Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that where Petitioner had ordinary means to challenge her sentence the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion by denying extraordinary relief.Petitioner was convicted of making false Medicaid claims and of larceny by false pretenses. Before sentencing, Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the judge consider the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, 6B. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of incarceration. In her Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition, Petitioner argued that the judge violated section 6B by sentencing her to a term of incarceration without making the necessary findings. The single justice denied relief on the ground that Petitioner had an adequate alternative remedy. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner had a remedy in the ordinary appellate process. View "Kiago-Wilson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder and related crimes and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that there was no reason to reverse the convictions or to reduce the degree of guilt.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to a competent interpreter to interpret the trial proceeding into his native language; (2) despite Defendant's arguments to the contrary, trial counsel provided effective assistance; (3) there was no error in the jury instructions as to joint venture liability, the merger doctrine, and the duty to find the highest crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in making certain rulings concerning the conduct of the trial; and (5) there was no reason to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt. View "Commonwealth v. Lee" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a judgment of conviction against Defendant of murder in the first degree the Supreme Judicial Court exercised its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the degree of guilt to murder in the second degree, holding that the interests of justice required that the degree of guilt be reduced under the circumstances of this case.A jury found Defendant guilty of murder int he first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder predicated on armed robbery. On appeal, Defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and the denial of his motion to reopen and reconsider that motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court as to the decisions to deny the motion for a new trial and the motion to reopen and reconsider the motion for a new trial but vacated the judgment of guilt of murder in the first degree, holding that, in the circumstances of this case, there was ground to reduce the verdict from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree. View "Commonwealth v. Dowds" on Justia Law

In this appeal from ongoing litigation involving adjoining property owners the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the motion judge's order denying plaintiff developer's special motion to dismiss defendant abutters' counterclaims, holding that the abutters could not demonstrate that their claims were not strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP suits).The developer filed a complaint against the abutters alleging abuse of process and violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Both parties were then involved in motions filed under the anti-SLAPP act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 59H. Here, the developer appealed from the denial of its special motion to dismiss the abutters' counterclaims alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, abuse of process, and violation of chapter 93A. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for entry of an order allowing the special motion to dismiss, holding (1) none of the abutters' contract-based counterclaims was colorable; and (2) the abutters failed to demonstrate that any of their remaining counterclaims were not retaliatory. View "477 Harrison Avenue, LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition seeking review of an order of a district court judge denying his motion for relief from the requirement that he register as a sex offender, holding that the single justice properly could have concluded that the circumstances did not require the court's intervention.Petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, which presumptively required him to register as a sex offender. Because Petitioner was not sentenced to immediate confinement he was eligible to seek relief from the registration requirement. Petitioner sought relief, but the district court denied the motion. Petitioner then filed a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition in the county court seeking relief from the judge's decision not to waive the registration requirement. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, in view of Petitioner's failure promptly to seek review under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, the single justice could have properly concluded that there were not exceptional circumstances that required the court to exercise its extraordinary power of general superintendence. View "Aroian v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Commission concluding that the Boston police department had not demonstrated reasonable justification for bypassing Michael Gannon for employment in 2013 because his hair sample tested positive for cocaine use in 2010, holding that that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and contained no error of law.Specifically, the Commission determined that the department had not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Gannon in fact had used illegal narcotics. The department sought review of the Commission's decision, and the superior court judge overturned the decision and entered judgment for the department. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judge's order allowing the department's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the Commission employed the correct standard and its decision contained no error of law and was supported by substantial evidence. View "Boston Police Department v. Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated a juvenile court judge's decision to adjudicate Juvenile delinquent for disturbing a school assembly, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 40 and declining to apply the amended statute, as appearing in St. 2018, ch. 69, 159, holding that St. 2018 ch. 69, 159 should be applied retroactively to cases pending on April 13, 2018.The complaint charging Defendant of disturbing a school assembly issued on February 20, 2018. On April 13, 2018, the Legislature struck the former statute in its entirety and replaced it. The juvenile court judge declined to apply the amended statute retroactively to Juvenile's conduct, and Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the delinquency adjudication and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for dismissal of the complaint, holding that because prospective application of St. 2018, ch. 69, 159 would be repugnant to the purpose of the Legislature's amendment of the school assembly statute, the statute applies retroactively to cases that were pending as of April 13, 2018. View "Commonwealth v. Ashe A." on Justia Law

In this case concerning the application of the standard set forth in Care & Protection of M.C., 479 Mass. 246 (2018) (M.C. I), governing requests for limited relief from impoundment of records in a care and protection proceeding in the juvenile court by a party in a related criminal proceeding, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the juvenile court judge properly applied the "good cause" standard.When this matter was previously before the Supreme Judicial Court the Court vacated the juvenile court judge's decision allowing Father's and the Commonwealth's motions for release from impoundment. On remand, the Commonwealth and Father filed renewed motions for relief from impoundment. The judge considered the motions in light of the newly announced standard in M.C. I and allowed both motions in part. Mother and Father appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the judge properly applied the "good cause" standard required by M.C. I and the Uniform Rules of Impoundment Procedure with respect to Father's motion; but (2) the Commonwealth's request for transcripts of Mother's and her psychotherapist's testimony should have been allowed contingent on the occurrence of specific events at Mother's trial. View "In Care & Protection of M.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court judge's judgment concluding that the Parole Board did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's application for parole and applying the 1996 amendment to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, 133A that increased the maximum permissible period between subsequent applications for parole from three years to five years, holding that further discovery concerning the Board's implementation of the 1996 amendment was necessary.In 1986, Appellant, then a juvenile, was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. After Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), was decided, Appellant became eligible for parole. The Board denied Appellant's application for parole and applied section 133A, which prescribes parole eligibility conditions for prisoners serving life sentences. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court's order allowing the Board's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding (1) the Legislature intended the 1996 amendment to apply retroactively; (2) the amendment is not unconstitutional on its face; but (3) further proceedings were necessary to determine whether application of the amendment to Appellant was nonetheless unconstitutional. View "Roberio v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the district court judge's order denying pretrial detention, holding that a charge of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen may not form the basis for pretrial detention under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58A.Defendant was charged with engaging in sexual activity with a thirteen-year-old boy in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 23A (statutory rape) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 13B (indecent assault and battery on a child). Under the dangerousness statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58A, a person charged with statutory rape cannot be held without conditions of release prior to trial. At arraignment, the Commonwealth sought a dangerousness hearing. The district court judge concluded that none of the charges qualified under the statute and that Defendant could not be detained without bail. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, contrary to the Commonwealth's contention, a charge for indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen does not render an individual eligible for pretrial detention. View "Commonwealth v. Vieira" on Justia Law