Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) superseding order of conditions allowing the City of Boston's bridge project to proceed superseded the decision of the Conservation Commission of Quincy to deny Boston's application to build the bridge in question.Boston petitioned the Commission for permission to build a bridge to Long Island because the bridge would have an impact on wetlands in Quincy. The Commission denied the application pursuant to the State Wetlands Protection Act and Quincy's local wetlands ordinance. Boston subsequently sought a superseding order of conditions from the DEP pursuant to the Act. The DEP issued the order. The superior court concluded that the project would be governed by the DEP's superseding order of conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DEP's superseding order of conditions preempted the Commission's denial of Boston's application. View "City of Boston v. Conservation Commission of Quincy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part the Housing Court judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as trustee of the Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-E, Mortgage Backed Certificate, Series 2005-E (HSBC), in this summary process action, holding that one of Defendants' counterclaims was not barred.Defendants purchased their home with proceeds from two loans secured by a mortgage on the property. The primary loan was at issue on appeal. After Defendants defaulted on their monthly payments HSBC, the assignee of the home mortgage loan, held a foreclosure sale and sold Defendants' home to the highest bidder. When Defendants refused to vacate the property HSBC initiated the present summary process action. Defendants brought counterclaims under section 15(b)(2) of the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act (PHLPA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C and under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of HSBC. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants were entitled to assert a counterclaim under PHLPA to limited monetary damages; and (2) Defendants' counterclaim under chapter 93A was barred. View "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris" on Justia Law

In this case involving licenses to operate a retail marijuana dispensary the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Land Court judge ordering the issuance of a special permit to Plaintiff and the issuance of a second injunction, holding that the second injunction exceeded the permissible scope of the judge's authority.After denying Plaintiff's application for a special permit license to operate a recreational marijuana establishment in the City of Taunton the City granted a special permit to a different applicant. Plaintiff filed a complaint challenging the denial of its special permit application. The Land Court judge found the City's denial of Plaintiff's special permit application was arbitrary and capricious and enjoined the City from conducting previously-scheduled licensing proceedings to consider applications from nonparties seeking licenses to operate medical marijuana dispensaries and from issuing any of the four licenses to the pending applicants. A single justice vacated the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the judgment concerning the city council's licensing hearings and otherwise affirmed, holding that the injunction exceeded the scope of the judge's authority but that the judge did not err in determining that the City's denial was arbitrary and legally untenable. View "Bask, Inc. v. Municipal Council of Taunton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial; (2) in no instance did the admission of polygraph evidence constitute reversible error; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter; and (4) this Court discerns no reason to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt. View "Commonwealth v. Gamboa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict to manslaughter or to order a new trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the exclusion of Defendant's recorded interview statements with police as inadmissible hearsay did not violate his constitutional rights; (2) the trial judge erred in instructing counsel that attorney-conducted voir dire is limited to questions solely related to apparent bias and does not include the opportunity to elicit information that may help counsel exercise a peremptory challenge, but the error was harmless; (3) the admission of relationship-related text messages between Defendant and a former romantic partner was not an abuse of discretion; and (4) the Commonwealth's cross-examination of Defendant did not result in reversible error. View "Commonwealth v. Steeves" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the housing appeals committee had jurisdiction over the projects at issue in this case and the power to remove or modify conditions that made such projects significantly more uneconomic.Under the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B, 20-23, qualifying developers of low or moderate income housing have access to a comprehensive streamline permitting process and expedited appeal before HAC. The Act further authorizes HAC to strike or modify any conditions on a comprehensive permit application that would make it "uneconomic" to proceed with a project. At issue was whether the HAC has the power to reject conditions where a project has received a funding commitment from a public subsidizing agency and the developer receives a comprehensive permit subject to conditions but the rate of return for the original proposal is found to be uneconomic and HAC determines that the imposed conditions make the project "significantly more uneconomic" and therefore rejects them. The Supreme Judicial Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that HAC is authorized to eliminate conditions that effectively prevent such projects by rendering them significantly more uneconomic. View "Zoning Board of Appeals of Milton v. HD/MW Randolph Avenue, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge granting partial summary judgment and entering declarations in the two underlying cases that certain waterways regulations were an improper delegation of the Department of Environmental Protection's public trust responsibilities, holding that there was no error.Consistent with its public trust responsibilities, the Department set certain specifications for buildings within one hundred feet of protected tidelands and promulgated regulations purporting to allow the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs to override the Department's specifications by approving substitute specifications as part of a municipal harbor plan. At issue was whether the Department had the authority to delegate this override authority to the Secretary. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the delegation was ultra vires and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Armstrong v. Secretary of Energy & Environmental Affairs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court denying Appellants' petitions for relief in the county court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 from the order of the municipal court that Appellants be detained on the ground of dangerousness, holding that there was no error. Appellants were charged with unlicensed firearm possession pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10(a) and held before trial on the ground of dangerousness. On appeal, Appellants argued that including unlicensed firearm possession as a predicate offense violates substantive and procedural due process and that there was insufficient evidence of their dangerousness. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) unlicensed possession of a firearm is a constitutional predicate offense under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58A(1); and (2) there was no abuse of discretion in the determinations that Appellants should be held on the ground of dangerousness. View "Vega v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme cruelty and felony murder, holding that there was no error warranting a new trial, nor was there any reason to exercise the Court's extraordinary authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme cruelty and felony murder; (2) although portions of the prosecutor's opening statement and examination of one witness were improper, the errors did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (3) Defendant's challenges to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings were unavailing. View "Commonwealth v. Sun" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree, carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, holding that there was no error warranting a new trial, nor was there any reason to exercise the Court's extraordinary authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's murder conviction; (2) the prosecution's introduction of character and prior bad act evidence did not sufficiently influence the grand jury's decision to indict to require dismissal of the indictments; (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's instruction on eyewitness identification; (4) the prosecutor's questions to the venire did not result in a biased jury; and (5) while several of the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument were improper, the improprieties did not warrant a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law