NEPBA), denying the city of Chelsea's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and confirming the underlying arbitration award in this labor dispute, holding that the trial court did not err in confirming the arbitration award.After NEPBA replaced another union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the emergency dispatchers in the city, NEPBA sought to arbitrate a grievance regarding an emergency dispatcher's termination following the change in union representation. While the NEPBA and city bargained to a new contract, employees had been working under the city's prior collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the former union. Because the CBA contained an arbitration provision, the arbitrator ruled that the dispute was arbitrable. The superior court confirmed the decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the dispute was arbitrable. View "City of Chelsea v. New England Police Benevolent Ass'n, Local 192" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice of the county court neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying, without a hearing, Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief.In 1985, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated rape and other offenses. In 2005, the Sex Offender Registration Board issued a decision ordering Petitioner to register as a level three sex offender, thereafter denying Petitioner's motion for relief from the registration requirement. In this petition, Petitioner brought, among other claims, constitutional challenges to both federal and state sex offender registration laws. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that no exceptional circumstances were present in this case warranting extraordinary relief. View "Rancourt v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the superior court against Plaintiffs and directed the court to enter a judgment declaring the "public comment policy" of the town of Southborough unconstitutional,holding that the town's public comment policy violated rights protected by articles nineteen and sixteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.At issue was the policy of the board of selectmen of Southborough that outlines the public comment portion of its meetings where town residents may address the board ("public comment policy"). Plaintiffs argued, among other claims, that the policy violated their constitutionally-protected right under article nineteen "to assemble, speak in a peaceable manner, and petition...town leaders for redress." The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court's decision rejecting the argument that the town's public comment policy was unconstitutional, in violation of articles nineteen and sixteen, holding that the town's civil restraints on the content of speech at a public comment session in a public meeting were forbidden under both articles nineteen and sixteen. View "Barron v. Kolenda" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court judge denying Defendant's motion to enforce a plea bargain, holding that the plea offer did not violate Defendant's rights to due process.Defendant was indicted along with two codefendants on two counts of murder in the first degree. Defendant was offered a "package deal" plea bargain under which he would have been able to plead guilty to manslaughter if his codefendant also agreed to the same plea. Defendant's codefendant refused the terms of the agreement. Defendant and his codefendant were tried and convicted of all charges. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate his convictions and to accept pleas to manslaughter, as the Commonwealth had originally offered, arguing that the condition attached to the plea offer violated his right to decide whether to accept the plea or go to trial. A superior court judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to enforce the plea bargain. View "Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter to the county court for entry of an order dismissing the Commonwealth's gatekeeper petition filed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E challenging the decision of the superior court judge granting Defendant's motion for postconviction relief and reducing his conviction, holding that the petition was untimely.Defendant served forty-four years in prison for his conviction of murder in the first degree. In 2020, Defendant filed a postconviction motion to reduce the verdict from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree on the grounds that the Commonwealth's 1978 package plea offer violated his right to due process. The motion judge granted the motion and, in 2021, reduced the verdict to murder in the second degree. The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal but did not file the gatekeeper petition until five and one-half months later, exceeding the thirty-day time limit set out in Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 36 n.10 (2000). After a remand, the single justice allowed the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter for entry of an order dismissing the Commonwealth's gatekeeper petition, holding that, with respect to filing deadlines, the Commonwealth is subject to the limitations established in Mains. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the trial judge granting Defendant's motion to dismiss his criminal case for lack of prosecution and requiring the Commonwealth to file a motion to vacate it if decided to proceed with the prosecution of the case, holding that the judge's decision to require the Commonwealth to seek court approval before refiling charges was an abuse of discretion.Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, among other charges. After Defendant's trial was continued three times, he filed his motion to dismiss. The judge granted the motion and required the Commonwealth to file a motion to vacate if it chose to refile the case. The Commonwealth sought extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, arguing that the underlying order violated the district attorney's authority to choose which cases to prosecute. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated so much of the order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss that required the Commonwealth to file a motion to vacate the dismissal, holding that the ruling constituted an unwarranted intrusion upon the powers granted exclusively to the executive branch under Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "Commonwealth v. Rosa" on Justia Law