Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this divorce case, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of divorce nisi that awarded general term alimony to Wife and, among other things, divided the marital estate such that fifty-five percent of the overall assets were awarded to Husband and forty-five percent to Wife, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Husband challenged the alimony award and the division of the marital estate. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge did not err in calculating the duration of the marriage for purposes of awarding alimony; and (2) the judge made no error in dividing the parties’ assets. View "Connor v. Benedict" on Justia Law

In this review of two decisions of the alcoholic beverages control commission (commission) that resulted in the issuance of penalties against Craft Beer Guild, LLC (Craft) and Rebel Restaurants, Inc. (Rebel), the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgments of the superior courts affirming the commission’s penalties, holding that the commission properly determined that Craft violated both Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 138, 25A(a) and 204 Code Mass. Regs. 2.08 but that the terms of the regulation did not apply to Rebel’s conduct.After evidentiary hearings, the commission determined (1) Craft, a licensed wholesaler of craft beers, had paid monetary rebates in differing amounts on craft beer purchases to certain licensed retailers in violation of the statute; and (2) both Craft and Rebel violated the regulation, which prohibited a particular scheme of commercial bribery. The superior courts affirmed the commission’s penalties. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed as to Craft but reversed as to Rebel, holding (1) Craft violated both the statute and the regulation, and the regulation remained valid; but (2) the terms of the regulation did not apply to Rebel’s conduct in accepting money derived from kickbacks paid by Craft. View "Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the trial judge’s denial of the Commonwealth’s renewed motion filed pursuant to Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512 (2014), and remanded for entry of an order compelling Defendant to enter a password into a cell phone seized from Defendant at the time of his arrest, holding that the motion judge abused his discretion in denying the Commonwealth’s motion.Defendant was charged with, among other things, trafficking a person for sexual servitude. The Commonwealth was granted a search warrant to search the cell phone found on Defendant, but the cell phone’s contents could only be accessed with the entry of a password. At issue was whether requiring Defendant to enter the cell phone’s password would violate his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. A trial judge concluded that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Defendant’s knowledge of the password was a “foregone conclusion” under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and denied the Commonwealth’s motion and renewed motion to compel Defendant to produce the password. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion and not subject to the protections of the Fifth Amendment and article 12. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court answered a question certified to it by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts concerning whether the six-year statute of repose set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, 2B operates to bar tort claims arising from diseases with extended latency periods where the defendants had knowing control of the injurious instrumentality at the time of exposure.The Supreme Judicial Court answered in the affirmative, concluding that section 2B completely eliminates all tort claims arising out of any deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction, or general administration of an improvement to real property after the established time period has run, even if the cause of action arises from a disease with an extended latency period, such as a disease associated with asbestos exposure, and even if a defendant had knowing control of the instrumentality of injury at the time of exposure. View "Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice denying Petitioner’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice correctly denied the petition because there were adequate alternative routes available to Petitioner to seek and obtain review of his claims.Petitioner was convicted of possessing counterfeit currency, uttering a counterfeit note, and larceny by false pretenses of property not exceeding $250 in value. Years later, Petitioner filed this petition alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal and that his convictions were wrongful in several different aspects. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the errors raised in the petition either were or could have been raised on direct appeal, the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying the petition. View "Tavares v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying Petitioner’s petition under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 for relief from a judgment entered in a small claims matter in the district court, holding that extraordinary relief was not warranted in this case.In the small claims matter a clerk-magistrate issued judgment in favor of Barclays Bank of Delaware as to both of Petitioner’s claims and Barclay’s counterclaims. The district court dismissed Petitioner’s claim of appeal. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but a judge denied the motion. In his petition in the county court Petitioner sought relief from the judge’s denial of relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner waived his right to appeal and likewise was not entitled to invoke this Court’s extraordinary power of general superintendence in lieu of an appeal that Petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary relief when he failed to request a transfer to the regular civil docket pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 218, 24. View "Mullane v. Barclays Bank Delaware" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, Petitioner’s petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying relief.Petitioner was the defendant in a small claims matter. Petitioner did not request that the matter be transferred to the regular civil docket. A magistrate found for the plaintiff. A judge in the district court also found for the plaintiff. Petitioner did not request that the judge report any questions to the Appellate Division, but instead, filed this petition seeking review of the judge’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice’s denial of relief, holding that Petitioner had no right to obtain review under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "Aronova v. Mohamed" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice denying Petitioner’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying relief.Petitioner, an inmate convicted of murder in the first degree, filed this petition asking the court to compel a judge in the trial court to act on then-pending motions for postconviction relief. Thereafter, the trial judge acted on and denied the postconviction motions. The Supreme Judicial Court held that because the trial court judge had acted on Petitioner’s postconviction motions, his request for relief was moot. View "Tyree v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying Appellant’s petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief.Appellant was the plaintiff in two actions against the same defendant in the small claims session of the district court. The clerk-magistrate offered to consolidate the two cases and transfer the to the regular civil docket. Appellant, however, voluntarily dismissed one action and proceeded solely on the other. Appellant prevailed in the surviving action. Thereafter, Appellant filed motions seeking reconsideration in both cases and then filed this petition. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was no entitled to invoke this Court’s extraordinary power of general superintendence under the circumstances. View "Taylor-Cameron v. Walcott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of carrying a firearm without a license, holding that Defendant’s claims of evidentiary errors and improper argument during the prosecutor’s closing did not require a reversal of his convictions.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence Defendant’s statement to the police; (2) it was error to admit certain extraneous firearm evidence, but there was not substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) a rhetorical question and answer in the prosecutor’s closing argument did not rise to the level of reversible error, and the prosecutor’s description of Defendant as “leader of the pack” and “Alpha dog” did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) there was no basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree. View "Commonwealth v. Collazo" on Justia Law