Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the single justice of the appeals court denying Defendant's motion to stay his sentence pending appeal of his motion for a new trial, holding that Defendant presented a serious flight risk.Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. On October 26, 2020, Defendant filed a second motion for a new trial and a motion to stay the execution of his sentence, seeking release due to COVID-19 concerns. The superior court denied the motion to stay, concluding that Defendant did not satisfy any of the factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Nash, 486 Mass. 394 (2020). Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to stay with a single justice in the appeals court. The single justice concluded that Defendant was a flight risk and that COVID-19 concerns did not support a different result because Defendant had already been vaccinated against COVID-19. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice properly denied Defendant's motion to stay his sentence pending appeal of his motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. McDermott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that there was no reason to order a new trial, reduce the verdict, or grant any other relief.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err in declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; (2) the trial judge did not erred in allowing a Boston police detective to testify about the contents of a certain record of the United States Customs and Border Protection agency that he saw on a computer screen at Logan Airport, but the error was not prejudicial; (3) the trial judge's instruction to the jury in response to Defendant's closing argument was not prejudicial; and (4) the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments did not rise to the level of prejudicial error. View "Commonwealth v. Brea" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this case for a new hearing held pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 7 and 8, holding that the trial judge erred in allowing an expert witness to testify on direct examination about the basis of his opinion when the facts were neither within the expert's personal knowledge nor otherwise admitted into evidence during the proceeding.The Department of Mental Health filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 7 and 8 to recommit P.R. to a mental health facility. The judge held a full hearing on the merits of the petition. During the hearing, P.R.'s psychiatrist testified for the Department. The judge ultimately found that P.R.'s commitment should continue, and the appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case, holding (1) the trial court erred by allowing the psychiatrist to testify about unadmitted medical reports on direct examination, and the error was prejudicial, requiring a new hearing; and (2) the judge did not err by not making a statement of written or oral findings before ordering commitment under sections 7 and 8. View "In re P.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions of Josiah Zachery and Donte Henley of murder in the first degree and Zachery's convictions of assault by means of a dangerous weapon and carrying a firearm without a license, holding that there was no reversible error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Zachery's motion to suppress evidence obtained during an investigatory stop, a warrantless search of his CharlieCard, and a search of his cell phone pursuant to a search warrant; (2) the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Zachery's motion to sever his case from Henley's; (3) the judge did not err in admitting evidence of prior misconduct that connected Henley to an earlier shooting; and (4) there was no other prejudicial error. View "Commonwealth v. Henley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the denial of Defendant's Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a) motion seeking to vacate his remaining sentences after he was paroled from his life sentence for murder and remanded the matter to the superior court for a hearing, holding that the motion judge failed to consider the specific circumstances and unique characteristics of Defendant as a juvenile.In 1996, Defendant, who was seventeen, committed crimes that resulted in his guilty plea to murder in the second degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and illegal possession of a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and two sentences of five to seven years' imprisonment for the assaults to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the life sentence. After Defendant was paroled from his life sentence he moved to vacate the remaining sentences and for resentencing under Rule 30(a). The motion judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter to consider whether Defendant's sentences comported with article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, holding (1) 120 Code Mass. Regs. 200.08 distinguishes parole for life sentences from other sentences and is therefore invalid; and (2) because Defendant already served the aggregate minimum of his sentences, he was immediately entitled to a parole hearing. View "Commonwealth v. Sharma" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order of the superior court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the counts of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion, holding that a conservator acting pursuant to judicial approval is a quasi judicial officer and is entitled to absolute immunity for conduct that is authorized or approved by the probate court.Plaintiff, acting as guardian and next of friend for his mother, filed a complaint against defendant, the mother's permanent conservator, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, malpractice, conversion, and fraud. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The judge allowed the motion as to the malpractice and fraud counts but denied the motion as to the remaining counts. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order allowing the motion to dismiss in its entirety, holding that Plaintiff did not allege that Defendant acted outside the authorized scope of her duties as conservator, and therefore, the superior court judge erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the remaining counts of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. View "Hornibrook v. Richard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court denying this action in the nature of mandamus as well as certiorari review of the decision of the city of Salem to reject Mederi, Inc.'s application to enter into a host community (HCA) agreement, holding that there was no error.When Mederi applied for an HCA with the city to open a retail marijuana establishment in Salem it was one of eight applications vying for four available spots. The city of Salem denied Merderi's application. Merderi then filed a complaint seeking relief in the nature of mandamus as well as certiorari review of the city's decision, claiming that by rejecting it as an HCA partner, the city effectively precluded Mederi from being considered for a license to sell marijuana. A superior court judge dismissed the mandamus claim and granted judgment on the pleadings on the remaining certiorari claim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the city made a rational choice to reject Mederi's application in favor of other prospective retail marijuana establishments; and (2) the city's application process was not contrary to law. View "Mederi, Inc. v. Salem" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying the Commonwealth's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking review of, and relief from, the judge's discovery orders in a criminal case, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.Defendant pleaded guilty to several drug crimes. Defendant later filed a motion for a new trial seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas on the grounds that chemist Sonja Farak analyzed the drugs at issue while she was employed at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute. The judge issued rulings related to the district attorney's obligations to review the facts related to Farak's performance and to disclose any exculpatory information to Defendant. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) produced thousands of pages of documents. The district attorney proposed to turn over all of the documents to Defendant without first reviewing them herself. The judge rejected this "open file" discovery approach, the Commonwealth filed the petition at issue. The single justice denied the petition on the merits. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Commonwealth was not entitled to review as of right pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 in these circumstances. View "Commonwealth v. Simmons" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court reversing the determination of the Massachusetts Office of Medicaid's board of hearings that Plaintiff's home was a countable asset, making her ineligible for Medicaid long-term care benefits, holding that the superior court did not err.While they were both still living, Plaintiff and her husband created an irrevocable trust, the corpus of which included their home. The terms of the trust granted Plaintiff, during her lifetime, a limited power of appointment to appoint all or any portion of the trust principal to a nonprofit or charitable organization over which she had no controlling interest. MassHealth denied Plaintiff's application for long-term care benefits, determining that the home was a countable asset because Plaintiff purportedly could use her limited power of appointment to appoint portions of the home's equity, which was included as part of the trust principal, to the nursing home where Plaintiff lived as payment for her care. The superior court reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the plain terms of the trust neither intended for nor permitted Plaintiff to exercise her limited power of appointment for her benefit, as contemplated by MassHealth. View "Fournier v. Secretary of Executive Office of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, 20, Fourth - which applies to the testimony of a parent of minor child against the other in criminal, delinquency, and youthful offender proceedings where the victim is not a family member and does not reside in the household - does not disqualify parents from being called as witnesses for the defense to testify at an evidentiary hearing for a motion to suppress.Juvenile was indicted as a youthful offender on the charge of carrying a firearm without a license. Before trial, Juvenile moved to suppress certain statements he made to the police and sought to call his mother to testify at the evidentiary hearing. The Commonwealth sought to prohibit the juvenile's mother from testifying based on section 20, Fourth. The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) section 20, Fourth prevents the prosecution from calling the child's parents to testify for the Commonwealth in youthful offender proceedings where the victim is not a family member and does not reside in the household; but (2) section 20, Fourth allows the child to call his or her parents as witnesses for the defense and then the Commonwealth to cross-examine them. View "Commonwealth v. Vigiani" on Justia Law