Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm; unlawful possession of a loaded firearm; and unlawful possession of ammunition without a firearm identification (FID) card. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions of possession of a firearm and possession of a loaded firearm. The court rejected defendant's argument and affirmed his firearm convictions. Defendant also appealed from his conviction under the sentencing enhancement provision of G.L.c. 269, 10G(c), on the ground that the evidence presented in support of one of his three prior convictions, assault and battery, failed to establish that he committed a "violent crime" within the meaning of G.L.c. 140, section 121. The court agreed with defendant and vacated the judgment for conviction under G.L.c. 269, section 10G(c), as an armed career criminal based on three predicate offense convictions, and remanded the case for the entry of judgment and resentencing under G.L.c. 269, section 10G(c), based on two predicate offense convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Eberhart" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery (with his fists); assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (shod foot); and the unlawful possession of a firearm outside of his residence or place of business, as well as unlawful possession of a firearm having previously been convicted of a violent crime. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the firearm should have been suppressed because there was neither probable cause that a firearm would be found in the vehicle nor grounds for conducting an inventory search; the evidence was insufficient to prove that he constructively possessed the firearm; and with respect to the assault and battery convictions, defendant contended that the judge improperly permitted the jury to view a photograph of the victim's facial injuries. The court rejected defendant's arguments regarding the firearm and subsequent offender convictions, and discerned no merit in defendant's remaining claims. View "Commonwealth v. Gouse" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on all three theories of murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping. On appeal, defendant argued (1) error in the denial of his motion to suppress statements and evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel predicated on trial counsel's failure to (a) engage a sleep deprivation expert and (b) request a jury instruction on the effect of defendant's intoxication relative to his intent; and (3) improper closing argument by the prosecutor. The court rejected defendant's arguments and affirmed the order denying the motion to suppress and the judgments of conviction. The court discerned no basis to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Morales" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant's claims on appeal related largely to statements he made to a detective while he was in custody in a hospital recovering from a gunshot wound. Because a number of aspects of the trial, among them the detective's testimony concerning defendant's unrecorded statements, prejudicial limitations on defendant's right to cross-examine a detective, and certain of the prosecutor's remarks in closing argument, created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Woodbine" on Justia Law

After her mother had died and genetic market testing had revealed that R.R. was not her biological father, a judge in the Probate and Family Court allowed Karen's motion to vacate the voluntary acknowledgment of parentage and a judgment of support, custody, and visitation that was based on the voluntary acknowledgment of parentage. At issue was whether the judge was correct in vacating the voluntary acknowledgement of parentage, where it was not challenged until more than one year after it was executed, where after the mother's death the mother's husband signed an affidavit denying paternity, and where the judge made no finding as to Karen's best interest. The court concluded that the voluntary acknowledgment of parentage never became effective as a matter of law because the mother was married at the time of the child's birth and the husband had not executed an affidavit denying paternity until after the mother's death. Because the acknowledgment never had force or effect, there was no time limit on challenges to its validity, and the judge was required to vacate it. View "D.H. vs. R.R" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a superior court judge's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging violations of her state civil rights. Plaintiff contended that she had a right, secured by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and by art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, to attend a lecture that was open to the public, held on the campus of Tufts and that defendants violated the act when they excluded her from the lecture. Tufts, through its office of continuing education, presented a publicly advertised lecture on its campus entitled, "Dangers of Feeding Your Pet a Raw Diet." Plaintiff, who was an advocate of raw food diets for animals, sought to attend the lecture. At the time, she had not paid her bill for services rendered to her horse and defendants informed plaintiff that she was ineligible for continuing education services at Tufts. The court concluded that the circumstances of plaintiff's exclusion from the lecture did not amount to an interference with any claimed free speech right, and thus that the allowance of summary judgment on this claim was proper. The court also concluded that the allowance of summary judgment for defendants' on plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence was correct. View "Roman v. Trustees of Turfts College & others." on Justia Law

The Foggs challenged the issuance of a building permit to 81 Spooner Road, LLC (developer), by the building commissioner for the town of Brookline. At issue was whether a judge in the Land Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Fogg and his mother, on the issue of their standing as "aggrieved" persons under G.L.c. 40A, section 17. The court concluded that the developer failed to rebut the Foggs' presumption of standing. Because the Foggs were deemed to have standing, the judge properly eliminated that issue from the ensuring trial on the merits of the parties' complaints seeking judicial review of the board's decision to rescind the building permit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "81 Spooner Road, LLC vs. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brookline & others (and a companion case )" on Justia Law

An insurer appealed from a decision related to an employee's injury in a metal rolling machine accident. The court concluded that the board was not arbitrary or capricious in deciding that there was insufficient evidence to find that the employee was entitled under G.L.c. 152, section 51 to compensation based on an amount greater than his average weekly wage. But the court concluded that the board erred in finding that the employee's compensation should be based on the average weekly wage he earned when injured in 1980 rather than the out-of-state average weekly wage he earned when that injury recurred in 2003. The court also affirmed the board's decision to vacate the denial of recoupment for the insurer's overpayment of temporary total disability benefits between 1985 and 1988, but noted that, should the insurer decide to renew its claim for recoupment in a separate complaint filed with the department, its claim could prevail only if recoupment was equitable in the circumstances. View "Scott Wadsworth's Case" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for trafficking in cocaine. On the second day of trial, defense counsel discovered that the Commonwealth had violated a discovery order by failing to copy for the defense at least 500 pages of computer-generated information obtained during the police investigation. Defendant moved to dismiss the case but, for financial and emotional reasons, objected to any declaration of a mistrial. Finding that the Commonwealth had not intentionally violated the order, the trial judge denied the motion to dismiss. The judge further found that the newly disclosed materials contained information that any "reasonably diligent" defense counsel would want to review, and that to do so would take longer than a mere "brief delay." Therefore, the judge declared a mistrial over the defendant's objection. The court held that, based upon the facts of the case, the judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that there was "manifest necessity" for a mistrial. There was no double jeopardy bar and defendant could be retried. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court for an entry of judgment denying the petition. View "Cruz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The court considered three petitions for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3, that related to the OpenCourt pilot project, which broadcasts live by "streaming" over the Internet video and audio recordings of certain proceedings taking place in the Quincy District Court. Each petition challenged one or more orders of a judge in the Quincy District Court concerning the broadcasts and online posting of particular proceedings in two different criminal cases. The court concluded that any order restricting OpenCourt's ability to publish -- by "streaming live" over the Internet, publicly archiving on the Web site or otherwise -- existing audio and video recordings of court room proceedings represented a form of prior restraint on the freedoms of the press and speech protected by the First Amendment and art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. Such an order could be upheld only if it was the least restrictive, reasonable measure necessary to protect a compelling governmental interest. In the Barnes case, the court vacated the order of the district court judge requiring the redaction of the minor alleged victim. In the Diorio case, the court concluded that Diorio had not met the heavy burden of justifying an order of prior restraint with respect to the specific proceedings at issue in his petition for relief. The court requested the Supreme Judicial Court's judiciary-media committee submit a set of guidelines of the operation of the OpenCourt project. View "Commonwealth v. Barnes" on Justia Law