Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from his convictions of two counts of rape of a child under sixteen years of age and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person who has attained the age of fourteen years. Defendant contended, among other things, that certain statements admitted against him at trial were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The court concluded that defendant unambiguously invoked his right to counsel and that questioning should have ceased until counsel was made available. Therefore, the incriminating statements should not have been admitted at trial. In any event, defendant was entitled to relief because the Commonwealth did not satisfy its heavy burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's subsequent waiver of that right was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Because the court could not conclude that the erroneous admission of defendant's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a new trial was required. View "Commonwealth v. Hoyt, Sr" on Justia Law

After the report and the transcript of an inquest was filed in the Superior Court, and a grand jury returned an indictment charging Amy Bishop with the murder of her brother, Globe filed a motion in the Superior Court to inspect and copy the inquest report and the transcript of the inquest proceedings. Applying the court's new standard to the inquest report and transcript at issue in this case, the court held that the denial of the motion to impound must be vacated because, as to the transcript, the judge failed to recognize the effect of G.L.c. 38, section 10, and, as to the report, the judge rested on the principle in Kennedy v. Justice of the District Court of Dukes County that the court replaced with the rule that the report became a presumptively public document when the transcript became a presumptively public document. On remand, the judge will conduct further proceedings in accordance with this opinion, with the proviso that the inquest report and transcript shall continue to be impounded until at least ten calendar days after the issuance of the rescript. View "The Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., petitioner" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree by reason of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed. The court concluded that the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree based on extreme atrocity or cruelty. The court also held that no substantial likelihood of miscarriage occurred where the evidence did not warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on heat of passion induced by sudden combat. Because defendant received the benefit of an instruction to which he was not entitled, any errors in the instruction could not have prejudiced him. The court further held that the judge correctly excluded the evidence of the victim's prior violent conduct. Finally, the court concluded that there was no reason to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law

This was an action for judicial review of a final decision and order of the board suspending Stephen Chadwick's license to practice dentistry in Massachusetts. Because the court agreed that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgt. Ass'n applied to the disciplinary proceeding, the court concluded that, while the board could mandate compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., standards in dental practices and sanction dentists for professional misconduct after OSHA determined that a violation had occurred, the board could not interpret, apply, and enforce OSHA standards regarding workplace safety on its own record. The court further concluded that the preemptive effect of OSHA articulated in Gade also barred the board from sanctioning Chadwick based on conduct it found to be violative of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines and department regulations, where such action constituted the direct and substantial regulation of occupational safety and health issues for which Federal OSHA standards were in effect. The court further concluded that the board's one finding unrelated to a formal OSHA standard was supported by substantial evidence View "Chadwick v. Board of Registration in Dentistry" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of rape of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. On appeal, defendant challenged the admission of testimony concerning a "second complaint" made by the victim. The court concluded that, under the first complaint doctrine, the Commonwealth was not entitled to present evidence, either from the victim or her mother, pertaining to the victim's disclosure to her grandmother. However, the court further concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, the admission of such evidence did not constitute prejudicial error because it was properly admitted to rebut defendant's suggestion that the victim had fabricated her accusations against him. The court modified the scope of judicial review of decisions on the admissibility of testimony pursuant to the "first complaint" doctrine set forth in Commonwealth v. King and its progeny. Defendant also challenged the admission, under the doctrine of verbal completeness, of a prior consistent statement made by the victim during her grand jury testimony. The court concluded that all the components of the verbal completeness doctrine were met and defendant had not demonstrated that the judge abused her discretion when she admitted the additional portion of the victim's grand jury testimony. Therefore, there was no error. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Aviles" on Justia Law

Vernon S. Kellogg sought review of a memorandum and judgment of a single justice of the court affirming a decision and order of the Board of Registration in Medicine (board) that revoked Kellogg's license to practice medicine. Kellogg asserted that various aspects of the board's proceedings violated his Federal and State constitutional rights and that the requirement that he obtain malpractice insurance violated the contracts clause of art. I, section 10, of the United States Constitution, and that the board's regulatory authority violated the principle of the separation of powers articulated in art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Having reviewed the single justice's thorough memorandum and judgment in which he addressed each of Kellogg's claims of errors, the court was satisfied that there was nothing that warranted further consideration. Here, Kellogg failed to support his claims of error with sufficient legal argument or factual detail, and failed to cite to sufficient supporting authority. As both a legal and practical matter, Kellogg's submissions provided an insufficient basis for the court to reasonably consider his claims. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Kellogg v. Board of Registration in Medicine" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, resisting arrest, and operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license and subsequently convicted of being an armed career criminal. Defendant raised three issues on appeal. The court held that the Superior Court judge did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the firearm, ammunition, and marijuana seized from his vehicle where there was ample probable cause to permit a search of defendant's motor vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant. The court held, however, that defendant's convictions of unlawful possession of ammunition and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm were duplicative, and his separate sentences for each crime violated the double jeopardy clause because he was punished twice for possession of the same ammunition. This error gave rise to a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice and therefore, defendant's conviction and sentence on the lesser included offense of unlawful possession of ammunition was vacated. The court further held that the requirement of licensing before one could possess a firearm or ammunition did not by itself render the licensing statute unconstitutional on its face and therefore, defendant's challenge to the Commonwealth's statutory licensing scheme failed. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the conviction must be overturned because (1) closure of the court room during jury selection violated his constitutional right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment; (2) defendant improperly was precluded from presenting evidence of potential third-party culprits; (3) one of the Commonwealth's DNA experts offered improper testimony; (4) the Commonwealth failed to make timely disclosure of expert materials; (5) the prosecutor's closing argument was improper; and (6) trial counsel was ineffective. Defendant further argued that the motion judge erred in ruling on his motions for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court affirmed the conviction, the orders denying defendant's motion for a new trial and his supplemental motion for a new trial, and declined to grant relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Buckman" on Justia Law

After his conviction in 2005 of murder in the first degree and carrying a firearm without a license, and while his appeal to the court was pending, defendant filed a motion for a new trial and a motion for postconviction discovery relating to evidence not disclosed by the Commonwealth. The court remanded the motions to the Superior Court. After separate hearings on the motions, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for a new trial. The commonwealth appealed. The court affirmed the trial judge's order granting defendant a new trial and concluded that the judge did not abuse her discretion or commit any other error of law in granting defendant's motion. View "Commonwealth v. Murray" on Justia Law

Defendant filed an application in the county court under G.L.c. 278, section 33E for leave to appeal from the denial of his second motion for a new trial. A single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court on the question of whether a so-called Acevedo error in the jury instructions on the burden of proof on provocation presented a "new and substantial" question under the statute, and if it did, whether the error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The court concluded that defendant's claims were not new and substantial within the meaning of G.L.c. 278, section 33E. The court continued to adhere to the principle that single justices, whose decisions under section 33E were final and unreviewable, faced with gatekeeper applications under section 33E, would allow cases to proceed to the full court in all meaningful matters. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court where an order shall be entered denying defendant's application for leave of appeal. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson, Jr." on Justia Law