Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the motion judge denying Defendants' special motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' defamation claim pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 59H, holding that the motion judge did not err in concluding that Plaintiffs' colorable defamation claim was not a SLAPP suit.Plaintiffs, nine nurses who had been fired from Steward Carney Hospital, Inc., filed this defamation action against the hospital and others (collectively, Defendants). Defendants filed a special motion to dismiss the defamation claim under the anti-SLAPP statute. A superior court judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hospital, Inc., 477 Mass. 141 (2017), after augmenting the anti-SLAPP framework devised in Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 247 Mass. 156 (1998) (Duracraft) and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the motion to dismiss was again denied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed after applying the newly augmented framework, holding that the defamation claim was not a SLAPP suit because it was not brought with the primary motivation of chilling the hospital defendants' right to petition. View "Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case involving the pretrial diversion of Defendant, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the language of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276A, 3 requires arraignment, at the Commonwealth's request, before a defendant can participate in a pretrial diversion program.Defendant was charged with assault and battery. After Defendant's initial appearance before a judge she moved to continue her arraignment sot hat she could be assessed for eligibility for pretrial diversion. The judge continued the arraignment over the Commonwealth's objection and also ordered, as a condition of release, that Defendant stay away from the alleged victim. Thereafter, the judge determined that Defendant was eligible for pretrial diversion and imposed conditions of release. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding (1) under the pretrial diversion statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276A, 3, a judge may not decline to arraign an adult defendant, over the Commonwealth's objection, and instead direct the defendant to a pretrial diversion program; and (2) whether during the screening period prior to arraignment or thereafter if the Commonwealth does not seek arraignment, a judge may order conditions of release, including GPS monitoring by the probation service. View "Commonwealth v. Newberry" on Justia Law

In this summary process eviction action, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the housing court judge's order for use and occupancy payments, holding that a court has statutory and equitable authority to order use and occupancy payments that become due pending trial to be paid into the court, into private escrow accounts, and directly to the landlord.Specifically, the Court held (1) to exercise its authority to order a tenant at sufferance to make interim use and occupancy payments during the pendency of an eviction action the judge, on motion by the landlord, must hold a use and occupancy hearing where the factors and circumstances described in this opinion are considered; and (2) payment into an escrow account maintained by the court or counsel for one of the parties will typically provide adequate protection to the landlord, but a judge may order payments directly to the landlord if certain factors are present. Based on the foregoing, the Court held that the order for use and occupancy payments in this case was deficient in two respects, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. View "Davis v. Comerford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court affirming the Sex Offender Registry Board's (SORB) classification of John Doe No. 23656 as a level two sex offender, holding that Doe's claims on appeal were unavailing.Specifically, the Court held (1) contrary to Doe's argument on appeal, the hearing examiner did not disregard the testimony of Doe's expert witness in evaluating the evidence, but rather, declined to "wholly adopt" the expert's conclusions; (2) there was sufficient evidence to classify Doe as a level two sex offender; and (3) Doe failed to demonstrate that his registration information should not be made available on the Internet. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court challenging the legality of the Boston Redevelopment Authority's (BRA) actions executing a permanent taking of the "Yawkey Way" easement and subsequently selling the easement rights, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the permanent taking of the Yawkey Way easement and the sale of the easement rights pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121B, 46(f).After plans were made to try to improve Fenway Park and its surroundings, the BRA executed a permanent taking of an easement over a portion of Yawkey Way - a public way adjacent to Fenway Park. The BRA then sold the easement rights to the Boston Red Sox for as long as Major League Baseball games are played at Fenway Park. Plaintiff, a local attorney and business owner who had sought to acquire the Yawkey Way easement rights for himself, brought this action challenging the BRA's actions. The motion judge granted judgment for the BRA. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the BRA's actions. View "Marchese v. Boston Redevelopment Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, holding that because there was no evidence that Defendant was acting in his professional capacity when he committed the offense, the judge erred in denying Defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty.During the time of his offense, Defendant was a police officer in a K-9 unit and was trained as a mandated reporter but was in plain clothes when he assaulted the victim. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, Defendant unsuccessfully moved for a required finding of not guilty. After he was convicted, Defendant appealed, arguing that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden to establish each element of the offense charged. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the Commonwealth presented no evidence to suggest that Defendant was acting in his capacity as a police officer at the time of the crime, the judge should have allowed Defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty. The Court then remanded the matter for entry of a judgment of guilty of the lesser included offense of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. View "Commonwealth v. Gomes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the board of assessors of Boston, holding that taxed personal property owned by and assessed to Veolia Energy Boston, Inc. consisting principally of pipes that Veolia used to produce, store, and distribute steam is exempt from local taxation and that the great integral machine doctrine remains an appropriate means by which to determine whether certain property constitutes machinery.At issue was whether the pipes were exempt from local taxation in accordance with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 59, 5, clause 16 (3), which provides that property owned by a manufacturing corporation "other than...pipes" is exempt from local taxation. The board found that Veolia's networks of pipes and appurtenant equipment operate in concert as a single, integrated machine and, as a result, concluded that the pipes constituted machinery exempt from local taxation in accordance with clause 16 (3). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the board's reasoning in all material aspects was sound and that there was no basis for disturbing the board's decision. View "Veolia Energy Boston, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Boston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court denied the request sought by Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC (the Globe) for declaratory relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that records of show cause hearings where a clerk-magistrate in the District Court or the Boston Municipal Court makes a finding of probable cause but declines to exercise his or her discretion to issue a criminal complaint are not presumptively public.The Globe claimed in this action that the public has a common-law and constitutional right to access the show cause hearing records. The Supreme Judicial Court denied the Globe's request for declaratory relief, holding (1) the records are not presumptively public under the common law, the First Amendment, or article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as amended by article 77 of the Amendments to the Constitution; (2) any member of the public may request the records of a particular show cause hearing, and a clerk-magistrate or a judge shall grant the request where the interests of justice so require; and (3) this Court now exercises its superintendence authority to require that all show cause hearings be electronically recorded. View "Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the judge made no prejudicial error in his evidentiary rulings; (2) nothing in the prosecutor's closing argument created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) the trial judge properly instructed the jury regarding murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty; (4) the jury's verdict was consonant with justice; and (5) this Court declines to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Reyes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to grant a new trial or to reduce or set aside the verdict, holding that none of Defendant's allegations of error warranted reversal.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury and in admitting conversations recorded while Defendant was in pretrial detention. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instructions did not prejudice Defendant; and (2) there was no violation of Defendant's constitutional rights in the admission of the recorded conversations. View "Commonwealth v. Odgren" on Justia Law