Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this summary process eviction action the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the Housing Court allowing an execution to issue on Landlord’s representation that Tenant had violated a nonfinancial condition of the appeals bond, holding that the Housing Court judge’s order of execution of judgment for failure to comply with a nonfinancial condition of the bond was improper.Landlord served Tenant with a notice of termination of tenancy before bringing a summary process eviction action against her. Following a trial, Landlord received a judgment of execution, and the Housing Court judge allowed the execution to issue. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) a legally effective notice to quit is a condition precedent to a summary process action and part of the landlord’s prime facie case but is not jurisdictional; (2) the notice to quit in this case was not defective; (3) the Housing Court judge abused his discretion when, without providing advance notice that he would conduct trial on the same day as a scheduled hearing on Tenant’s motion to vacate a default judgment, he denied a volunteer attorney’s request for a continuance provided by Housing Court Standing Order 1-01; and (4) the judge lacked statutory authority to impose a nonfinancial condition on the appeals bond. View "Cambridge Street Realty, LLC v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice denying, without a hearing, Petitioner’s petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and application for “direct appellate review” purportedly under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that neither the petition nor the application was the proper means for Petitioner to get the review that he sought of his conviction.After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of rape and of being a habitual offender. In both his petition and application, Petitioner raised issued related to the habitual offender conviction. After a single justice denied relief, Petitioner appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the issues raised were ones for which Petitioner had an adequate alternative remedy by way of direct appeal, and therefore, the single justice did not err in denying both the petition and the application. View "Barbosa v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court judge allowing Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that was found in plain view during a protective sweep on the basis that the officers’ entry into Defendant’s home was not justified based on exigent circumstances, holding that the judge properly found that the police created the exigency that prompted their warrantless entry into Defendant’s dwelling.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides greater protection than the Fourteenth Amendment where the police have relied on a reasonably foreseeable exigency to justify the warrantless entry into a dwelling; (2) under the circumstances of this case, the arrest of Defendant in his dwelling without a warrant was unreasonable; and (3) the Commonwealth waived the argument regarding whether, if the permissible observations from the affidavit were redacted, the search warrant was based on probable cause. View "Commonwealth v. Alexis" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a criminal proceeding, the Supreme Judicial Court discerned no reversible error but, under the unique circumstances of this case, exercised its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree, holding that a conviction of murder in the second degree was more consonant with justice.Specifically, the Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to prove that the murder was deliberately premeditated; (2) trial counsel’s error in failing to admit Defendant’s medical records in evidence did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (3) an error in the prosecutor’s closing argument did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) where there was nothing to suggest that there was any ill will between Defendant and the victim and evidence of Defendant’s intoxication, Defendant’s first-degree murder verdict is vacated and a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree shall be entered. View "Commonwealth v. Salazar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court’s order allowing in part and denying in part the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority’s (MBTA) motion for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s action alleging that Derek Smith, an MBTA bus driver, assaulted him, holding that the trial judge did not err.In his complaint, Plaintiff asserted claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision; and vicarious liability. In allowing in part the MBTA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the superior court held (1) the MBTA was immune from the vicarious liability claim, and (2) Plaintiff failed adequately to present the negligence claim as required by the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, 4, but the MBTA had waived the defense of defective presentment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court judge was warranted in concluding that the MBTA waived the affirmative defense of inadequate presentment by failing to plead it with the required specificity and particularity. View "Theisz v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction on a single count of deriving support from prostitution under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 7, holding that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 7 is constitutional and that there was no prejudicial or other reversible error in this case.On appeal, Defendant argued that because no definition of “pimp” or “purveyor” appears in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 7, the language of the statute is unconstitutionally vague and that he was prejudiced from jury instructions tracking such language. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) the statute targets those who, with the intent to profit from prostitution, live or derive support or maintenance from, or share in the earnings or proceeds of, the known prostitution of others; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; and (3) while this Court clarifies prospectively the jury instructions, there was no prejudicial error in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the single justice that the decision of the Board of Registration of Real Estate Brokers suspending Michael Thomann’s license for ten days, imposing a $1,200 civil penalty, and imposing certain conditions on the reinstatement of his license was supported by substantial evidence and free of any errors of law.An administrative hearing officer concluded that the Board established that Thomas had violated 254 Code Mass. Regs. 2.00(11), 3.00(14)(e) and 3.00(13)(a) by engaging in the business of real estate brokering through an unlicesed limited liability company and by failing to provide a certain notice of agency disclosure to the seller of real property. As a sanction, the Board ordered suspension of Thomann’s license for ten days. On review, the single justice affirmed the Board’s final decision and order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the Board’s decision. View "Thomann v. Board of Registration of Real Estate Brokers & Salesmen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions as a joint venturer of kidnapping and murder in the first degree and the denial of his motions for a new trial and for post trial discovery and further declined to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his clothing was properly denied; (2) statements that the prosecutor made during closing argument regarding blood evidence connecting Defendant to the crime did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) there was no reason to reduce the degree of guilt or grant a new trial pursuant to the Court’s superintendence powers. View "Commonwealth v. Parker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and the denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding that no reversible error occurred in the proceedings below and that the Court had no reason to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to grant a new trial or to reduce or set aside the verdict.Specifically, the Court held (1) the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced by his inability to obtain before trial information related to the sole defense witness’s status as a confidential federal informant, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to require the Commonwealth to secure the witness’s informant records from federal authorities and in declining to compel the testimony of federal law enforcement officers; and (3) Defendant’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. View "Commonwealth v. Ayala" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held a party in a civil case has no right to an immediate appeal from a discovery order under the doctrine of present execution but nevertheless retains two other avenues to seek immediate appellate review of an interlocutory order.Plaintiffs brought a civil action against Defendants. During discovery, Plaintiffs sought certain information. The motion judge found that, contrary to Defendants’ claims, the information was not protected by the attorney-client privilege. Defendants filed a notice of appeal seeking review under the doctrine of present execution and also brought a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 118 seeking interlocutory relief. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) orders requiring the disclosure of privileged material, such as the order in this case, are not appealable under the doctrine of present execution; and (2) although this appeal was not properly before the Court under the doctrine of present execution, the Court exercised its discretion under its superintendence authority to reach the merits and held that it must remand the matter to the motion judge for further factual findings. View "Patel v. Martin" on Justia Law