Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice denying Petitioner's petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.Petitioner was charged with trafficking in heroin, operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, and two civil motor vehicle infractions. Petitioner filed a motion to suppress, which was denied. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for leave to file a renewed motion to suppress, as well as a motion for recusal of the district court judge. The judge denied both motions. Petitioner then filed his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition arguing that the trial judge made multiple decisions that were unfairly prejudicial to him. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was nothing exceptional about Petitioner's case that warranted the exercise of this Court's extraordinary power. View "Torres v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition filed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that Petitioner's petition failed because of adequate alternative remedies.Petitioner asked the county court to order the clerk of the superior court to enter a final judgment in certain proceedings in that court. The judge denied the motion, concluding that the petition failed because there existed an adequate alternative remedy. Petitioner then filed his current petition asking the court to direct the trial court to either enter judgment or schedule a trial. A single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner's petition failed because of an adequate alternative remedy. View "Bishay v. Superior Court Department of the Trial Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court summarily denying the Commonwealth's petition under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking relief from an evidentiary order of the superior court judge in this criminal matter, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the denial of relief.Defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and other offenses. Defendant filed a motion requesting that the Commonwealth's test firing of an alleged firearm be observed by a defense expert. The superior court judge denied the request but ordered that the test firing to be recorded and that the recording be provided to Defendant. The Commonwealth brought this petition seeking relief from the order. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of relief. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the juvenile court finding Juvenile in criminal contempt, holding that the juvenile court judge abused her discretion.Juvenile, who was sixteen years old, was before the juvenile court judge for a hearing on alleged violations of conditions of her release, called the judge a "dumb, white bitch." For this statement the judge found Juvenile in criminal contempt. Thereafter, the judge sentenced Juvenile to ninety days, the maximum sentence under rule 43. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of contempt, holding that the judge abused her discretion by not taking into account Juvenile's status as a child when she imposed a ninety-day criminal sentence and did not comply with the requirements of Mass. R. Crim. P. 43 and 44. View "Commonwealth v. Ulani U." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the trial court's judgment denying Plaintiff's claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 11 and affirmed the remainder of the judgment, holding that the judge erred in instructing the jury under section 11.The attorney defendants in this case misappropriated propriety materials from their employer during their employment and subsequently used those materials to compete with their former employer. A jury found Defendants liable on claims for conversion, conspiracy, and breach of the duty of loyalty. The jury denied relief on the plaintiff employer's claims for unfair or deceptive trade practices, in violation of section 11. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that Defendants may be liable for unfair or deceptive trade practices, and the judge erred in instructing the jury that Defendants' conduct before leaving their employer was not relevant to Plaintiff's claim under section 11. View "Governo Law Firm LLC v. Bergeron" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court set aside the verdict in this case, vacated Defendant's conviction, and remanded the matter for a new trial, holding that the prosecutor's failure to disclose certain statements and newly discovered evidence required that this matter be remanded.Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Prior to trial, the prosecutor failed to disclose testimony by the stepdaughter of the victim describing the victim's last words. Following trial, a forensic pathologist opined that the victim could not have spoken after he had been stabbed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction, holding (1) the prosecutor's failure to disclose the stepdaughter's testimony prejudiced Defendant's ability to prepare and present his defense effectively; and (2) the pathologist's opinion likely would have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations. View "Commonwealth v. Rodriguez-Nieves" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and vacated his conviction of accessory after the fact to murder, holding that, under the circumstances, Defendant could not convicted of joint venture murder in the first degree and of accessory after the fact.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) there was sufficient evidence to prove murder in the first degree; (2) the jury instruction on joint venture liability was a correct statement of the law; (3) while the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant as an accessory after the fact, because one cannot properly be convicted of a crime and of being an accessory after the fact to the same crime, this conviction must be vacated; (4) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by failing to order the trial severed; (5) reversible error did not result from the judge's response to a jury question; and (6) there was no reason for the Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Watson" on Justia Law

In this case involving the Attorney General's investigation into Facebook, Inc. under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A focusing on whether Facebook misrepresented the extent to which it protected or misused user data the Supreme Judicial Court held that most of the civil investigative demands (demands) served by the Attorney General were not covered by the attorney-client privilege but that the work product doctrine applied to the documents requested.After potential widespread misuse of Facebook user data by third-party applications was reported Facebook started an investigation, known as the app developer investigation (ADI), to identify the extent to which the apps had misused user data and to determine potential resulting legal liabilities. At issue were six requests contained with the Attorney General's demands. Facebook argued that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protected the information. A judge determined that most of the information was neither privileged nor work product. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding (1) the documents sought by the first five requests were covered by the work product doctrine; (2) the sixth request required further review; and (3) a remand was required to determined whether some of the documents requested constituted opinion work product. View "Attorney General v. Facebook, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter to the county court for entry of a judgment allowing Defendant's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and ordering that the superior court judge's order hospitalizing Defendant under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 16(a) be vacated, holding that Defendant's substantive due process rights were violated.A grand jury returned a twelve-count indictment charging Defendant with two counts of armed carjacking and multiple related charges. After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental illness. Thereafter, the judge granted the Commonwealth's motion to hospitalize Defendant for evaluation pursuant to section 16(a) for forty days. Defendant filed a petition pursuant to section 3 requesting relief from confinement. A single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter, holding that there was no constitutionally adequate justification to temporarily commit Defendant under section 16(a). View "Garcia v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court exercised its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the jury's verdict of murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree, holding that, in light of the circumstances, a verdict of murder in the second degree was more consonant with justice.Defendant was fifteen years old when he killed the victim and had a history of trauma, impaired cognitive abilities, and mental health issues. Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after twenty years. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected most of Defendant's arguments but agreed that, in the circumstances of this case, there was ground for reducing the verdict from first to second degree murder. View "Commonwealth v. Concepcion" on Justia Law