Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, as well as assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. On appeal defendant argued that the judge failed to conduct an appropriate voir dire of the prospective jurors during jury selection; his statement to police following his arrest on the day of the killing should have been suppressed; the judge erred in admitting a statement he made to another inmate; the prosecutor's closing argument was improper and created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice; and the judge erred when he instructed the jury that they must consider whether defendant "as a result of a mental illness, lacked the capacity to have the intent, knowledge, or state of mind necessary" to prove the crimes charged. The court addressed each issue and affirmed the convictions. After a complete review of the record, the court declined to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Bishop" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of failing to verify his sex offender registration information by refusing to provide certain secondary addresses, and was sentenced to lifetime parole. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the judge erred in denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty. Because the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to convict defendant, the court reversed. In light of this conclusion, the other issues defendant raised were moot. However, because there appeared to be some confusion concerning whether the complaint properly alleged that defendant could face lifetime parole, the court addressed it briefly. The court concluded that the complaint issued against defendant in this case did not meet requirements of art. 12. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed. View "Commonwealth v. Kateley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an appeal in the Superior Court from a decision of the defendant board of health of Southbridge (board) approving a "minor modification" to the site assignment for an existing landfill and related processing facility in that town under G.L.c. 111, section 150A. At issue was whether plaintiffs had standing to seek judicial review of the Superior Court of the board's decision. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that the Superior Court judge had authority to allow plaintiffs' motion to extend the time for filing their notice of appeal. The court concluded, however, that on the record before the court, plaintiffs lacked standing to seek judicial review of the board's decision in the Superior Court as persons "aggrieved" and plaintiffs' substantive challenges to the decision lacked merit. View "Board of Health of Sturbridge & others v. Board of Health of Southbridge & another." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for examination and discharge under G.L.c. 123A, section 9, the section of the sexually dangerous person statute that entitled someone who was committed as a sexually dangerous person annually to file a petition for examination and discharge from the Massachusetts Treatment Center. At issue was whether section 9 rendered admissible the written reports of expert witnesses retained by a section 9 petitioner for purposes of the section 9 proceeding. The court concluded that an interpretation of section 9 to bar the admission in evidence of a written report prepared by a petitioner's expert psychiatrist or psychologist, while authorizing introduction of the reports prepared by the qualified examiners and the community access board, would raise substantial due process concerns. Therefore, the court construed section 9 to render admissible petitioner's experts' written reports. The court agreed with the Appeals Court that the objected-to exclusion of the written reports prepared by petitioner's experts in this case was prejudicial and vacated the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Santos, petitioner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs originally filed a complaint asserting that defendants were liable on various claims under principles of common-law negligence. After a variety of counts against defendants were dismissed on summary judgment, plaintiffs amended their complaint to assert additional claims against defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, Jessica, was negligent for knowingly allowing underage persons to possess alcohol on property under her control -- conduct that plaintiffs claimed violated G.L.c. 138, section 34. The court was asked to enlarge the scope of social host liability under its common law by extending a duty of care to an underage host who did not supply alcohol to underage guests, but provided a location where they were permitted to consume it. The court declined to extend the scope of liability and reaffirmed that liability attached only where a social host either served alcohol or exercised effective control over the supply of alcohol. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Juliano & others v. Simpson & another." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate felony. On appeal, defendant claimed that he was denied a fair trial because the judge disallowed one of his peremptory challenges and barred the third-party culprit evidence he sought to present. The court held that the judge's striking of the peremptory challenge did not amount to reversible error; the "substantial connecting links" doctrine, governing the admissibility of third-party culprit evidence at criminal trials, remained a reasonable evidentiary standard that was valid under the Federal Constitution; the trial court did not err in excluding the third-party culprit evidence at issue after weighing certain considerations and correctly deeming the proffered evidence inadmissible; certain hearsay statements contained within the excluded evidence were not admissible under the then-existing mental condition exception to the hearsay rule and did not preclude the jury from assessing the relevance of the victim's relationship with defendant in considering defendant's guilt; and there was no reason to set aside the verdicts or order a new trial under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

In a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, a question arose concerning the application of the Commonwealth's homestead protection statute, G.L.c. 188, section 1, to a beneficiary of a trust. Finding no controlling precedent in the court's decisions, the Bankruptcy Court judge certified the following question: "May the holder of a beneficial interest in a trust which holds title to real estate and attendant dwelling in which such beneficiary resides acquire an estate of homestead in said land and building under G.L.c. 188, section 1?" The court confined its answer to the 2004 version of the homestead statute and answered the certified question in the negative. The court rejected the debtor's claims and concluded that even though the debtor resided in the Lowell property and used it as her home, as the owner of a fifty percent beneficial interest in the trust that holds to the property but who did not direct or control the trustee, she could not validly claim a homestead exemption for the property under the 2004 act. View "Boyle v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of a class D substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, as a subsequent offense, G.L.c. 94c, section 32C(a) and (b). At issue was whether, in view of the enactment of G.L.C. 94C, section 32L, which decriminalized possession of one ounce or less of marijuana, a defendant could be criminally charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of G.L.c. 94C, section 32C(a). The court concluded that the passage of G.L.c. 94C, section 32L did not repeal the offense of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, G.L.c. 94C, section 32C(a), where the amount of marijuana possessed was one ounce or less. The court also determined that, while the sale of any amount of marijuana remained a criminal offense under G.L.c. 94C, section 32L, a prosecution under G.L.c. 94C(a), was not limited solely to situations where the "distribut[ion]" involved a sale. Accordingly, the court reversed the order allowing defendant's motion to dismiss and affirmed the allowance of defendant's motion to suppress. View "Commonwealth v. Keefner" on Justia Law

This appeal related to insurance claims settlement practices of a primary and an excess insurance carrier. The underlying lawsuit involved a tort action against, among others, the truck driver who rear ended plaintiff's car, causing her serious injuries. The court concluded that the damages plaintiff and her family (plaintiffs) were entitled to recover under G.L.c. 93A, section 9, on account of defendants' postjudgment violation of G.L.c. 93A, section 2 and G.L.c. 176D, section 3(9)(f), must be based on the underlying judgment in plaintiffs' tort action, and not the loss of use of the sum ultimately included in the excess insurer's late-tendered settlement offer months after the jury's verdicts. This conclusion made it unnecessary to determine whether the excess insurer's willful and knowing violation of the application statutes before the verdicts in the tort case caused injury to plaintiffs, because even if, as they argued, plaintiffs did establish the requisite causal link between the excess insurer's preverdict violations and injury and thereby were entitled to a multiple of the underlying tort judgment as damages, plaintiffs could not recover that amount twice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judge's determination that the primary insurer did not violate G.L.c. 93A and G.L.c. 176D, and was not liable to plaintiffs. View "Rhodes & others vs. AIG Domestic Claims Inc., & others." on Justia Law

Wayside, owner of a mobile home park in the town of Shirley, sought a special permit from the town's zoning board of appeals in order to expand its mobile home park, a lawfully nonconforming use, from 65 to 75 units. The board refused to grant the special permit, finding that Wayside had failed to establish that the expansion would not be substantially more detrimental to the neighborhood than the existing mobile home park. The court concluded that the expansion complied with the zoning bylaw at issue, which the court interpreted as imposing minimum lot size dimensions on the entire mobile home park and not on individual mobile homes, governed only by the board of health regulations. The court further agreed with the Land Court judge that there was no evidence that either the density within the mobile home park expansion or the modest increase in traffic would be detrimental to the surrounding neighborhood. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Land Court judge. View "Shirley Wayside Limited Partnership v. Board of Appeals of Shirley" on Justia Law