Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the lease of a commercial property that has lasted nearly eight years. The plaintiff brought claims against the defendants for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of G. L. c. 93A. The plaintiff prevailed at trial and was awarded a monetary judgment of over $20 million. The defendants paid the full amount of the judgment but notified the plaintiff that they intended to exercise their appellate rights.The Superior Court initially handled the case, and the plaintiff prevailed. The defendants appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment. The defendants then sought further appellate review, which the Supreme Judicial Court granted, limited to issues related to postjudgment interest.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the exercise of appellate rights does not constitute a condition on the payment of a judgment. Therefore, the judgment was fully satisfied when it was paid in full, and the accrual of postjudgment interest halted upon payment. The court concluded that postjudgment interest is meant to compensate the prevailing party for the loss of the use of money when damages are not paid on time, not to punish or discourage appeals. The court reversed the portion of the lower court's order that allowed for the accrual of postjudgment interest after the defendants' payment in full. View "H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. South Washington Street, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendant, a New Hampshire resident, was arrested in Massachusetts on November 8, 2021, for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol following a collision. During a search of his vehicle, a handgun and ammunition were found. The defendant did not have a Massachusetts nonresident firearm license and was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). He moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the nonresident licensing scheme violated his Second Amendment rights, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen.The District Court judge allowed the motion to dismiss, concluding that the nonresident licensing scheme was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. The judge found that the scheme violated the Second Amendment by imposing discretionary licensing requirements on nonresidents. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Commonwealth's prior nonresident firearm licensing scheme, which allowed the State police colonel discretion to issue or deny licenses, violated the Second Amendment under the Bruen decision. The court noted that such discretionary "may issue" regimes are presumptively invalid and not supported by historical tradition. The court also found that the impermissible portions of the statute could not be severed from the remainder, rendering the entire scheme unconstitutional. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the charge against the defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Donnell" on Justia Law

The defendant, a New Hampshire resident, was involved in a vehicle accident in Massachusetts and was found in possession of an unlicensed firearm. He was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme violated his Second Amendment rights in light of the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen. The motion judge allowed the motion to dismiss, and the Commonwealth appealed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court first determined that the defendant lacked standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme because he had not applied for and been denied a license under that scheme. The court then considered the merits of a facial challenge to the scheme.The court held that the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme is consistent with the Second Amendment. The scheme's purpose is to restrict access to firearms by demonstrably dangerous persons, which is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court also found that the scheme's "shall issue" licensing regime, which requires nonresidents to meet specific criteria to obtain a license, is analogous to historical regulations such as surety and going armed laws.Additionally, the court held that the scheme does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights to travel and to equal protection. The differences in the treatment of resident and nonresident license applicants, such as license duration and processing times, are rationally related to the legitimate state interest of ensuring public safety.The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the motion judge's order allowing the defendant's motion to dismiss, upholding the constitutionality of the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme. View "Commonwealth v. Marquis" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, David Roman, who was convicted of murder in the first degree for the killing of Joseph Stanick. On May 9, 2015, a police officer found Stanick's dead body at his residence. Roman admitted to killing Stanick but claimed it was in self-defense. The victim had suffered seventy-six stab wounds, and Roman was later indicted and convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree based on extreme atrocity or cruelty.The case was initially tried in the Superior Court Department, where Roman was convicted. He filed a motion to reduce the verdict, which was also considered and denied by the same court. Roman appealed the conviction and the denial of his motion, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that various errors by his counsel, the Commonwealth, and the judge required reversal. He also requested the court to exercise its power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court affirmed Roman's conviction and declined to reduce the verdict. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction of murder in the first degree. The court also addressed and dismissed Roman's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, improper admission of evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct. The court concluded that any errors in the trial proceedings did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Roman" on Justia Law

In the early morning of October 23, 2013, Colleen Ritzer, a Danvers High School math teacher, was found dead in the woods outside the high school. She had been raped, strangled, and stabbed. The defendant, a fourteen-year-old student in her class, was convicted by a Superior Court jury of first-degree murder, aggravated rape, and armed robbery. The primary issue at trial was whether the defendant lacked criminal responsibility due to mental illness.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge impeded his ability to present his defense. He raised several issues: the exclusion of expert testimony on brain scans, limitations on expert testimony regarding his statements, improper cross-examination of defense experts, forced disclosure of psychological test data, the use of suppressed statements by the Commonwealth's expert, the denial of a jury instruction on adolescent brain development, insufficient evidence for the aggravated rape and armed robbery convictions, the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, improper prosecutorial conduct in closing arguments, the denial of a change of venue due to pretrial publicity, and the proportionality of his sentence under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the exclusion of the brain scan evidence was within the judge's discretion due to its limited probative value and potential for unfair prejudice. The limitations on expert testimony were also upheld, since the defendant was able to present sufficient evidence of his mental state. The court found no abuse of discretion in the cross-examination of defense experts or the disclosure of psychological test data. The use of the suppressed statements by the Commonwealth's expert did not warrant exclusion of the testimony. The court also found no error in the denial of the jury instruction on adolescent brain development, the sufficiency of the evidence for the aggravated rape and armed robbery convictions, the denial of the motion to suppress, or the prosecutor's closing arguments. The court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to a change of venue and that his sentence was not disproportionate under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "Commonwealth v. Chism" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, the register of deeds for Norfolk County, filed a lawsuit against the county commissioners for Norfolk County, seeking declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief regarding funding and personnel matters within the registry of deeds. The dispute centered on hiring a new chief information officer and the funding for that position. While this litigation was ongoing, the plaintiff requested the county director to transfer funds within the registry's budget to cover legal fees for the personnel litigation. The county director denied these requests, prompting the plaintiff to file a second lawsuit for declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief.In the Superior Court, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment regarding the budget transfers, and the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. The judge granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that under G. L. c. 35, § 32, the plaintiff had the authority to transfer funds within a main group of the budget based on his opinion of public necessity and convenience. The defendants appealed this decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the statutory language of G. L. c. 35, § 32, clearly grants the authorized official the discretion to transfer funds within a main group based on their opinion of public necessity and convenience. The court found that the plaintiff's opinion was sufficient justification for the transfers and that the defendants' interference was unlawful. The court ordered that any outstanding amounts that should have been transferred be specifically authorized by the defendants and that the defendants refrain from hindering lawful transfers within the Contractual Services main group in the future. View "Register of Deeds for Norfolk County v. County Director for Norfolk County" on Justia Law

