Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree with deliberate premeditation, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, armed assault with intent to murder, and other crimes, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's murder conviction; (2) a firearm or other gun need to be operational to prove either assault by means of a dangerous weapon or armed assault with intent to murder because armed assault with intent to murder requires only that the defendant think his weapon is operational; (3) the instructions were not correct with respect to armed assault by means of intent to murder and assault with a dangerous weapon, but Defendant was the beneficiary of the error; and (4) there was no reason for the Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to grant a new trial or to reduce to set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree. View "Commonwealth v. Buttimer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and declined to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that there was no basis to set aside or reduct the verdict.Specifically, the Court held (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction of murder in the first degree; (2) there was no reversible error in the manner in which the judge handled two issues that arose in connection with two sitting jurors; (3) the judge did not err in admitting prior bad acts evidence to show motive; and (4) the statements made by the Commonwealth during closing argument were proper. View "Commonwealth v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to grant a new trial or to reduce or set aside the verdict, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced by the judge's decision not to give Defendant's preferred eyewitness instruction; (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision to deny Defendant's motion for a mistrial; and (4) there was no basis to grant extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Bryant" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, holding that the Commonwealth erroneously elicited false testimony and failed to correct the false testimony, which created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.During trial, a state police trooper testified that Defendant told police during two separate interviews that he was picked up on the night of the shooting in the area of a Dunkin' Donuts restaurant that was near the crime scene. Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the trooper testified falsely. The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) as made clear by the trooper's police reports and transcripts of Defendant's interviews with police, Defendant never told police that he was picked up or near Dunkin' Donuts; (2) because the testimony was blatantly false and pertained to a critical component of the Commonwealth's case, it was error for the prosecutor not to correct the testimony; and (3) the error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Ware" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that the motion judge committed reversible error in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search and seizure of a motor vehicle in which he was a passenger and in denying Defendant's postconviction motion for discovery of wiretap recordings of his conversations with a confidential informant.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) Defendant's motion to suppress should have been granted because Defendant was subjected to an illegal seizure, and the evidence obtained from the subsequently impoundment and search of the vehicle was the direct result of the illegal seizure, and the error was not harmless; (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts; and (3) the motion judge properly denied Defendant's postconviction motion for a new trial but erred in denying the motion for discovery. View "Commonwealth v. Tavares" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of carrying a loaded firearm unlawfully as an armed career criminal with one predicate offense, holding that Defendant's indictment was not void and that Defendant's conviction of assault and battery could serve as a predicate offense under the Massachusetts Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10G.Defendant was indicted for several unlawful firearm offenses, and the indictments also alleged that Defendant previously had been convicted of three violent crimes and was thus subject to enhanced penalties under the ACCA. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to carrying a loaded firearm unlawfully as an armed career criminal with one predicate offense. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate the ACCA conviction and sentence for a new trial. The motion was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) although the indictment did not set forth the alleged ACCA predicate convictions, the indictment was not void because Defendant had sufficient notice of the crimes charged; (2) Defendant's prior conviction of assault and battery qualified as a predicate offense under the ACCA; (3) counsel was not ineffective; and (4) Defendant's guilty plea on the ACCA charge was entered into intelligently and voluntarily. View "Commonwealth v. Wentworth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that because Total Wine & More sold liquor and wine purchased through invoices sales in the record at prices below the net price reflected in those invoices the Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission was justified in finding that Total Wine sold the liquor or wine at a price less than invoiced cost in violation of 204 Code Mass Regs. 2.04(1).After the Commission found Total Wine in violation of section 2.04(1) Total Wine brought this action contending that it was not in violation of the regulation because, after accounting for the cumulative quality discounts (CQDs) that it obtained from its bulk purchases of these brands of liquor and wine - which were credited in subsequent invoices - its ultimate net cost per bottle was below its sales price to consumers. The superior court allowed Total Wine's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to enter judgment in favor of the Commission, holding that the plain language of section 2.04(1) requires that the net cost of liquor or wine sold to a licensed retailer, including any credits applied to that sale from CQDs, be reflected in the invoice for that particular sale; and (2) the Commission's interpretation of the regulation was reasonable. View "Massachusetts Fine Wines & Spirits, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside a superior court judgment affirming a Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) decision to classify John Doe as a level two sex offender, holding that there was not substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's decision to classify Doe as a level two sex offender by clear and convincing evidence.SORB classified Doe as a level two sex offender after Doe was convicted of two counts of open and gross lewdness. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) SORB had jurisdiction to classify Doe as a sex offender; (2) in order classify an individual as a level two sex offender, the hearing examiner is required to make three explicit determinations by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) in light of this three-prong test, the hearing examiner did not support her decision to classify Doe as a level two sex offender by clear and convincing evidence. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice denying Petitioner's "Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief" without a hearing, holding that the single justice did not err in denying relief.Specifically, the Court held that Petitioner's request for declaratory and inductive relief was a mere recasting of the same types of claims Petitioner raised in his previous postconviction filings, and even if his claims were new, his avenue for seeking relief was in the superior court in the first instance. Therefore, the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief. View "Vinnie v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Norfolk" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.While Petitioner was incarcerated in Indiana for unrelated offenses, he filed a petition for a speedy disposition of Massachusetts charges underlying this action pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Commonwealth had failed to bring him to trial within the time frame required by the IAD. A district court judge allowed the motion. Meanwhile, Petitioner had been indicted on the same charges. Petitioner moved to dismiss the charges on jurisdictional grounds. The superior court judge denied the motion. Petitioner then filed his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition arguing that in denying the jurisdictional motion, the superior court judge had revoked the district court judge's dismissal of the complaint. The superior court denied the IAD motion before the single justice acted on the Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. Thereafter, the single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not err in denying relief. View "Ghebrehiwet v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law