Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case concerning whether retail salespeople who are paid entirely in commissions or draws are entitled to additional overtime or Sunday pay, the Supreme Judicial Court held that such employees are entitled to overtime or Sunday pay with separate and additional payments of one and one-half times the minimum wage for every hour the employees worked over forty hours or on Sunday.At issue before the Court was whether the defendant employers in this case satisfied their obligations under the overtime statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, 1A, and the Sunday pay statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 136, 6, when they paid draws or commissions that equaled or exceeded the minimum wage for the plaintiff employees' first forty hours of work and one and one-half times the minimum wage for all hours worked over forty hours or on Sunday. The Supreme Judicial Court held that draws and commissions cannot be allocated retroactively as hourly and overtime wages and Sunday pay even where the draws and commissions equal or exceed the minimum wage for the employees' first forty hours of work and one and one-half times the minimum wage for all hours worked over forty hours or on Sunday. View "Sullivan v. Sleepy's LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff's personal injury action on the grounds that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 84, 15, the road defect statute, provided the exclusive remedy for Plaintiff's claim and that Plaintiff had not provided the statutorily required notice, holding that section 15 did not limit Defendant's common-law liability under tort law and that Defendant may be sued for negligence without providing thirty days' notice under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 84, 18, the notice statute.Plaintiff was injured when, while riding his bicycle, he struck a utility cover that was misaligned with the road surface. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, Veolia Energy North America, for negligence. The superior court judge dismissed the lawsuit. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the road defect and notice statutes apply to governmental and quasi-governmental actors responsible for the public duty of maintaining the public way and not to a private party such as Veolia that has created a particular defect in the road; and (2) Veolia may be sued for its own negligence without providing thirty days' notice. View "Meyer v. Veolia Energy North America" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of indecent assault and battery, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant's request that a question be posed to potential jurors about bias toward non-English speakers.Specifically, the Court held that while there may be a bias toward non-English speakers, such as Defendant, and that a thorough voir dire is necessary to ensure an unbiased jury, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant's request to pose a question to the venire regarding language-related bias; (2) even if the judge erroneously admitted testimony from an investigator, there was no prejudice warranting a new trial; (3) the judge did not permit improper bolstering of the victim's credibility through the first complaint witness; and (4) the trial judge properly instructed the jury regarding the first complaint testimony. View "Commonwealth v. Espinal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court Defendant's conviction of first degree murder and declined to exercise its extraordinary powers to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) where a defendant facing trial on a charges of murder, sexual offenses against children, or rape requests individual voir dire on the issue of racial or ethnic prejudice and the defendant and the victim are of different such backgrounds, that request should be granted; but (2) a new trial was not required in this case.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant was not denied the right to a fair and impartial jury when, after members of the jury were exposed to an extraneous influence, the judge did not excuse the entire jury; (2) while the trial judge erred by partially excluding Defendant from the subsequent voir dire of the deliberating jury, Defendant was not prejudiced; (3) Defendant was not deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury when the judge denied Defendant's request for individual voir dire on questions of ethnic bias; and (4) the judge did not abuse his discretion in certain evidentiary rulings. View "Commonwealth v. Colon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Land Court judge reversing the decision of the zoning board of appeals of Brockton (board) denying Plaintiffs' appeal of the denial of their permit to construct a house on a lot in Brockton, holding that the Land Court judge correctly determined that the division of the lot was not a subdivision and that the owners were not otherwise required to seek any planning board action.In 1964, the lot at issue was part of a lot that was divided by its owner into two separate conveyances without a plan presented to the local planning board. Plaintiffs applied for a permit to construct a house on the lot. The building inspector denied the permit. The board denied Plaintiffs' appeal, concluding that the lot was unbuildable because the division of the lot did not comply with the subdivision control law. A Land Court judge reversed the board's decision, determining that the division did not constitute a subdivision under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, 81L. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the original division did not require planning board approval and that the lot met all other requirements that existed at the time for a proper division of land. View "RCA Development, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brockton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of arson of a dwelling house, felony-murder in the second degree, and two counts of injuring a firefighter, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that, although the jury instruction on an "alternative theory" of arson was erroneous, the error did not warrant overturning the verdicts.On appeal, among other things, Defendant challenged the arson conviction, which served as the predicate for the other charges, and argued that the trial judge erred, as a matter of law, in instructing the jury on the alternative theory of arson, namely, that Defendant could be found guilty of she accidentally or negligently set the fire and then willfully and maliciously failed to extinguish or report it. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant specifically intended to burn the apartment building; (2) it was error to provide the supplemental instruction on arson, but the error did not require a new trial; and (3) there was no merit to Defendant's remaining arguments on appeal. View "Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction of accessory after the fact to murder, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.Defendant, who witnessed a killing, did not provide the police with a false alibi or comparable information that would exculpate the killer, a false narrative of the crime that would give the killer a defense, or false information to assist in the killer's escape. The only "aid" or "assistance" alleged in this case was that Defendant made false and misleading statements to police detectives and refused to provide them with requested telephone numbers. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding (1) Defendant's false statements and refusal to cooperate did not constitute the aid or assistance necessary to find him guilty as an accessory after the fact under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 274, 4; and (2) the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Rivera" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the Appeals Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of assault and battery as a lesser included offense of attempted murder, holding that the trial court's failure to give a nondeadly force self-defense instruction created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct on the use of nondeadly force in self-defense. The Appeals Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to such an instruction and, even if were entitled, the lack of such an instruction did not give rise to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on that charge, holding (1) the court's failure to provide a nondeadly force self-defense instruction lowered the Commonwealth's burden to prove the absence of proper self-defense; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the omission of such an instruction constituted reversible error. View "Commonwealth v. Abubardar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a single justice's denial of Appellant's motion for the appointment of counsel filed in connection with a gatekeeper application that Appellant had filed in the county court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that the single justice did not abuse her discretion.Appellant, who was convicted of murder in the first degree and related charges, filed several motions for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court eventually directed a single justice of the court to consider Appellant's gatekeeper application for leave to appeal from the superior court's denial of his motion for the appointment of counsel to prepare and file a motion for forensic testing and his request to have counsel appointed for purposes of the application. The single justice denied the gatekeeper application and Appellant's request for the appointment of counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order denying Appellant's motion for the appointment of counsel, holding that Appellant failed to show that the single justice abused her discretion or that the denial of appointed counsel resulted in any unfairness or deprived him of meaningful access to review of his gatekeeper application. View "Commonwealth v. Monteiro" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the second degree and the order denying his motion for a new trial, holding that Defendant's sentence was constitutional and that no prejudicial error occurred in the proceedings below.Defendant, who was seventeen years of age at the time of the murder, was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment with eligibility for parole after fifteen years. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) a mandatory life sentence with parole eligibility after fifteen years for a juvenile homicide offender convicted of murder in the second degree is constitutional; (2) the judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion to continue his sentence so that he could present evidence related to his juvenile status; (3) the judge did not err in denying Defendant's request to instruct the jury on accident; (4) Defendant's counsel was not ineffective for not requesting other jury instructions; and (5) the judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the warrantless "pinging" of Defendant's cellular telephone because no evidence came from the search. View "Commonwealth v. Lugo" on Justia Law