The taxpayer, 480 McClellan LLC, leased property from the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) to construct and operate a cargo facility. The property, located in East Boston, was previously taxable before Massport acquired it in 1990. In 2017, the City of Boston began taxing the property, and the taxpayer sought abatements for the tax years 2017 through 2020, which were denied by the city's board of assessors.The taxpayer appealed to the Appellate Tax Board, arguing that section 53 of the 1993 supplemental appropriations bill exempted it from taxation because the property was used for "air transportation purposes." The board invited the parties to address whether section 53 had amended section 17 of the Massport enabling act, which governs the taxation of Massport lessees. The board concluded that section 53 was not enacted because the Senate did not finalize its reconsideration of the Governor's veto before the end of the 1993 legislative session. The board also determined that the property was leased for "business purposes" under section 17, making the taxpayer subject to taxation.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the board's decision. The court held that the Senate's initial vote to override the Governor's veto of section 53 was not final due to a timely motion to reconsider, which was not resolved before the legislative session ended. Therefore, section 53 did not amend section 17. The court also upheld the board's interpretation that "business purposes" under section 17 includes commercial, for-profit activities, and found that the taxpayer leased the property for such purposes. Consequently, the taxpayer was subject to taxation under section 17. View "480 McClellan LLC v. Board of Assessors of Boston" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with three counts: second-degree murder, manslaughter while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and leaving the scene of personal injury resulting in death. The trial lasted over two months, involving extensive evidence and numerous witnesses. After deliberating for several days, the jury sent three notes to the judge indicating they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The judge declared a mistrial based on the jury's final note, which stated that further deliberation would be futile and would force jurors to compromise their deeply held beliefs.The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that posttrial accounts from several jurors indicated they had unanimously agreed she was not guilty on two of the three charges and were deadlocked only on the remaining charge. The trial judge denied the motion, reasoning that no verdict was announced in open court, and thus, there was no acquittal. The judge also rejected the request for a posttrial juror inquiry, stating that it would involve an impermissible inquiry into the substance of the jury's deliberations.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the trial judge's decision. The court held that the trial judge acted within her discretion in declaring a mistrial based on manifest necessity, given the jury's repeated statements of deadlock and the risk of coercion in further deliberations. The court also concluded that posttrial juror accounts could not retroactively alter the trial's outcome, as no verdict was returned and affirmed in open court. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss and request for a posttrial juror inquiry were properly denied. View "Read v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The defendants, Nicholas Sicellon and Jerion Moore, were indicted for first-degree murder and unlicensed possession of a firearm. Their first trial in December 2021 ended in a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury. In their second trial in July 2022, the jury again could not reach a unanimous verdict, leading the trial judge to declare a mistrial after the jury reported twice that they were deadlocked. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the mistrial was declared without manifest necessity and that the evidence was insufficient to identify them as the perpetrators. These motions were denied.The defendants then petitioned a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, which was also denied. They appealed this decision, arguing that the trial judge improperly declared a mistrial without manifest necessity and that the evidence was insufficient to support their identification as the shooters.The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in declaring a mistrial. The judge had given careful consideration to the alternatives and determined that further deliberations would be coercive given the jury's unequivocal statements of deadlock. The court also found that the evidence presented at the second trial was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to identify the defendants as the perpetrators beyond a reasonable doubt.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's denial of the defendants' petitions, holding that there was no clear error of law or abuse of discretion in the denial of relief. The judgments of the single justice were affirmed, allowing the Commonwealth to retry the defendants. View "Sicellon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The defendant, a police captain in the West Springfield police department, was found guilty of obtaining an unwarranted privilege with fraudulent intent by using over $1,000 from the police department's evidence room to pay his home mortgage. The defendant was sentenced to a one-year term of probation. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that the statutes under which he was convicted were unconstitutionally vague and that the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted with fraudulent intent or that the unwarranted privilege had a fair market value of over $1,000 in any twelve-month period.The Superior Court denied the defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. After a jury-waived trial, the trial judge found the defendant guilty and denied his motion for a required finding of not guilty. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statutes in question were not unconstitutionally vague. The court found that the terms "unwarranted privilege" and "fraudulent intent" provided sufficient notice of prohibited conduct to a person of reasonable intelligence. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant acted with fraudulent intent, as he had secreted money from the evidence room to pay his mortgage and made false statements to investigators. Additionally, the court determined that the fair market value of the unwarranted privilege exceeded $1,000, based on the face value of the money taken from the evidence room. View "Commonwealth v. Spaulding" on Justia Law